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Abstract 
Ed D Thesis: The Development of a Discourse of Ethics in Education 
This thesis, although drawing upon many different sources, chiefly draws its key, 
illuminating idea from the work of four people, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Karl Popper, 
Richard Rorty and Don Cupitt, all of whom exemplified, in one way or another, the 
view that in order to extend one's understanding it is first necessary to extend 
one's language. In other words, this thesis subscribes to the view that 'the limits of 
my language are the limits of my world' (Wittgenstein, 1993:56). Thus the task of this 
enquiry is to represent, by synthesis and extension, the kinds of language activity 
potentially capable of characterising a modern moral discourse. 
in the first instance, then, the thesis offers a commentary on the contemporary 
debate over the role of morality in education. The research is confined to a UK 
context and it draws its primary theoretical data from five different subject areas: 
Education, Psychology, Sociology, Theology and Philosophy. A secondary source 
of theoretical data is derived from an analysis of recent public documents from a 
range of organisations including the Schools Curriculum and Assessment Authority 
(SCAA). 
Second, the thesis thereafter offers a theoretically derived model of four distinctive 
value positions: Religion, Humanism, Utilitarianism and Kantianism. It is claimed 
that this provisional template is typical and largely representative of the mainstream 
data from above. 
Third, it is further claimed that these four value positions are representative of a 
common morality which can best be characterised as particular manifestations of 
language embedded in activity; or, to put it another way, as particular forms of 
language games: in this case games which perform the function of enabling value 
judgements to become enacted. 
Finally, a frame of reference for a common morality flows from the analysis 
composed of three constituent parts: (a) an obiective element designated as A 
Four Quadrants model and based on the above four value positions; (b) a 
subjective element designated as A Syntax of Four Voices to reflect the belief 
that to be moral is also to be subjective (reflection and deliberation are seen here 
as bedrock metaphysical properties); (o) a synthesis element designated as Six 
Moral Precepts which emerge from the exploration and yield a codification of 
moral maxims which cohere as such to be representative of a common morality. 
Michael P Collins September 1997 
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OVERVIEW 
This thesis is a theoretical contribution, based on rationalist principles rather than 
empirical ones, and is concerned with the issue of developing a vocabulary and 
conceptual framework in relation to morals in education. It is a strange paradox that 
what would appear to be the most common, public and accessible world - the world 
of Immediate experience ^nd values - should be the most private and inaccessible. 
Indeed a major contention of this research is that thus far no adequate 
underpinning language, nor meaningful conceptual framework yet exists in which 
to locate a moral discourse for teachers, managers and policymakers 
What follows, then, is a theoretical argument derived from the literature which 
provides a new synthesis and different way of understanding the concept of moral 
values than has hitherto been presented. The pattern of theory generation offered 
is not in terms of causal relationships and proofs but instead is in terms of 
serehdipitous explanation and description by heuristic illumination: 
The heuristic researcher' is not only intimately and autobiographically related to the 
question but learns to love the question. It becomes a kind of song into which the 
researcher breathes life...It creates a thirst to discover, to clarify, and to understand 
crucial diniensions of knowledge and experience (2). 
In 1930 Robert Musil identified the Zeitgeist of the twentieth century, 'We no longer 
see the moral norm as the immobility of rigid commandments, but as a mobile 
equilibrium continually demanding exertion towards its renewal'(3). And although I 
am confident that moral discourse has not reached the Orwellian adjectival 
nightmare of double-plus-good, it nevertheless remains a necessary condition of 
each moral community's existence to continually seek to renew and enrich our 
cultural and moral heritage. I hope that this paper may contribute to that end. 
CHAPTER 1: THE CURRENT MORAL CLIMATE IN SCHOOLS 
Introduction 
the aim of this chapter is twofold: Firstly, to identify the ideological tensions and 
contradictions inherent in the public domain discourse in education during the 
1980's and 1990's and second, to locate such ideologies within the context of 
explicit public values. But although within any culture and school system there 
resides an implicit idea of what constitutes values in education, when these 
assumptions are made explicit there is controversy, disagreement and alternative 
competing views. Of course many commentators had already identified these 
ideological tensions (see especially Ball, 1994; Bernstein, 1994; Grace, 1994; 
Hargreaves, 1994 and Tomlinson, 1993) but in terms of this analysis it is necessary 
to go beyond the descriptive ideological perspectives and begin to make explicit 
the underlying process of values. In this latter respect research evidence remains 
sparse, although certainly a small corpus of recent writers have pursued aspect of 
values in education (e.g.. Bloom, 1987; Bottery, 1993 and 1994; Fullan, 1992; 
Hodgkinson, 1983 and 1991; Sergiovanni, 1992; Tomlinson, 1995) (4). 
The purpose of this analysis, therefore, will be to try to encapsulate succinctly the 
educational process itself within a dynamic of what I shall henceforth refer to as a 
process dynamic of educational values in action. In other words this chapter will 
argue that there exists a complex arena of competing alternative public voices, all 
of which are constantly jostling for position and expression. Such a scenario in 
education is applicable at the following levels of interaction: National Curriculum 
classroom teaching; teacher training; LEA administration; policy formulation. In 
these terms then, the analysis will thus attempt to explicate more fully the range 
and type of secular and non-secular value positions expressed within the 
educational process itself. 
The Context 
A major difficulty when discussing values in education is to be certain in the first 
place about whose values are being represented. All theorists would accept that 
school education is inescapably involved with values both within and across the 
National Curriculum. Some of these implicit values are to do with curricular bias in 
particular subjects (such as English where the value of creativity and self-
expression may take precedence over grammar and syntax and vice versa where 
the former is pre-requisite to the latter), or where a preference for a particular 
pedagogical style predominates; while even other implicit values relate to 
institutional preferences (school uniform, disciplinary codes and what constitutes 
good behaviour, etc.) And by contrast, the value perspective of an LEA will differ 
from that of central Government. Nevertheless and in spite of these demonstrable 
differences as soon as one seeks specificity for a particular implicit value position 
the task becomes more difficult. 
The answers to such first order questions as: What should I do? and what moral 
principles should I adopt? remains the perennial quest for each "moral agent'. Yet 
in the absence of an explicit vocabulary and criteria of reference it is easy to see 
why so much dispute exists. Indeed the School Curriculum and Assessment 
Authority (SCAA:) recommends that each school "promotes an ethos which values 
imagination, inspiration, contemplation, and a clear understanding of right and 
wrong" (1996:10). Parallel to this a 1996 House of Lords committee, chaired by the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, debated a motion concerning "Society's Moral and 
Spiritual Well-being" and began with Cardinal Hume's premise: 
We are not engaged, surely, in producing just good performers in the market place 
or able technocrats. Our task is the training of good human beings, purposeful and 
wise, themselves with a vision of what it is to be human and the kind of society that 
makes that possible (Official Report No. 120,1996:1692). 
Probably few would quibble with the moral reasoning behind Cardinal Hume's 
task of "training good human beings". The Archbishop of Canterbury in summing 
up this debate emphasised agreement on three prerequisites for a moral society: 
First, we have called attention to the importance of nurturing young people to 
capture a vision of moral values as central to a responsible and caring society. 
Secondly, we have called attention to the centrality of our schools and affirmed 
the crucial role of our teachers. We want to encourage the initiative of SCAA. 
Thirdly we have called attention to the need for all sections of society - parents, 
the media, the entertainments industry - to exercise their responsibilities on 
behalf of us all {lbid:1776). 
It is, therefore, the major contention of this paper that a consensus is beginning to 
emerge for a societal engagement with issues of moral education and ethical 
teaching. The implications of this moral emergence require society to deepen its 
moral culture by developing and extending its moral language and ethical 
concepts. Novak (1995) underscores the urgency for such an agenda: 
Unless society deepens its moral culture it will die. As human lungs need air, so does 
liberty need virtue. As does this blue-green Planet ESrth, so has liberty its own 
ecology. The deepest and most vital struggles of the 21st century will be cultural 
arguments over the sorts of habits necessary to the preservation of liberty. What 
are the habits we must teach our young? Which are the habits we must encourage 
in ourselves, and which discourage? To allow liberty to survive - and more than that, 
to make it all worth all the blood and tears expended to achieve it - how do we need 
to live? (p. 21) 
The following section will explore and develop the argument for a moral vocabulary 
within the context of values in action, across and within the school curriculum. The 
thrust for such a quest towards greater clarity is the very point made by T.S. Elliot 
in his Four Quartets: 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time 
(1989:48) 
Values in Action 
Policy Formulation 
Since the time of the first Thatcher Government in 1979 the view that 'the right may 
engage in social engineering as freely as the left' (Tomlinson 1993:168) has 
framed unequivocally any analysis of discourse firmly within the context of an 
ideological power struggle over contested value assumptions - in other words as a 
battle of ideas; or to put it another way, as an example of values in action, jostling 
for position and expression. Certainly , as Ball (1994) claims, 'we now need to 
recognise and analyse the existence of dominant discburses' (p.24).That is a 
discourse position of neo-Conservatism, the new radical right has its faith in 'the 
majesty of the market' (Ball, lbid:144). The culmination of this was given with the 
emergence of the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) - an Act with many voices. 
Such legisiation fused the traditional conserving and consensual, neo liberal 
voices in the party with the voice of Thatcher's moral populism: 
The strength of the 1988 Act politically was its versatility. It could be presented in 
different ways to different audiences. Baker's line - his 'Great Education Reform', 
improving standards and bringing order, sometimes by central prescription, 
sometimes by enhanced parental choice - was the most consensual version, capable 
of appealing to a wide audience. A second, neo-liberal version (that the Act paved the 
way for a free market in education) kept the radicals in line after their increasing 
rebelliousness under Joseph. A third version was associated with the moralism and 
populism of Mrs. Thatcher herself and such campaigning agencies as the Daily Mail. 
Here the Act was presented asakey move in the moral, social and cultural 
regeneration - 'My New Crusade' - of the third term. It was a crucial item in the 
alliance with moral and religious orthodoxy, with 'responsible citizens' and with the 
principle of parental choice-and-responsibility (therefore 'the family') more generally, 
in this way some of the more difficult conflicts within the ruling bloc were deferred. In 
the meantime the many 'voices' of the Act helped to hold together and even expand 
a complex social alliance of a distinctive right-wing kind (Education Group, 1992:72). 
The Conservative Government's centralist tendencies towards greater 
accountability in education, particularly since ERA, have produced a significant 
demise in the nature of LEA control and a correspondingly stronger central role for 
government in educational policy (Ball, 1994; Chitty, 1992; Education Group, 1992; 
Grace, 1994; Hargreaves, 1994; Pring, 1995; Tomlinson, 1995). 
In these terms the creation of deregulated markets means that 'the market itself 
can be controlled and manipulated and used as a tool for social change' 
(Tomlinson, 1993:168). The question as to whether or not such a values in action 
process was the catalyst for the present moral malaise in society, which is 
discussed in chapter 4, requires a good deal more circumspection and reflection 
than is yet available. In the meantime, however, public sentiments such as 'society 
is the very nursery of civic virtue' had framed the value position of Thatcher's 
highly moralising speech to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 
May 1988 (5) and thereafter became the catalyst for renewed debate and analysis. 
Increasingly, Thatcher's strategy became more and more public, direct and 'straight 
for the jugular' and as such it located morality squarely within the public domain -
that is to say that public space in our social world where issues are open and 
amenable to debate, reflection moral argument and eventual change (6). Later 
analysts reinforced the arguments for a sound, core civic and moral education. Ball 
(1994) warns of the danger of 'the market crossing an important moral barrier 
and replacing one ethic with another' 
(p. 145), and Grace (1994), in arguing a case for 'education as a public good and 
that, this being so, it should be provided primarily by the State and without direct 
charge, to all citizens' (p. 34) advances an important social and ethical position. A 
position summarised as follows: 
In summary, my position is that education should be regarded as a public good 
because its free, universal and equal-acces? provision is fundamental to the 
generation of other public goods. It is essential for the effective operation of a 
democratic society and for the enhancement of civic intelligence and participation. It 
is a powerful source for the nurture of moral, social and community values and 
responsibilities and for introducing all children to moral and ethical concepts. It 
represents, through the schooling system, a democratically provided public 
service for the enhancement of the intellectual and creative potential of all 
citizens-in-the-making, with a formal commitment that this enhancement process 
should not be related to class, race or gender of the student or his ability to pay for it 
It is premised upon the social and public value of maximising the resources of talent in 
a population in which conditions establish a sense of fairness and equal opportunity 
for all in that process. If all of this is not a public good, then what can be? (p. 135). 
Here Grace argues persuasively the need for a discourse of civic virtue and social 
ethics in any debate concerning the values of education. Of course here the 
debate is framed, unequivocally, in moral and ethical terms, rather than narrow 
economic and technical ones. The legitimacy for such a philosophical stance is 
inherent in the principle that the function of thought is not merely to collect, 
comprehend and order facts, but also to contribute a quality that renders such 
activity possible, a quality Marcuse (1969) defines as 'a priori to facts' (p. 31). The 
alternative sees 'the ultimate authority of the fact' (ibid) as paramount and finds its 
expression in the technical and managerial rationality of the inputs and outputs of 
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league tables and other such performance variables. 
The logic of such managerial rationality is to assume that education is a 
commercial product and, correspondingly, that a free market model is the most 
appropriate mechanism for its delivery; but by contrast the extended logic of 
Grace's interpretation of education as 'a public good' (ibid) negates that argument 
on moral, civic virtue and ethical grounds. And while Grace argues that 'it is an 
important source for introducing all children to moral and ethical concepts' (Ibid), it 
can certainly be added that by defining alternatives and contesting arguments for 
free markets in education such discourse converts into an important source 
for introducing the free marketeers' fraternity to alternative concepts to do with 
moral and ethical concerns. 
This is a point of fundamental significance, for unless the most serious and rigorous 
conceptual alternatives are placed in the public arena for debate then the 
positivist's free market paradigm will prevail unchallenged. For it is not until well 
formulated alternatives are submitted to public scrutiny that change can begin. Or 
to put it another way: If I want something to mean something, then it can mean 
whatever I choose it to mean; but if I want other people to accept my meaning, then 
I must argue its case in the public domain. This is the essence of initiating change 
in values. For I cannot get inside other peoples' heads and nor can I get outside of 
my own consciousness; in this sense consciousness is perceptual and language 
mediates between me and others and me and objects (Merleau-Ponty, 1992; 
Rorty, 1991 ;and Deleuze, 1991). 
It is of course no more than a truism to claim that any theory has to be grounded in 
reflection; but how much time can that reflection take? There are in fact a number of 
important critiques whicli provide a detailed analysis of the chronological 
framework and gestation period for Thatcher's free market philosophy, 
which began well before she came to office in 1979 (see especially Ball, 1994; 
Chitty, 1992; Education Group, 1992; Grace, 1994; Hargreaves, 1994; Pring, 
1995; Tomlinson, 1993). But nevertheless, and conversely, it is also reasonable to 
assume that a certain period of time must lapse for emergent alternative 
theories to be sufficiently well formed to be capable of engagement with the 
discourse of the dominant New Right theories of the public arena - the social and 
personal domain. Thereafter, of course, it would then be theoretically possible to 
engage in well formulated intellectual debate and thus begin to contest and 
challenge the dominant paradigm of 'free market' economics in education. 
Following on from this line of reasoning, 'The Commission on Social Justice" 
(1994) published their report, Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal, 
which can be seen as a principled intellectual contribution from within the "broad 
church" of the Left wing establishment. And as the debate widens and deepens this 
contribution may well be regarded as an important forerunner in the quest to 
establish a new alternative agenda for society: 
The UK needs new direction. We need to be clear abouX our values, understand the 
forces shaping change, create our own vision of the future - and then set out to 
achieve it. Our fate is not determined; we can bridge the gap between the country we 
are and the country we would like to be (Ibid: p. 13) 
Further to this position, and very much in an incremental sense, a vision of 
community in terms of civic virtue and social ethics is further exemplified as an 
alternative discourse in the dominant public domain by the following recent media 
report: 
1 0 
There is now a new consensus around a market economy allied to a strong 
community (Finance Guardian, 1 April 1997). 
And allied to this (1995) articulates a destructive economic critique of 'free market' 
theory in public services by disputing the possibility that such a model could exist in 
anything but an idealised form. Mutton's assertion that 'successful enterprise is a 
social rather than an individual act' (p. 236) endorses the values of the civic and 
the social. It is 'the hegemonic machine of Conservative government' (p. 35) that 
Mutton seeks to challenge through his development of an economist's critique of 
the flaws in 'free market' theory. Indeed he sees it as indispensable that alternative 
arguments enter the public debate: 
People are most likely to accept that there is no alternative to New Right policies 
if the ideas and theories available to them make deregulated market institutions 
appear natural and inevitable (Ibid: 297) 
A Strong indication of this clear shift in favour of discourse exchange in the domain 
of civic virtue or social ethics is that Mutton's book struck a powerful public 
resonance in that it reached the top of the Sunday Times' hardback best seller list. 
As a book imbued with technical economic terms and national and international 
micro and macro economic comparisons, it is highly questionable that such a 
publishing phenomenon could have occurred - as this paper has argued - without 
the existence of the preceding cycle and synthesis of competing ideological 
struggles. The underlying logic of this phenomenon has enabled the collision of 
specific ideological stances and, incrementally, produced a debate on values 
which has thus entered the public domain of social and personal discourse. 
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This complex alliance of cultural and traditional conservcitism fused so successfully 
with the radical theories of the New Right neo-liberal marketeers, and expressed so 
powerfully in the 1988 Education Reform Act, is now only beginning to be tested at 
the ideological level. As the dominant paradigm becomes increasingly subjected to 
well formulated critical positions, in a climate where attitudes are now much more 
predisposed to encouraging and nurturing alternative views, if such a movement 
continues to enter the public discourse domain a change in the dominant paradigm 
will become inevitable. 
At the same time Grey (1993) a recognized exponent of traditional Consen/ative 
values is beginning to dissociate himself from new Right neo-liberal marketeers: 
One of the basic needs of human beings is membership in a community. Such 
membership will be stable if, and only if, the community is seen to be meeting 
basic human needs through the institution of the market, and, where these fail, 
through other institutions, such as the enabling welfare state (p. 122). 
Such a convergence of values as 'a community' and the 'enabling welfare state' is 
strongly indicative of the pendulum swinging in the opposite direction and towards 
the ideals of civic virtue and social ethics. 
But given the inevitable proliferation of competing values Pring (1995a) frames his 
analysis within an analogy of competing different conversations: 
These ideas are inherited, they are transmitted through the conversations which 
take place between the generations of mankind. And it is the job of education to 
get the next generation onto the inside of that conversation (p. 111). 
And, by extension, we become competent within and across the curriculum by 
1 2 
learning these different conversations. The analogy is fine as far as traditional 
curricula are concerned but because of the lack of a common moral vocabulary its 
rationale can not adequately accomodate the discourse of values. 
A further development of this theme is developed in Hargreaves (1994) where part 
of the solution is: 
to think of a plural society not of one in which there is a Babel of conflicting 
languages, but rather as one in which we each have to be bilingual. There is 
a first and public language of citizenship which we have to learn if we are to 
live together. And there is a variety of second languages which connect us to our 
local framework of relationships: to family and group and the traditions that 
underlie them (p.32). 
I am reminded of Wittgenstein's (1988) dictum, 'Philosophy aims at the logical 
clarification of thoughts' (p. 25) and without such an activity thoughts are destined 
to remain 'cloudy and indistinct' (Ibid); for it is in this sense that the constant 
expression and subsequent refinement of conversations must take place. Freedom 
of thought and free discussion require a readiness to listen and learn and in the 
Popperian sense a necessary pre-condition is a stance of critical openness: 
Truth is not manifest; and it is not easy to come by. The search for truth 
demands at least: 
(a) imagination 
(b) trial and error 
(c) the gradual discovery of our prejudices by way of (a) 
and (b) and of critical discussion (Popper 1992:157). 
In the Popperian sense. White (1994) provides a cogent demonstration of the 
inappropriateness of economic concepts to support arguments for a 'free market' 
system in education. Interestingly, White's examination of the key concept 
1 3 
"consumer" is placed within the discourse domain of market theory as it is being 
applied to education and scrutinised. Mis conclusion that pupils can only be 
regarded as consumers in the 'weaker sense' (acquirers of dispositions and 
knowledge but not able to choose what or why to study as they are insufficiently 
knowledgeable until after the event) and not in the 'stronger sense' 
(knowledgeable and able to make informed decisions) is persuasive. He then turns 
to establish the status of parents as consumers and argues that in a democracy as 
decisions arise from democratic values in the expression of 'civic decision-making' 
(p. 122), then citizens per se - which also includes parents - are consumers but 
with certain constraints. Me continues: 
In civic decision-making individuals make decisions not about their own 
flourishing but about the flourishing of a whole community and it is their collective 
reference, as expressed through democratic procedures, which is 
authoritative. The proper conclusion is that there is no room for the concept 
of consumer in decisions about aims and cun-icula. The consumer is not merely 
a decider, but a decider within a market, if the market is ruled out, there still can 
be deciders - i.e., citizens - but no longer room for consumers (p. 122). 
The logic of White's inference in relation to this 'free market' conundrum in 
education is compelling and offers a convincing critique against the use of 
economic concepts to advance and augment the arguments for a 'free market' 
model in education. 
Therefore, it is important to create the optimum conditions, if our culturally 
impoverished moral language is to grow, for the effective transaction between 
teacher and learner across the myriad of different school conversations: science 
and mathematics, history and geography, literature and philosophy, art and 
engineering, religion and drama. These different voices in the conversation must 
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engage with the meta-language of values, so that it should be possible, not only to 
articulate moral views more intelligibly and distinguish right from wrong, but also to 
be able to ultimately accept that often two "rights" pull in different directions. 
Vogt (1997) articulates a strong case in favour of 'tolerance as minimally 
necessary for civil society' (p. 43) and regards it as the cornerstone virtue for good 
educational practice: 
Schools have a profound influence on student's general orientation toward life in 
society. In particular, schools shape student's notions of right and wrong in public, 
impersonal encounters. Most important is the norm of procedural fairness, which 
is learned in schools through a kind of socialization and personality development. 
The lessons learned are needed if one is to live in a society in whrch the people 
with whom one interacts may have interests and values quite different from one's 
own. It does not take children long to learn the norm of procedural fairness for all 
persons who fall into the same category. A child usually resorts to it in the first 
instance to make certain that he or she is treated fairiy. Students learn quickly to 
keep a sharp eye on teachers for signs of favoritism and inequality of treatment. 
The concept of equal rights is a natural extension of this vigilance. A school can 
hardly function without it, nor can a modern diverse society. The principle of equal 
rights leads inevitably, at least on some occaisons, to forbearance, to putting up 
with others who are different from oneself. Schools and societies may get by 
without ecumenical, multicultural values, but functional tolerance, or mutual 
forbearance,is an indispensable minimum (p.113). 
Certainly formative experience has to be shaped by language within the remit of 
the school arena and beyond and in these terms the teaching of tolerance is an 
important first aim. 
Following on from such an endeavour, and if moral reasoning was located within 
the school arena, then the creative moral impulse could be duly nurtured. From this 
perspective Wittgenstein's (1993) dictum 'The limits of my language mean the limits 
of my world' (p.56) becomes central. For it is only by extending our language and 
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its concepts that we can begin to extend our understanding and although we can 
distinguish between certain forms of right and wrong, it is only through the 
development of a moral vocabulary that we can begin to exercise truly moral 
discernment. 
Peters , writing in 1966, refers to this educational process in the following terms: 
Such feelings are inseparable from the view one has of people as sons or brothers, 
as colleagues or competitors. In general respect for persons is the feeling awakened 
when another is regarded as a distinctive centre of consciousness, with peculiar 
feelings and purposes that criss cross his institutional roles....To respect a person is 
to realize all of this and to care. In the teaching situation this general respect for 
persons is overlaid with the awareness that one is confronted with developing 
centres of consciousness (1979:.59). 
And although school education has changed many of its constituent labels since 
then, Peter's sentiment still resonates sharply. For if school is really to be 
concerned with laying the foundations for the inculcation and development of such 
centres of consciousness, then it seems only sensible that a modicum of 
conceptual clarity be established. 
By this reckoning we need a set of symbols to guide our beliefs and behaviour in 
our schools and to assist in the development and reinforcement of individual and 
collective responsibilities. For, as Skeen (1980) puts it 'unless we already have 
some notion of what is morally acceptable we will be powerless to accept or reject 
any person, book, or institution as a moral authority' (p. 15). At a minimal and 
foundational level Vogt's (1997) 'functional tolerance', which presupposes self-
respect and respect for others, has to be a good starting point for establishing a 
sound institutional value system within our schools 
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Tomlinson's (1995) appraisal draws a similar set of conclusions: 
If Britain is taken as an example, somewhere in the 1950's and 1960's we shed strong 
forces of conformity and deference which had provided a social structure: class, 
religion, 'respect for one's betters', unwritten codes and and respect for strong 
normative institutions such as the monarch, parliament and the BBC created in the 
mould of Lord Reith. In their place we have created a society in which different 
religions and creeds - from the most authoritarian to the most nihilistic - and different 
life-styles, are deemed equally valid and worthy of respect in the public forum. Late 
nineteenth-century liberalism created a society in which there was a great deal of of 
personal freedom (for those with resources to exercise it) set in strong and inflexible 
social structures. We, in our generation, have chosen to bring these personal 
freedoms into the public domain, and most of the social structure gas dissolved 
(p.310). 
He continues: 
Let me review the argument so far. In the 1950s and '60s all three pillars of the 
curriculum, knowledge, knower and social context, became problematic. And while 
we were learning to cope with that two heavier blows fell: all knowledge and morality 
were declared relative and the government enshrined the selfish self as the basis for 
civil society'. How could schools - how could teachers - any longer hope to create a 
moral community in which the world of the mind was worthy of respect and that 
respect the impetus to learning? (pp. 310-311). 
Conclusion 
This then is the current educational context whereby a 'values in action' dynamic 
activates much at the political and ideological level where the prevailing hegemony 
of the 'markets-in-education' paradigm still prevails. Certainly oppositional value 
critiques are increasingly being successfully pushed in the public domain. But 
precisely because such critiques are frequently politically and professional 
polarised (i.e., in terms of the left or the right or in terms of the philosophical/-
psychological/sociological/theological and in a limited sense the educational) 
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there remains a demonstrable need to go deeper and put on a fresh pair of 
metaphorical glasses. 
This is not dogmatic and revolutionary in the sense that any particular ideology is 
being challenged in the Foucaultian sense whereby ' it is not like a pair of glasses; 
it is rather like a pair of Guns; it does not enable one to see better but to fight better' 
(cited in Merquior 1985:85). On the contrary, rather the allusion is more in the 
sense in which Wittgenstein (1994) applies the same metaphor: 
The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakeable. You can never get outside; outside 
you cannot breathe.--Where does this come from? It is like a pair of glasses on 
our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to 
take them off (p.45). 
A new pair of metaphorical glasses will be worn for the creative and interpretative 
process of generating new theory from old data, through a constructivist version of 
grounded theory. Thus a fourfold process begins to emerge: (1) the acquisition 
of the meta-language, (2) the development and synthesis of a new vocabulary 
and syntax, (3) the establishment of basic terms of reference with wide applicability 
and (4) the emergence of a discourse model for the educational practitioner. In 
these terms it may be possible for the various conversations of differing voices to 
articulate a consciousness of value itself. For not until you begin to change the 
language - the social space between people - is it possible to begin to change the 
reality. It is the contention of this reasoning that such a process is ripe for 
development; provided, of course, that 'the rhyme must never dictate the meaning' 
(Voltaire, 1989:103). 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
Following Armstrong (1993) the perspectives and methodology of the research 
design necessarily Involve the incorporation of four interrelated areas: (1) the 
philosophical framework, (2) the theoretical perspective, (3) the methodological 
and (4) the practical. 
In relation to (1) paradigmatic considerations are paramount, particularly so in 
terms of epistemological questions about the status of knowledge and of the 
knower. In regard to (2) the theoretical perspective is crucial in distinguishing 
between facts and values, as facts become meaningful as such only within the 
context of a particular theory. In terms of (3) the methodological determinants of this 
thesis are largely drawn from theoretical sources - in this respect Bevan (1991) 
makes the following assertion: 
What is clear is the need to begin the research enterprise by asking an essential 
question and then asking what you must do to convince yourself and others of 
the valklity of the ideas supporting it (cited in Rudestam & Newton, 1992:41). 
The essential question asked was: What are the guiding principles of morality and 
how best can we as educators express that morality? By virtue of the fact that 
language itself is a moral medium, the instruments of illumination need to be 
clearly demarcated as only clearness and exactness of concept will suffice. And in 
the sense that Armstrong (1993) defines 'research methodology as part of the 
scaffolding for constructing meaning' (p.92), so too will this methodology provide a 
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scaffolding for a common morality consisting of an emergent theory with its key 
underlying concepts. In the context of the final area (4) the practical, it is important 
to acknowledge the role of serendipity in the research process - here serendipity is 
defined as 'the interactive outcome of unique and contingent "mixes" of insight 
coupled with chance' (Fine and Deegan, 1996:434). 
The intention of this chapter is to explore the research issues pertaining to these 
four interrelated areas. 
The Philosophical: the Paradigm Context 
How one approaches research is determined by the choice of paradigm and 'our 
actions in the world, including actions that we take as inquirers [researchers] 
cannot occur without reference to those paradigms' (Lincoln & Guba, 1990:15). In 
order to understand and apply research methods it is essential that we are aware 
of the assumptions that are being made about both the nature of human beings 
and how we learn, as well as the methods used to gather, analyse and interpret 
our data. 
Kuhn (1970) defines paradigms as : 
some accepted examples of actual scientific practice...[that] provide models from 
which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research...The study of 
paradigms...is what prepares the student for membership in that particular scientific 
community with which he will later practice. Because he there joins men who learned 
the bases of their field from the same concrete models, his subsequent practice will 
seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals. Men whose research is based 
on shared paradigms are comitted to the same rules and standards for scientific 
practice (pp. 10-11). 
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And with regard to the general issue of paradigms, he distinguishes between the 
paradigm of 'normal science' and the paradigm of 'revolutionary science'. Here the 
assumption is that the predominance of any given paradigm is merely the 
orthodoxy of the prevailing 'normal science' which in Kuhnian terms is, 'an 
attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the 
paradigm supplies' (p. 24). Kuhn continues by suggesting that such selectivity is 
essential, 'No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of 
phenomenon; indeed those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all' 
(lbid:24). In these terms the scientific process appears inclusive and convergent 
and as such appears contrary to the Popperian view of normal science (7). 
Indeed for Popper (1994) science is 'the method of bold conjectures and ingenious 
and severe attempts to refute them' (p.81). The claim is that a good theory is not 
one which explains everything that can possibly happen; on the contrary, it rules 
out most of what coyld possibly happen and is therefore ruled out itself if what it 
rules out happens. In this sense a theory must be permanently placed at risk, as 
Falsifiability is the criterion of demarcation between its status as science and non-
science. The crucial point is that if all possible state of affairs fit in with a theory 
then no actual state of affairs can be claimed as supporting evidence for it, for there 
can be no observable difference between it being true and it being false. 
Following on from this line of reasoning, 'although we cannot justify our theories 
rationally and cannot even prove that they are probable, we can criticise them 
rationally. And we can distinguish better from worse theories' (Ibid). Here Popper 
draws a useful parallel between 'the method of the social sciences, which like 
that of the natural sciences, consists in trying out tentative solutions to those 
problems from which our investigations start' (p.66) (8). 
21 
And although it is often asumed that there is a conflict between Popper's portrayal 
of scientific method and Kuhn's account of scientific paradigms (Lakatos and 
Musgrave, 1970) in reality the conflict is more imagined than real. For Kuhn's 
purpose is to show how historically one paradigm is overthrown in favour of 
another paradigm, whereas Popper's purpose concerns the logic and rationality of 
the scientific method itself o). 
Certainly the discussion thus far has been unequivocally framed within a 
qualitative 'interpretist' tradition of data analysis. The distinction here is between an 
interpretist explanation and its more orthodox 'positivist' counterpart. Indeed the 
principal manner in which positivist science constructs its version of social reality is 
by drawing a distinction between identifiable acts, structures and institutions, such 
as 'brute facts' or 'brute data' on the one hand, and beliefs, values and attitudes, 
reasons, etc., on the other. (Lakatos and Musgrave , 1970; and Hughes, 1993). 
However, in these terms the natural sciences can be seen as largely 
quantitatively-driven and the social sciences as largely qualitatively-driven; the 
former using a so-called objective methodology with less possibility of human 
contamination, and the latter requiring the direct interaction of a human being in the 
research methodology (see for example, Hughes, 1993; Cohen and Mannion, 
1994; Hammersley (Ed), 1993; Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). Nevertheless, in 
education there is a strong emphasis on "the human as instrument' (Maykut and 
Morehouse 1994:46). A position which is strongly endorsed by Polyani (1967) who 
defends this point of view as a legitimate form of knowledge and characterises it as 
follows: 
Tacit knowing now appears as an act of indwelling by which we gain access to new 
meaning. When exercising a skill we literally dwell in the innumerable muscular acts 
22 
which contribute to its purpose,a purpose which constitutes their joint meaning (p31) 
Polanyi's point is that if we believe that reliable knowledge must always be clear 
and explicit and testable by experiment, then we cannot know anything about such 
intangibles as beauty, justice, goodness, compassion, decency and fairness. Thus: 
Indwelling involves a tacit reliance on our awareness of particulars not under 
observation, many of them unspecifiable. We have to interiorise these, and, in doing 
so, must change our mental existence. There is nothing definite to which we can hold 
fast in such an act. It is a free commitment. But there is something imponderable for 
us to rely on. We have around us great truths embodied in works born of the very 
freedom which we are hesitating to enter. And recent history has taught us that we 
can breathe only in the ambience of these truths and of this creative freedom. I, for 
one, am prepared to rely on this assurance for acquiring and upholding knowledge by 
embracing the worid and dwelling in it (cited in Scott, 1996:112) (10) 
Such a perspective sees moral traditions as built up, preserved and upheld by a 
rational moral community while, at the same time, capable of being modified by the 
new moral insights of fresh moral communities. By such a reckoning it is difficult to 
disagree with Eisner's (1993) observation: 
I believe we are better served by recognising that whatever it is we think we know is a 
function of a transaction between the qualities of the world we cannot know in their 
pure, non-mediated form, and the frames of reference, personal skills and individual 
histories we bring to them (p.53). 
Indeed the conceptual model which has arisen from the research has been 
specifically drawn from a disparate range of literature spanning sociology, 
psychology, philosophy and theology, as well as education, in an attempt to 
synthesise otherwise incommensurable positions which are in Polanyi's sense 
'imponderable great truths' (op cit). 
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By pulling together these disparate strands a model has emerged which seeks to 
represent a kind of 'common morality'. Moreover, the model can be likenecl to 
Eisner's 'frames of reference' in the objective sense as a body of explicit publicly 
accessible knowledge intended to typify strategic reference points in current moral 
discourse. That is to say, what emerges is explicitly verifiable and falsifiable 
knowledge positions which are amenable to public scrutiny and mutually self-
correcting critical openness (Popper 1992). 
In summary the method of qualitative inquiry here adopted is firmly located in the 
interpretist paradigm which regards the "human-as-instrument within a posture of 
indwelling". The process is descriptive and reflective rather than calculative and in 
Maykut and Morehouse's (1994) terms is based on 'a posture toward knowledge 
which is inclusive and indwelling rather than exclusive and distancing' (p.39). The 
process is a kind of 'reflective research' which blends the principles of heuristic 
research with those of naturalistic research and is described by Mowry (1992) in 
the following terms: 
A reflective approach aims to understand, rather than explain (the determination 
of cause and effetet), control or predict. Instead of universais, statistical analyses, 
and growth charts, the reflective approach seeks to understand in order to gain 
insight into the multiple relationships and subjective factors which people use to 
make sense of their lives (p.58). 
The Theoretical Perspective 
The research procedure grew out of an increasing interest in the application of 
qualitative research methods to research in education. In particular I was attracted 
and excited by Strauss' (1987) version of a 'grounded theory' conceptual 
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framework whereby theory must grow out of and be grounded in the data studied. I 
was no less excited by Moustakas' (1990 and 1994) heuristic research methods 
where the role of the researcher as a uniquely "human instrument" is always 
fundamental to the inquiry. Moustakas' concluding comments on his own 
reasoning for applying heuristic research methods, although lengthy, encapsulate 
superbly my own reasons for following suit: 
As I come to a closing place in this reflective and meditative journey 1 am alive with 
images and ideas, struck with the wonder of passionately discovering the only way 1 
can truly come to know things...and to immerse myself completely in what is there 
before me, look, see, listen, hear, touch, from many angles and perspectives and 
vantage points, each time freshly so that there will be continual openings and 
learnings that will connect with each other and with prior perceptions, understandings 
and future possibilities. In other words, I must immerse myself totally and completely in 
my world, take what is offered without bias or prejudgment. I must pause and consider 
what my own life is and means, in conscious awareness, in thought, in reflections. 1 
enter into my own conscious reflections and meditations, open and extend my 
perceptions of life and reach deeper meanings and essences. This connectedness 
between what is out there, in its appearance and reality, and what is within me in 
reflective thought and awareness, is in truth a wondrous gift of being human (p.65). 
Methodological Context 
Methodologically, the design of the research framework is located within the 
parameters of Glaser and Strauss' (1967) concept of 'grounded theory which 
consist of the following highly interrelated properties: 
1. FITNESS, 2. UNDERSTANDING, 3. GENERALITY, 4. CONTROL 
i . The theory must closely fit the substantive area in which it is to be 
used. 
2 It must readily be understandable by laymen concerned with the area 
3 It must be sufficiently general to be applicable to a multitude of 
diverse daily situations within the substantive area, not to just a 
specific type of situation 
4 It must allow the user partial control over the structure and process of 
daily situations as they change through time (p.23). 
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Such a process is a highly creative and interpretative process of generating new 
theory from old data. In grounded research the theory is generated during the 
research process and from the data being collected (Moustakas, 1994). In Strauss' 
(1987) 'constructivist' version of grounded theory 'the researcher puts down 
theoretical questions, hypotheses, summary of codes, tracking and coding results 
and stimulating further coding, and also as a major means for integrating theory' 
(p.22). The aim is, of course, to construct an integrated theory. In this respect the 
theory is inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents. 
Strauss (1987) summarises this process as follows: 
The grounded theory of analysis...involves a grounding in data. Scientific 
theories require first of all that they be conceived, then elaborated, then checked 
out. The aspects of inquiry are induction, deduction and verification. Consider 
induction first: Where do the insights, hunches, generative questions come 
from? Answer: They come from experience...from actual exploratory research 
into the phenomenon, or from a previous research programme, or from 
theoretical sensitivity, derived from the knowledge of the technical literature. As 
for deduction: Success at it rests on the ability to think logically and with 
experience about the particular data under scrutiny. And verification: It involves 
knowledge about sites, events, actions, actors, also procedures and techniques 
(and learned skills in thinking about them) (pp. 12-13). 
Following on from the subsequent data derived frdm the 'constructivist grounded 
theory' framework - which in this case involved a theoretical review of research 
literature from fiye different academic disciplines - the emergence of a conceptual 
model and its emergent theory of a common morality was the initial consequence 
of the data analysis. 
The next and concurrent stage was to apply heuristic methods and procedures to 
the process of illuminating and evaluating of the model, which Moustakas (1990) 
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categorises as an experience wliereby: 
I begin the heuristic investigation with my own self-awareness and explicate that 
awareness with reference to a question or a problem until an essential insight is 
achieved, one which will throw a beginning light on to a critical human 
experience...Emphasis on the investigator's internal frame of reference, self-
searching, intuition, and indwelling lies at the heart of heuristic inquiry (pp. 11-12). 
IVIoustakas (1994) puts it tliis way In relation to the task of Illuminating research 
questions: 
this requires passionate, disciplined commitment to remain with a question 
intensely and continuously until it is illuminated or answered (p. 18) 
Moustakas (1990) describes the basic design as follows: 
Six phases of heuristic research guide unfolding investigations and comprise the 
basic research design. They include: the initial engagement, immersion into the 
topic and question, incubation, illumination, explication, and culmination of the 
research in a creative synthesis (p.27). 
The root meaning of 'Heuristic' is derived from the Greek word heuriskein and is 
defined by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1987) as a process of internal 
search 'applied to a system of education under which the pupil is trained to find out 
things for himself (p.959). For Moustakas this rneans ' a process of Internal search 
through which one discovers the nature and meaning of experience and develops 
methods and procedures for further investigation and analysis. 
Later, Moustakas (1994) emphasises that the underlying mechanisms arises when 
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'the question grows out of an Intense interest In a particular problem or topic and 
where the researcher's excitement and curiosity inspire the research' (p. 140). He 
continues: 
As the fullness of the topic emerges, strands and tangents of it may complicate an 
articulation of a manageable and specific question. Yet this process of permitting 
aspects of the topic to enter into awareness is essential in the formulation of a core 
question that will remain viable and alive throughout the investigation. A human 
science research question has definite characteristics: 
1. It seeks to reveal more fully the essences and meanings of human ex-
perience; 
2. it seeks to uncover the qualitative, rather than the quantitative factors in 
behavior and experience; 
3. It engages the total self of the research participant, and sustains personal 
and passionate involvement; 
4. It does not seek to predict or to determine causal relationships; 
5. It is illuminated through careful, comprehensive descriptions, vivid and 
accurate renderings of the experience, rather than measurements, ratings 
or scores (p. 105). 
Indeed adaptation and modification of the theory will occur during such an 
undertaking; for as Strauss (1987) puts it 'the procedures for discovering, verifying, 
and formulating grounded theory... are in operation all through the research project 
and...go on In close relationship to each other, in quick sequence and often 
simultaneously' (pp.23-24). 
But whereas much of social behaviour Is manifestly rule-governed (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966), this does not necessarily Imply the position stated by Cohen and 
Manion (1994) that such educational data 'should be investigated by the methods 
of natural science' (p.36). On the contrary, this qualitative research will not test in 
the posltlvist, scientific sense but instead will test within the more open and 
exploratory context of an 'Interpretist' paradigm of qualitative and heuristic 
explanation. In accordance with the above qualitative research assumptions, 
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therefore, the principal objective of the research will be to propose a model and 
illuminate, evaluate and refine it in accordance with Moustakas' (1990) six phases 
of heuristic research, while at the same time drawing on Strauss (1987) insights on 
grounded theory. 
The Serendipity Pattern 
Armstrong (1993) draws on the observations of Burgess (1984 and 1992) in 
relation to 'the importance of evaluating the processes involved in the analysis of 
data and the writing of research reports" (p. 106). The point is particularly targeted at 
qualitative researchers who: 
although generally good at providing detailed accounts of their data procedures, are 
rarely explicit about the procedures they use to analyze this data (Burgess, 1992). 
Analytic induction and grounded theory are sometimes invoked but: 
there are few accounts of the way in which these processes actually 
occur as opposed to the way they are supposed to°occur. 
(Cited in Armstrong, 1993:106). 
Following on from this Merton's (1968) study, the first influential attempt to apply 
the concept of serendipity to social science research (Fine and Deegan, 1996), 
addresses the very same issue: 
There is a rich corpus of literature on how social scientists ought to feel and act, but 
little detail on what they actually do, think and feel 
(cited in Fine and Deegan, 1996:438) 
In speaking about the serendipity pattern whereby unexpected data provide the 
spark for the creation of theoretical analysis, Fine and Deegan offer a trio of 
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analytically distinct components of research: temporal serendipity - happening 
upon a dramatic instance; serendipity relations - the unplanned building of social 
relations; and analytic serendipity - discovering concepts or theories that produce 
compelling claims (Fine and Deegan, 1996). 
In these terms, although the research exercise has largely drawn its data from 
theoretical sources, the serendipity pattern has nevertheless provided a kind of 
grid - a working template - in which new data can be incorporated creating a 
template for the development of a new emergent theory of moral discourse. Fine 
and Deegan's (1996) summation of the process captures precisely these qualities: 
Serendipity involves planned insight coupled with unplanned events which are core 
to the philosophy of qualitative research. By recognizing the centrality of 
serendipitous findings and events in qualitative research we come closer to 
understanding how research products are created and appreciated in practice. In a 
methodology that so values insight, the thin line between bhiliance and nothingness 
is both a powerful image and vast chasm: our fear and our salvation. When a 
researcher prepares to enter a field setting: the worry exists that nothing interesting 
will be discovered. Such fear,, however, fails to reckon with the intellectual 
preparedness necessary to to make sense of the power of an ongoing social reality 
(p.445). 
Data Sources 
In relation to the issue of data sources in social science research Cooper's (1984) 
observation is important: 
The question of which and how many sources of information to use has no general 
answer. The appropriate sources will be a function partly of the topic under 
consideration and partly of the resources of the reviewer. As a rule, however, I 
suggest that researchers should always employ multiple channels so that the 
chances of a strong unidentified bias distinguishing included from unincluded is small 
(p.57). 
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In this piece of research a triangulatlon of three different sources of theoretical 
data are used. 
First of all, an Initial twelve months literature search, which included extensive 
access to ERIC and International ERIC computer data bases, took place across 
five overlapping key disciplines: Sociology, Psychology, Philosophy, Theology, 
and Education. The first four disciplines were selected because of their explicit 
Immersion in moral and ethical issues. The intention waste identify common 
moral/ethical concepts, language and theories which would be able to provide a 
sufficiently general but consistent framework for educational practitioners. Having 
synthesised the outcome of the literature review, a common morality was then 
exhibited and its key explicit precepts ascertained and an emergent theory 
resulted. 
In the first place, and as far as theory is concerned, the issue of morality in 
education has recently resurfaced as a key public concern. And although it is 
certainly true that there is no single source of authority which legitimates the values 
we hold in common, this is necessarily very different from the assumption that 
there Is no common morality. In this context, a handful of public bodies have been 
very active in seeking consensus on what more precisely those particular values 
are. The result of such activities has produced a range of consultation 
documents and reports (these are National Forum for Values In Education and the 
Community (NFVE),1996 and 1997; Schools Curriculum and Assessment Authority 
(SCAA) Discussion Papers, 1996 and 1997; House of Lords report: Society's Moral 
and Spiritual Well-being, 1996; The Common Good in Education by the Catholic 
Church, 1977). 
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Thus, the major source of data is a sampling of literature drawn from established 
academic disciplines; whereas the literature drawn from public body discussion 
documents, although hardly grounded in the same academic rigour as the 
orthodox literature sampling, represents the current, untested state of play with 
regard to opinion and concern across a range of the public bodies relevant to 
education. In other words, the former data source provides the content from which 
the emergent theory was drawn while the latter data source provides the context. 
In terms of the theoretical review of the literature a threefold distinction emerged: 
(1) a review of literature in relation to education specifically which was largely 
undertaken in Chapter 1; (2) a review of recent public body discussion 
documents in relation to morality in education, undertaken in Chapter 3 ; and (3) a 
review of literature across Sociology, Psychology, Philosophy and Christian 
Theology, undertaken in Chapter 4. 
The combination of the above three theoretical data sources produced a fruitful 
interplay and combination of different ideas and resulted in a model with its 
emergent theory which is the subject of Chapter 5. This ensuing model consists of 
(a) a set of external publicly accessible reference points - the Four Quadrants - (b) 
a set of internal publicly verifiable reference points - a Syntax of 4 Voices - and (c) 
a common morality - Six Moral Precepts. 
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CHAPTER 3 : The Operational Context: The Current Debate 
The Educational Context 
It is generally accepted that Philosophy has seen two main revolutions this century 
- the one analytical and the other more humanistic (Honderich, 1995). In the first 
place, the analytical tradition was in two forms: the positivism of the scientifically 
and mathematically orientated Vienna Circle of the 1920s and 1930s, largely 
inspired by Wittgenstein; and ordinary language philosophy stemming from 
Wittgenstein, Austin and Wisdom. The second revolution in philosophy was in 
marked contrast and at odds with the logical and epistemological preoccupations 
of the analytical tradition and instead focused on moral, political and social issues 
and is characterised by Sartre, Heidegger, Popper and Rorty. 
Following on from this, the analytical tradition of repudiating metaphysics and 
confining the function of philosophy to clarification and analysis was parallelled by 
a new concept of the function of the philosophy of education: 'to lay bare the 
issues; to expose the premises implicit in the reasoning of the contributory 
disciplines' (Almond 1989:57). At the same time and complementary to this position 
the widely acknowledged leader of the liberal educational establishment - R.S. 
Peters published his influential text 'Ethics and Education'. This seminal work, first 
published in 1966, laid down a blueprint for the philosophy of education that 
largely determined the path that has been followed since. The issues identified 
were: 
1. the analysis of educational concepts, 
2. the application of ethics and social philosophy to education, 
3. problems in philosophical psychology, particularly the critique of 
psychologists' assumptions, and 
4. the examination of the logical and epistemological basis of the 
curriculum (1979:pp18-19). 
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In relation to 2. above, education is seen as an initiation into various 'worthwhile 
activities' (p.59) which are largely of an intellectual and aesthetic sort to be 
pursued for their own sake 'in developing centres of consciousness' (p.59). A 
justification of worthwhile activities as 'ultimate moral principles' is rightly regarded 
as 'a precondition of a 'democratic' system of government' (p.302).The assertion 
that 'there are moral principles such as fairness, liberty and the consideration of 
people's interests as well as valuations about what people's interests are' (p. 113) 
is a well argued position. But perhaps even more persuasively argued is its 
corollary position: 
The controversies are largely about the application of these principles and valuations 
to a concrete situation. Questions are seldom raised About the justification of the 
principles themselves. (p.113). 
Nevertheless, and although the underlying principle of this ethical framework is 
firmly rooted in the Kantian tradition whereby all children 'should be initiated into 
traditions in which the fundamental principles of reason are implicit (p.314), Peters 
certainly favours an ethical framework of Kantian rationalism and Mill's 
Utilitarianism: 
Like Kant's rational being they would have respect for law, which would be tinged with 
the consciousness that the law, demarcating what was desirable, had been arrived at 
by their own active deliberation and would only be implemented by their corporate 
striving and the Utilitarian notion of the importance of their individual self-interest 
(pp.215-216). 
Of course there will always be considerable latitude for disagreement about values, 
in education as elsewhere, but the ultimate basis of any values, if it is not to be 
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metaphysical, religious, or transcendental can only be choice. The recognition of 
this observation necessarily entails an enriching of the range of choices in order to 
identify and align shared common values. 
Peters' contribution in this regard can be seen as an important precursor to the 
current educational debate whereby the moral basis of teaching itself may soon 
become codified. In this respect, the 'Universities Council for the Education of 
Teachers' (UCET) has drawn up the following list of eleven guiding principles: 
1. Intellectual integrity: teachers should have a respect for truth, the canon of 
knowledge and the importance of evidence, and should cultivate a "lively 
scepticism". 
2. Vocational integrity: involves the duty to keep up to date with subject and 
professional knowledge and to develop new skills 
3. Moral courage: teachers should show independence of mind and action and 
be prepared to teach subject matter or use methods that are officially frowned 
upon "if intellectual or vocational integrity so demand". 
4. Exercise altruism: pupils' interests must come first, teachers should respect 
pupils' individuality. 
5. Exercise impartiality: teachers must avoid favouring one individual or group. 
6. Exercise human insight: teachers should be sensitive to the diverse social 
background of their pupils, ensure equality of opportunity and avoid stereo-
typing. 
7. Assume the responsibility of influence: teachers should be aware that they 
can have a powerful impact on their pupils' lives. 
8. Exercise humility: teachers must be willing to acknowledge that they are 
fallible, and remember that "their most significant measure of success is a 
pupil who can learn without their aid". 
9. Exercise colleqiality: respect and work co-operatively with colleagues, be pre-
pared to learn from others and accept that disciplines have common as well as 
separate concerns. 
10. Exercise partnership: recognise and make use of pupil's talents and the 
talents of their families and associates. 
11. Exercise vigilance with regard to professional responsibilities and aspirations: 
be willing to promote the profession by commenting publicly on education 
policy (cited in the Times Educational Supplement, 16 May 1997:12). 
There is probably as much to commend such a list as there is to criticise it, but the 
really central question is: how such a list of moral precepts could be drawn 
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up in the first place? The mere fact that such a set of values, however tentative, 
now exist within the public domain of competing discourse positions is very 
significant and by itself worthy of further examination. Although here, it is perhaps 
sufficient to point out that without the existence of the preceding cycle and 
synthesis of competing ideological struggles this new orientation towards moral 
concerns in education could not have occurred at all. 
Tliree Discourse Domains 
Indeed the call for a new social agenda about values had already gained a fresh 
urgency with the recent publication of 'The Commission on Social Justice' (1994) 
report. A report which laid important foundations for the eventual emergence of a 
new Labour administration: 
The UK needs new directbn. We need to be clear about our values, under-
stand the forces shaping change, create our own vision of the future - and 
then set out to achieve it. Our fate is not determined; we can bridge the gap 
between the country we are and the country we would like to be (Ibid: p. 13) 
Similarly, and as already noted. Mutton's (1995) economic critique of free market' 
economics in public services can be said to have captured the Zeitgeist of the 
people by reaching the top of the Sunday Times' hardback best seller list. Indeed, 
as a book imbued with technical economic terms, it is highly questionable that 
such a publishing phenomenon could have occurred at all without such a public 
shift in values having already started to take place in the first place. Thus, by 
endorsing the 'values of the civic and the social, rather than the hegemonic 
machine of Conservative government' (p.35). Mutton had struck a public chord 
36 
for change and as such the book can be seen as an essential prerequisite to the 
eventual emergence of other alternative arguments favouring a new moral 
discourse: 
People are most likely to accept that there is no alternative to New Right policies 
if the ideas and theories available to them make deregulated market institutions 
appear natural and inevitable (Ibid: 297) 
The logic of this intriguing cycle and synthesis, or product-life-cycle (i i), of the 
successful emergence of new ideas in relation to values in education can be 
illustrated by the following diagram: 
The Personal Domain 
•2 The Public Domain 
The Dominant 
Paradigm Domain • 
The Logic of the model requires movement from 1 (where ideas are generated and 
tested within ideological communities) through to 2 (where public scrutiny 
affirms or negates, again within ideological communities) to 3 (where 
sufficiently well formulated new ideas can test, contest and potentially replace the 
dominant paradigm). 
Figure 1: The 3 DISCOURSE DOMAINS (12) 
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Mence, the parameters of any established paradigm of values will have journeyed 
a similar threefold route: (1) initiation stage within one's own ideological 
community (2) nurturing and development stage within the public domain of 
competing positions and (3) refining and further development stage whereby 
serious contesting of the paradigm occurs. The dynamic of such a synthesis is be 
captured by imagining the above series of three concentric circles with (a) as the 
inner circle, moving through to (b) the middle circle which eventually is 
accommodated within (c) the outer circle. Indeed the dynamics of the flow and 
flux of all intellectual engagement and interaction will undertake a not dissimilar 
cycle in each of the three stages of the overall process. On each occasion the 
rigours of Popperian, mutually self-correcting, criticism will enrich form and content 
across these three different discourse domains, before an eventual paradigm 
change can take place. 
Peters' seminal work in 1966, had planted seeds of liberal optimism in an 
educational system which had become increasingly imbued with new right 
conservative free market dogma of the eighties and nineties, which found its 
greatest expression in the 1988 Education Reform Act. Nevertheless, it took a 
period of almost thirty years before the emergence of equally well formulated and 
critically acceptable alternative arguments had emerged. 
Thus the process of societal change cannot, in any Kuhnian sense, 'attempt to 
force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm 
supplies' (Op. cit); on the contrary, it must instead conform to a more gradual and 
revelationary process, neither sudden, dramatic, nor revolutionary. 
Such a model of the process of change necessarily requires its cycle and synthesis 
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of competing value positions in order for any one position to be overthrown in 
favour of a better one. It is precisely within this context of change, with its cycle and 
synthesis of competing value positions, that Kuhn's (1970) paradigm of 'normal 
science' is displaced by the paradigm of 'revolutionary science'. Thus it is hardly 
surprising, coinciding as it does with with the first change in government in 
eighteen years, that a veritable eruption of alternative moral critiques is now 
beginning to emerge against the backcloth of what Rue (1994) refers to as the 
inevitable 'Kulturkampf (p.261). Rue continues: 
Kulturkampf is a chronic condition of ideological struggle within human social groups. 
It is a characteristic of the species, Whenever human tseings craft memes (1 3) by 
which to organize themselves, there we will find competition among incompatible 
meanings. The condition is incurable. Nor is a cure even desirable, for it is the 
vigorous struggle of ideas that provides resources for adaptive change. A culture 
without Kulturkampf is moribund...There are periods when the condition flares up and 
becomes more noticeable, periods when ordinary, low-level competition rises to the 
point of pitched battle between identifiable belligerents. And as one might expect, 
the belligerents in the controversy break down into two camps: the liberals who seek 
fundamental change, and the conservatives, who wish to maintain the status quo 
(pp.261-262). 
The Liberal/Conservative Dichotomy 
Bloom's (1987) impassioned indictment of the American universities', 'great moral 
consciousness' (p.34l) accuses the liberal education tradition of leaving nothing 
but a supermarket of mediocrity in place of the core and canon of the great 
humanizing conservative tradition: 
...the crisis of liberal education is a reflection of a crisis at the peaks of learning, an 
incoherence and incompatibility among the first principles with which we interpret the 
world, an intellectual crisis of the greatest magnitude, which constitutes the crisis of 
our civilizatbn (p.346). 
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But despite such an assault on liberal society. Bloom is keen to restore the status 
quo by a combination of argument and emotional appeal: 
The books in their objective beauty are still there, and we must help protect and 
cultivate the delicate tendrils reaching out toward them through the unfriendly soil of 
student souls (p.280). 
Mowever, as Williams (1985) has noted, the real challenge with such change is not 
just that that we adapt more rapidly to it, but also that our response capacities are 
themselves altered. For as the world around us changes, so too do we change with 
it, as 'the urge to reflective understanding...goes deeper and is more widely spread 
than it has ever been before, and the thicker kinds of ethical concepts have less 
currency than they did in more traditional societies' (p. 163). 
In these terms, Jonathan (1995) argues convincingly that it is 'urgent to consider 
how education might play a more positive part while still avoiding simple value 
reproduction' (p.345) of the conservative variety favoured by Bloom. Mere, Abrams 
(1982) encapsulates succinctly and persuasively the dilemma and ultimate fear of 
the conservatives: 
A specter is haunting this discussion of the philosophy of the curriculum - the specter 
of nihilism. We humanists are forever embarrassed at the uncertainty of our 
conclusions, whereas the logicians and mathematicians can define precisely the 
validity of their inferences. We can never, alas, determine absolutely the truth or falsity 
of any proposition (cited in Rue, 1994:268). 
By contrast, and according to the liberal argument, the traditional core curriculum 
has been inaccurate and politically hegemonic (Ball, 1994; Bloom, 1987; Grace, 
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1994; Johnson, 1995; and Rue, 1994). Hence, we have the postmodernist plea for 
'de-centering and re-visioning' of the curricular; in Ball's (1994) terms, this ensures 
that the debate enters 'the public sphere, a space in our social world in which 
issues are open to debate, reflection and moral argument' (p. 145). 
Certainly, Pring (1995) offers a most cogent and impassioned defence of a liberal 
education: 
The broader ideal of liberal education has to take everyone seriously, even those who 
may not be academically able. Everyone, in his or her own way is capable of what 
Ctoleridge refers to as 'the art of reflection'. And teachers , with proper support and 
with the richness of various form of cultural achievement as their resource, are capable 
of engaging in that transaction with young people through which they, in their 
different ways, might explore the issues in literature, history, the arts, the sciences 
which are of profound personal and social importance (p. 195). 
At least in one important respect the difference between liberal and conservative 
positions can be reconciled as indeed both demonstrate support for preserving and 
transmitting the very best of inherited culture and its associated knowledge. But at 
another level, of course there are very real differences which Rue (1994) 
summarises neatly as: 
The conservatives have defended the traditional core and canon as the best of 
human guides through a thicket of perennial questions and on toward the clearing of 
truth. The classics have struggled with all the key questions of human existence, and 
they have made some indisputable gains.. Indeed the traditional canon is a repository 
of truth. But the liberal agenda's endorsement of relativism, the view that truth is a 
variable of time and circumstance, that is no more than an enhanced version of 
opinion, something to be made up and not discovered or revealed. But if truth is mere 
opinion, then moral virtue is mere convention, or worse, political power (p.268). 
The most general implication of Rue's observation is to avoid the temptation to 
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adopt an "either/or" mentality, which is restrictive and reductive, and instead to 
extend the debate to a kind of postmodernist nihilism: 
There is no final vocabulary for adequating appearance to reality, nor can there be 
one. All truths and values are optional. The universe has no meaning, only 
interpretations do. And no interpretation is privileged by a transcendent point of 
reference. In fact, I am so persuaded by the postmodernist critique that I am 
compelled to embrace its nihilism in a way that postmodernists are generally 
reluctant to do (p.274). 
At one level of explanation, Rue's perspective places the onus of responsibility with 
each individual for generating meaning by personal interpretation; and while this is 
fine to a point, there is, nevertheless, a very great danger of this resulting in the 
"throwing the baby out with the bathwater" syndrome. For if there is not sufficient 
consideration of our cultural heritage - the core and canon of the great works of art 
and literature - then It is possible that a kind of moral relativism will prevail, where 
one opinion is not necessarily any better than the next opinion. 
Bruner (1990) navigates a careful and sensitive path through the "choppy waters" 
of this particularly messy dichotomy by insisting instead on a 'viable pluralism' 
(p.30), which he defines as: 
...the pluralism of modern life and the rapid changes it imposes, one can argue, 
create conflicts in commitment, conflicts in values, and therefore conflicts about the 
"rightness" of various claims to knowledge about values...But it is whimsical to 
suppose that, under present world conditions, a dogged insistence upon the notion 
of "absolute value" will make the uncertainties go away. All one can hope for is a viable 
pluralism backed by a willingness to negotiate differences in world-view (pp.29-30). 
It is precisely within the context of this "slippery slope" of alternatives - leading to 
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nihilism witli a happy face - that the plethora of recent public body consultation 
exercises, concerning moral issues in society and education, has been 
undertaken. For unless society can in fact agree a 'viable pluralism' in terms of its 
moral discourse, then it is unlikely that we can ever discover what values we share 
as a society. 
This preceding remark, then, highlights the central difficulty of whose values are to 
be promulgated? and whose values are not? Skeen (1980) puts the point in the 
following way: 
(1) Moral values cannot simply be derived from Christianity since moral 
positions are presupposed by Christianity. 
(2) What is seen as a Christian value changes over time. 
(3) Reliance on 'Christian values' does not solve the problem of moral 
education (p.22). 
Precisely because religion in itself 'does not solve the problem of moral education' 
this enriched ethical model of alternative positions was developed. 
Public Domain Discourse Documents 
Having identified the postmodernist context within which the current debate in 
education is located, my attention will now focus largely on the specific concerns 
expressed in a small corpus of recent consultation documents. The organisations 
concerned are as follows: 
School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA); National Forum for Values in 
Education (NFVE); House of Lords; Catholic Bishop's Conference of England and 
Wales (CBC); Catholic Education Service (CES). 
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All of these documents have appeared since July 1996 and directly concern 
themselves with education and the role of morality. The issues discussed range 
from what the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Carey, has termed 'the fight back 
against moral and cultural relativism' (House of Lords. 1996:1695); to what SCAA 
(1996) defined as a 'cause for concern about spiritual and moral values and the 
current state of society' (p.5). Or, in specific terms of reference, the remit of NFVE 
(1996), which is very largely complementary to the other bodies, was to make 
recommendations on 
1. ways in which schools might be supported in making their contribution to 
pupil's spiritual, moral, social and cultural development. 
2. to what extent there is any agreement on the values, attitudes and behaviour 
that schools should promote (p.1) 
The assumption behind such thinking is that we are becoming morally reticent, or 
inarticulate and lack the linguistic wherewithal to express ourselves morally. Or to 
repeat the Wittgenstein (1993) dictum, 'the limits of my language are the limits of 
my world' (p.56), which in the vernacular sense here means you cannot properly 
express yourself as a moral person if you do not have a moral language! The 
following pages will endeavour to identify the shared values and common issues 
and see to what extent this can be placed within a meaningful framework of a moral 
discourse. 
SCAA 
For SCAA the initial frame of reference was the 1993 National Curriculum 
Council publication 'Spiritual and Moral Development' in relation to whole school 
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policy. Although a mere eight pages of discussion the paper helped to frame the 
debate in a language of 'spiritual development in an educational context' (p.4). 
SCAA republished the document in 1995 and emphasised that ' schools transmit 
values to pupils consciously or unconsciously, and it is important that these values 
are consistent with those the schools claim to promote' (p.8). In this context the role 
of values transmission in and by the school was made explicit: 
Values are inherent in teaching. Teachers are by the nature of their profession 'moral 
agents' who imply values by the way they address pupils and each other, the way they 
dress, the language they use...Values lie at the heart of the school's vision of itself as 
a community (p.9). 
By 1996 SCAA was able to draw on a much wider popular consensus whereby its 
stated purpose was in declaring that 'the way fonward was by the formation of a 
common language and many delegates believed that SCAA should clearly define 
the terms of such a debate'(p.9). 
Thus in summarising its position, SCAA (1996) begins by stating that 'the current 
confusion over values is due in part to a misunderstanding of the philosophical 
debate' (p.5): it then continues, 'The fact that some values or behaviours 
cannot be defined as'absolutes' does not prevent them from being promoted as 
the general rule (p.5). Indeed the paper is one in a series of discussion papers 
and arose out of a conference which was convened : 
...partly in response to public concern at a perceived degeneration in moral 
standards, especially among young people. Some delegates believed that we are 
living in a time of 'moral crisis', viewing society as rife with drugs abuse, crime and 
violence. It was the view of some delegates that, although every generation 
expresses concern over the values of the young,a significant proportion of young 
people are now out of control. It was the behaviour of young people that gave the 
greatest cause for concern. The murder of headteacher Philip Lawrence in 
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December 1995 was cited by a number of delegates as evidence for this view (p.8). 
Overall, however, the conference formulated seven key possible causes for their 
perceived moral malaise: 'moral relativism; loss of moral discernment; loss of 
respect for national leaders, both temporal and spiritual; materialism and greed; the 
fragmentation of the family; technological developments; lack of a common 
language' (pp. 8-9). Not surprisingly, however, it was in relation to the latter, 
central observation - the lack of a common language - that much discussion 
ensued and from which emerged the following four aims, whereby it was 'argued 
that young people should become': 
1. Knowledgeable about standards of right and wrong; 
2. skilled in moral reasoning; 
3. willing to conduct themselves in a responsible manner; 
4. prepared to take responsibility for their own actions (p. 11). 
And while the above aims are a reasonable basis for further discussion there are 
still important questions left unanswered. For example, if 1. relates to content, then 
that content needs detailing more explicitly and if 2. is about process, then this 
crucially needs much clearer conceptual mapping. By contrast, 3. and 4. relate to 
attitudinal or predispositional qualities and so fit less readily with 1. and 2. But as 
'the conference did not set out to address how spiritual and moral development 
could be promoted through the curriculum' (p,13) my comments here may seem 
unreasonable. Nevertheless, this is not the case as 'most delegates did address 
this issue' (p. 13); and while no firm conclusions were reached, the issue of 
implementation , occupies some six pages of a twenty four page document. 
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But to return to the issue of the conceptually mapping out of 2, above - being 
skilled in moral reasoning - the following outline is the sort of 'provisional" starting 
point which is envisaged: 
Perception of moral prot)lem 
• 
Produce a model to exemplify and frame the problem 
and produce an ethk;al "ought" statement to include: 
1. What is to be done 
2. Bywtiom? 
3. Under what conditions? 
V 
List range of alternative actions available 
V 
Choose appropriate action 
V 
Identify consequences (immediate & tong term) if the 
statement is to be implemented 
Evaluate the consequences against the model in terms of external 
terms of reference and one's own Internal terms of reference: then 
modify and finally formulate a decision 
FIGURE 2: A PROCESS FOR MORAL DECISION MAKING 
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Certainly SCAA's advice on school's using the statutory and non-statutory 
curriculum as a whole is preferable to designating any one subject as a symbolic 
totem, but even though this was not SCAA's specific remit there is still no real 
sense of the "how to" implement issues, or the "what to" implement in terms of 
specific knowledge beyond the advice that thematic links are suggested in the 
sense 'that moral issues should be mapped across the curriculum' (p. 13). The 
advice is that spiritual and moral dimensions must be central to the school policy 
and permeate all activities and all subjects in the curriculum (p. 13).Indeed Dr. Nick 
Tate, SCAA's Chief Executive, criticised the alleged prevalence of moral relativism 
and concluded by saying "if ever a dragon needed slaying, it is the dragon of 
relativism" (p. 10). And central to this position and much more difficult to realise is 
the role played by adults: 
Adults should lead by example in the school and wider community. Educators must 
be confident in handling inner as well as outer lives if young people are to be 
. equipped for the world. Knowledge is important, but so are acceptance of personal 
responsibility, judgement, working with others and understanding codes of behaviour 
(P13). 
The conference concluded by unanimously agreeing that 'education needs a 
common language to discuss values' and that as such 'national assent to core 
values would give schools authority and confidence in promoting them' (p. 18). 
Furthermore, it was directly as a result of recommendations from this particular 
conference that a national forum for school and community values was established. 
The recommendations were: 
8.1 The report of the conference should summarise the points made by 
delegates and also aim to stimulate debate 
8.2 Any national forum to discuss values in education should be representative 
of as many constituencies as possible and take account of the diversity of 
views in society. 
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8.3 There needs to be a coherent approach to spiritual, moral, social and cultural 
development. 
8.4 There is an urgent need for a working group tp track issues related to 
spiritual, moral, social and cultural developments through the subjects of 
the curriculum and in other areas of school life. 
8.5 Any monitoring of the curriculum should include provision for spiritual, moral, 
social and cultural development. 
8.6 A list of research agencies, publications and interest groups concerned with 
spiritual, moral and cultural developrnent would be helpful to all concerned 
with these issues, including schools. 
8.7 There is a need for research and development work on the possibility of 
assessing spiritual, moral, social and cultural development. 
8.8 Work on international comparisons should include an investigation of the 
provision and content of citizenship education in other countries (p. 19). 
NFVE 
As a direct consequence of the above series of recommendations the 'National 
Forum for Values in Education and the Community' was established by SCAA in 
September 1996. The first task of the Forum was to initiate a wide-ranging 
consultation exercise whereby the terms of reference were as follows: 
The consultation aims to discover: 
1. whether - and if so, how far - there is support for the value statements 
drafted by the Forum; 
2. what schools regard as current good practice in spiritual, moral, social and 
cultural development 
3. whether schools would find the value statements, and their endorsement by 
society in general, supportive of and complementary to their work in this area; 
4. what further support, from SCAA or other agencies, schools would welcome 
(p.2). 
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There are four 'value statements' and thirty principle activities which are intended 
to exemplify the four values which are concerned with society, relationships, the 
self and the environment'. The value statements are stated thus: 
Society 
Relationships 
The Self 
The Environment 
We value truth, human rights, the law, justice and collective 
endeavour for the common good of society. In particular we 
value families as sources of love and support for all their 
members and as the basis of a society in which people care 
for others. 
We value others for themselves, not for what they have or 
what they can do for us, and we value these relationships as 
fundamental to our development and the good of the 
community. 
We value each person as a unique person of intrinsic worth, 
with potential for spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical 
development and change 
We value the natural world as a source of wonder and ins-
piration, and accept our duty to maintain a sustainable en-
vironment for the future (p.4). 
As this NFVE study as a whole is a two year pilot and this particular research 
exercise piece is not yet published, the only available progress reports to date are 
short articles in the national press. Such articles, which are highly favourable to 
the aims of the project, are typified by a recent leader article in the Guardian: 
We have seen recently in SCAA's report, and the ensuing discussion that it is 
possible and normal to have different views of authority and of particular ethical 
questions and yet to have strong shared values which we can build on together for 
the good of all. I understand from the large and heterogeneous group responding to 
the authority's forum, and much to the surprise of some of them attending,a 
substantial consensus emerged about a whole series of values...The final report from 
SCAA's National Forum should be a significant item for an incoming government. It is 
important to be clear about what the report claims to he. It seeks to describe what the 
shared values of a wide-cross-section of society are. That is different from saying 
what they should be (Guardian 22 April 1997). 
50 
As a national exercise this is indicative of its importance and significance. It is 
timely and highly appropriate work which should be able to identify what in 
general ethical ternrts is so frequently referred to as the 'common good'. Certainly 
the forum of 150 members - which included the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cardinal 
Hume, the Chief Rabbi, Dr Nick Tate, senior politicians and educationalists -
achieved a high degree of consensus in agreeing the value statements in the first 
place. The next step will be to marry the findings with the statements to determine 
the degree of further consensus. For as the Guardian so astutely points out 'to 
describe what the shared values of a wide-cross-section of society are is different 
from saying what they should be', in other words you cannot simply derive an 
ought from an is or prescription from description. 
C B C 
In presenting the C B C ' s publication. The Common Good, Cardinal Hume prefaces 
the study with the following remarks: 
The Church does not present a political programme, still less a party political one. The 
social teaching of the church, as expounded in this document, provides a set of 
consistent and complementary principles, values and goals. We recognise, of 
course, that many people of other faiths or even none would be able to accept much 
that this teaching has to offer, whether it is described as Catholic or not. Every public 
policy should be judged by the effect it has upon human dignity and the common 
good (p.1). 
So although the religious context is Catholic , the central aim is 'to bring about a 
good and fair society' which is encapsulated by the phrase 'the common good' 
(P-2). 
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Two basic, further ideas from Catholic Social Teaching are introduced: 
subsidiarity and solidarity. They are closely linked with the former meaning 
'decisions being taken as close to the grass roots as good government allows' and 
the latter meaning 'we ai^ e all responsible for each other' (p.3). The message is 'a 
firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good' (p.14) 
and it is a persuasive message: 
The fact that men and women in various parts of the world feel personally affected by 
the injustices and violations of human rights committed in distant countries, which 
perhaps they will never visit, is a further sign of a reality transformed into awareness, 
thus acquiring a moral connotation (p. 14). 
In these terms we 'have a claim on each other and on society for certain basic 
minimum conditions without which the value of human life is diminished or even 
negated' (p. 10). These basic human rights are defined as 'inalienable, in that 
individuals or societies may not set them at nought' (p. 10). 
The plea is for a new ethical renaissance by a 'renewed effort to awaken the 
conscience of the majority' (p. 17) and where 'the nation's real crisis Is not 
economic, but moral and spiritual' (p.25). A crisis defined as one where 'lives are 
increasingly dominated by impersonal economic forces which leave little room for 
morality' (p.26). Hence, 'the common good must prevail, even against strong 
economic forces that would deny it' (p.27). The argument is prosaic and 
persuasive: 
As a result of this loss of confidence in the public arena, people seek space for 
personal fulfilment by turning increasingly to their private world. There is a retreat from 
the public area of community involvement to the domestic and individual sphere. This 
process of privatisation may well throw more weight than it can bear upon a fragile 
personal relationship, often a marriage relationship. Thus the very place where 
satisfaction and security is sought becomes the place where it is less likely to be 
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obtainable (P.26). 
C E S 
The Catholic Church has now extended the debate into education by developing 
its earlier document into "The Common Good in Education' (May, 1997) which 
locates the same arguments and ethical principles specifically within the domain of 
education. 
In essence the document is a scathing attack on crude league tables and the 
competitive 'market forces' ethos of recent education policy. In a plea for 
community values, education is defined as 'primarily about "human flourishing" and 
the development of the whole person' (p.7). But in an education system which has 
become largely market-driven the verdict is that 'individual good is being realised 
at the expense of the common good' (p.13). 
The rhetoric of passion and commitment underscore the ethical position: 
Education is about the service of others rather than the service of self. To substitute 
"public provider" for "public servant" undermines the sense of vocation teachers 
have. They consider that they have been called to dedicate their lives to serving the 
young through education, to sharing with them their love of learning, their love of 
knowledge in a particular area of the curriculum which offers insight into the Author of 
all knowledge. It is a noble and ennobling vocation which is diminished by the 
constraints and the language of the market place' (p. 13). 
Certainly the limitations of the market place are increasingly exposed to ever more 
articulate critiques in the public domain, where real challenge and change are now 
beginning to be realised. And it is right to proclaim that teaching is a vocation 
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whereby individual teachers are indeed moral agents who really can make a 
difference to their pupils. Here the power of example is key, as teachers offer both 
opinion and behaviour which are never morally neutral. 
The arguments here appeal to both the Christian as well as to the Humanist 
tradition and are persuasively and convincingly captured in the following summary 
observation, which concluded the document: 
There is no doubt that reforms in the education system have put pressure on 
teaching staff. Stress can be a creative pressure for some. For others, it has become 
destructive. As the rise in premature retirements has illustrated recently. It is the 
responsibility of employers and managers to be able to recognise the cracks before 
someone falls to pieces, and try to relieve the pressure. Insecurity and a lack of 
confidence are signs that a person is losing his or her sense of dignity and worth. Staff 
may need support to regain to regain their sense of vocation in teaching, to 
understand more fully how, with God's help, they are co-operating in his creative 
activity (p. 19). 
House of Lords 
This final example of public domain discourse, although a less controlled level of 
disclosure, is the published proceedings of an unprecedented debate on morality 
in the House of Lords last July. The topic of 'Society's Moral and Spiritual Well-
Being' was debated by Peers from all sides of the House and thus offers a wide 
range of contemporary 'establishment' views. Indeed the fact that such a debate 
took place at all is cleariy indicative of an increasing consensus towards, as this 
paper has argued, the need for the development of a common discourse for moral 
issues. 
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In opening the debate, the Archbishop of Canterbury emphasised in particular 'the 
responsibility of schools in society's moral and spiritual well-being' (p. 1691). 
Thereafter, Dr. Carey reminded the House of 'its long-standing concern for the 
moral and spiritual dimensions of education, because you were indeed 
responsible for inserting these as primary purposes of education on the face of the 
Education Act 1988' (pi 691). Dr Carey necessarily frames his argument in 
religious terms, but in so doing argues against moral relativism where no common 
moral vocabulary can exist: 
There is a widespread tendency to view what is good and right as a matter of private 
taste and individual opinion only. Under this tendency, God is banished to the realm 
of the private hobby and religion becomes a particular activity for those who happen to 
have a taste for it. Many people now find it embarrassing to talk about either religion or 
morality in public, and the traditional vocabulary of moral discourse for example, virtue, 
sin, good, bad, right,wrong, wholesome, godly, righteous and sober - all these terms 
have come under acute contemporary suspicion, as though their validity has 
disappeared along with traditional sources (p. 1692). 
Following on from this. Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach, former head of Margaret 
Thatcher's policy unit, speaking for the Conservative Government said: 
...a moral and spiritual basis is crucial to our institutions. It is crucial to the family. If a 
family has a moral and spiritual core, it is very much more likely to hold together and 
much less likely to be dysfunctional. If a school has a moral and spiritual ethos to it, 
which distinguishes right from wrong, which respects the pupils for what they are 
regardless of their abilities but recognises that each one of them has different gifts 
and wants to develop their character, I believe that it is a better school (p. 1696). 
Nevertheless, Lord Griffiths believes there to be common shared values "I believe 
people know right from wrong; people recognise fair play, and people know they 
have certain responsibilities' (p. 1697). His final point, 'moral values are much 
more likely to succeed when they are underpinned by religious belief (p. 1697) 
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validates his own personal position which he expresses as 'The fear of the Lord is 
the beginning of wisdom'. 
Lord Morris of Castle Morris, Labour's education spokesman, addressed the status 
of teachers, particularly in relation to low pay, 'it is a sad fact that today respect is 
given to the higher paid and the low paid workers are despised. Teachers must not 
be in that category' (p. 1697). And in rich rhetoric he concluded by saying: 
Now is the hour with a general election approaching, to consider the moral spiritual 
status of the nation in the light of the ideal. Sir Richard Livingstone said: 
"Moral education is impossible without the vision of greatness" 
We may say: "Where there is no vision the people perish" (p. 1701). 
The Lord Bishop of Winchester blamed society since the 1980's for 'its obsession 
with instant gratification and the pursuit of competitiveness at all costs' (p. 1707). 
The 'role of education' is seen as both 'the repository and the representative of 
visions of the good society, of moral and spiritual values' (p. 1708). He continues: 
In a society which has gained in health by being less deferential, we still need models 
and traditions of behaviour, traditions of values and beliefs and good practice. It 
seems to me it is cruel and restricting, as well as mistaken, to suggest to people of any 
age, as many do today, that there is no wisdom into which they can tap and need to 
tap, that there are no models to look to, no traditions upon whrch they can depend 
and within which we can be fomed as we grow (p. 1708). 
Lord Birdwood captured the central difficulty of precise definition in such matters 
when he admitted: 
Of course, at the end of the day, I believe the facts about educational standards in 
schools on maths., spelling or foreign language proficiency because I can measure 
these things. But I am much less on fimri ground if I turn my attention to to moralities. 
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Perhaps alt the life of rational human beings is the search for moral absolutes, not the 
finding of them. Something in me says that moral absolutes lie beyond measurement 
(p.1759). 
In summing up the debate Dr. Carey pointed out that >ou cannot take moral 
behaviour for granted, it needs to be examined, and nurtured again and again' 
(P. 1775). And by prefacing his final summation with the following rhetorical rather 
than interrogative question: 'What other parliament throughout the world would 
devote a whole day to moral and spiritual matters in the life of a nation?' (p. 1776), 
Dr, Carey underlines the significance and topicality of this important issue within 
the public domain of competing moral conversations. His summation of the various 
contributions is as follows: 
It was said in some of the newspapers earlier this week that 1 was calling for a moral 
crusade. I have already rejected that understanding of the matter. The Motion on the 
Order Paper is to "call attention" and perhaps 1 may point to three areas which I have 
picked up to which we have called attention. First, we have called attention to the 
importance of nurturing young people to capture a vision of moral values as central to 
a responsible and caring society. Your Lordships have echoed that again and again. 
Secondly, we have called attention to the centrality of our schools and affirmed the 
crucial role of teachers. We want to encourage the initiative of SCAA. Thirdly, we 
have called attention to the need for all sections of society - parents, the media, the 
entertainment industry - to exercise their responsibilities on behalf of us all (p. 1776). 
A Summary Position 
While these public documents offer neither systematic theory, methodology nor a 
fully developed epistemology, there are nevertheless implications in all of these 
areas. The emergence of such a clear convergence of views towards a common 
morality of shared values is indeed very revealing and encouraging, in as much 
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as it coincides and is consistent with the remit of this particular research. And as 
the research process is neither strictly inductive nor strictly deductive in terms of 
traditional reasoning, the result is an emergent theory which is most adequate 
to the data. Here the criterion for religious or ethical statements accords well with 
Macquarrie's (1967) explanation as a form of phenomenology: 
Theology must apply the phenomenological approach to all its basic concepts, 
forcing its critics first of all to see what the criticized concepts mean and also forcing 
itself to make careful descriptions of its concepts and to use them with logical 
consistency The test of a phenomenological description is that the picture given 
by it be convincing, that it can be seen by anyone who is looking in the same 
direction, that the description illuminates related ideas, and that it makes the reality 
which these ideas are supposed to reflect understandable (cited in Long, 
1985:100). 
In other words, the explanation is a sort of "best-fif approach to a theory whereby 
the most adequate description of the pattern of the data examined combines and 
coheres in favour of the model presented. In these terms a theory can be 
defined as: 
A scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a 
group of facts or phenomena...which consists in the knowledge or statement of the 
facts on which it depends, or of its principles or methods as distinct from the practice 
of it (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1987, Vol 2, p. 1281). 
By this reckoning, the process of argument is not always a chain of 
demonstrative reasoning, rather it is frequently a case of a presenting and 
representing of those features which severally cooperate in favour of the 
conclusion of the emergent theory with its "common morality". 
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It is in this latter sense of representing ethical data that Wittgenstein's last well-
known proposition in the Tractatus (1993) gains its greatest strength: "What we 
cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (p.74). Wittgenstein was in no 
doubt that everything of real importance, especially the ethical, is inexpressible in 
ordinary language - by this reckoning the Tractatus was the impossible attempt to 
demarcate the expressible (logic and mathematics, or facts) from the inexpressible 
(aesthetics and morals, or values). 
However, the urgent appeal for a new 'viable pluralism' and a 'common good' has 
effectively extended the terms of reference from the merely sacred to the 
secular, and in so doing begins to express the inexpressible. For there is a clear 
and discernible quest, not just for greater clarity of moral language and its ethical 
concepts, but for a new or renewed language to reflect the shared values of 
consensus and cohesion and of 'subsidiarity and solidarity'; where individual and 
community fuse into a morally viable whole. And once such a language, or the 
semblance of such a language begins to properly emerge - as, demonstrably, the 
consensus is already there to establish such a language - then real "paradigm-
busting" in the public discourse domain may well lead to a radical change, from 
laissez-faire free market ideology to one where human values more frequently take 
precedence over market force principles. 
Such an assessment of the current situation poses a number of challenges to the 
hegemony of traditional moral thinking. Moreover, this is a hegemony whereby 
alternatives to the predominance of either Kantianism or Utilitarianism, or Religion 
or Humanism must be found outside of the particularist or relativistic tradition of the 
"either/or" set of options. This is an assessment which is neatly summarised by 
Nussbaum (1992): 
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...moral philosophy is turning from an ethics based on enlightenment Ideals of 
universality to an ethics based on tradition and particularity; from an ethics based on 
principles to an ethics based on virtue; from an ethics dedicated to the elaboration of 
systematic theoretical justifications to an ethics suspicious of theory and respectful of 
local wisdom; from an ethics based on the isolated individual to an ethics based on 
affiliation and care; from an ahistorical detached ethics to an ethics rooted in 
concreteness and history (p.9). 
The way forward in such an impasse is not to seek direct reconciliation of these 
incommensurable positions, which are all equally jostling for the same discourse 
position in the public domain, but to seek their synthesis instead. The intention 
here is not to suggest that mere description can, or even should, convert to 
prescription, rather the suggestion is that moral values need illustration and 
characterisation to bring them to life, otherwise they may well remain cold, 
inanimate and factual. 
With regard to a 'common morality' it is interesting to note that the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Cardinal Hume and the Chief Rabbi have developed a new 
agreement 'to promote 1999 as a year of national reflection on moral values' 
(cited in Observer, 18 May 1997). Here the underlying thinking is: 
There is a growing sense of anomie in society. There is a loss of meaning of shared 
values and as we prepare for the millennium we have to ask what kind of society we 
want to create....the strongest idea emerging was to generate a 'mega-dialogue on 
society. We live in a country which has lost its spiritual and cultural memory. The task 
is to use the year 2000 to reawaken that memory (Ibid). 
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CHAPTER 4: THE OPERATIONAL STAGE - LITERATURE REVIEW 
Preliminary Definitional Issues 
In accordance with the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1987) common usage 
defines ethics as 'the science of morals' and 'morals as the practice of ethics'. The 
former is derived from the Greek word 'ethos' and the latter from the Latin word 
'moralis'. At one time both words performed the same function and existed together 
as English scholars knew both Greek and Latin. However, by 1500 the word moral 
was defined in terms of "knowledge, opinions, judgements relating to the nature 
and application of the distinction between right and wrong" (p. 1354) and by 1602 
ethics was defined as 'the science of morals or the moral system of a particular 
writer or school of thought' (p.685). As a description of two complementary nouns 
this wilt suffice for a preliminary definition, but even so it is worth saying something 
about the usage of these words as adjectives. For if ethics is the science of morals, 
whatever concerns morals evidently concerns ethics too, and is as much ethical as 
it is moral and vice versa. In this context it is perhaps more readily meaningful to 
refer to a moral individual and an ethical social system; and whereas the immoral 
usually refers to improper personal behaviour the unethical in contrast usually 
refers to the infringement of an accepted code of conduct (The Oxford Library of 
English Usage, 1991, Vol 3). Similarly, while it it would make complete sense to 
talk about a work ethic it would riot be as meaningful to talk about a work moral. 
This is because in common usage ethics now designates a particular system of 
values - a prevailing code - and moral relates to the specifics of behaviour, albeit 
within a particular ethical system. 
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By this reckoning moral relates to individual action and ethical to a particular 
ethical theory or paradigm. Such a paradigm could, for example, adopt a Utilitarian, 
Kantian, religious or other set of moral principles. Furthermore the actual focus 
could be on medicine, environment, science, education, politics, economics, etc. 
In view of such a juxtaposition of paradigms and foci, it is hardly surprising that in 
everyday language - the moral arena of daily interaction - the words moral and 
ethical are frequently used interchangeably. Following on from this and premised 
on the Wittgenstein idea that 'the limits of my language are the limits of my world' 
(op. cit.) it is not possible to express oneself as a moral person without direct 
access to a moral language. The major difficulty here is that such a moral 
language - vocabulary and theories - is rather difficult to locate. Should the 
emphasis be placed on the intention of a proposed action or its consequences? 
Alternatively should the emphasis be placed on the social and legal implications of 
behavibur instead of the religious? In other words what are the necessary 
criteria to arrive at agreed answers to the following first-order question: 
What should I do? 
What moral principles should I adopt? 
Becker (1991) rightly identifies the central role of language in determining each 
individual's ethical position: 
Ethics goes back to languaging. The legitimacy of my own experience within my own 
domain of discourse depends upon - and is built around - the legitimacy of the ex-
perience of others, however undesirable that other experience may appear to me. 
I need not approve, only keep the possibility of conversation open (p232). 
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Here the shift from noun to verb, from language as an abstract to languaging as an 
act, is crucial in linking the dynamic and creative nature of language as the 
mediator of moral expression. The emphasis upon conversation is reminiscent of 
Pring (1994) and his analogy of competing different conversations: 
These ideas are inherited, they are transmitted through the conversations which 
take place between the generations of mankind. And it is the job of education to 
get the next generation onto the inside of that conversation (p.111). 
Correspondingly, when John Dewey was asked in his ninetieth year for a 
summation of his ethics, his reply was 'Democracy begins in conversation' 
(Observer, 26 May, 1996). 
Additionally, and apart from linguistic and conceptual differences in ordinary 
usage there are different and differing approaches to moral issues across various 
academic disciplines. Thus the main purpose of this chapter will be to review a 
selection of the literature across four major academic disciplines: Sociology, 
Psychology, Philosophy, and Theology in an attempt to provide an outline for a 
moral vocabulary and ethical framework. 
But as a precursor to exploring the more specialist vocabularies of these particular 
disciplines, it is worth re-emphasising that we currently have neither an adequate 
moral vocabulary with which to describe ongoing and everyday difficulties nor an 
agreeable methodology for accessing and employing it. In what follows then, the 
selection is arbitrary and not fixed, fluid and not solid, amenable to change and not 
absolute and although necessarily personal the synthesis of academic voices to 
emerge will provide a controlled reference point and anchored methodology for 
further research. 
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Indeed in academic and scholarly writing the emphasis is usually on "controlled" 
disclosure at the expense of conveying the inner tensions which are a necessary 
pre-condition to achieving such control. The recognition of this malaise becomes 
even more important when seeking to identify a moral vocabulary and 
methodology for its practice. This is because in expressing oneself morally the 
vocabulary will invariably appear circumspect, arbitrary and predicated on ill-
defined meanings; all of which may become exacerbated due to the unstated 
nature of the subjective internal dialogues inherent in any personal moral struggle. 
Our normal habits of speech, of definitional logic, of causal relations and 
verifiability are all grounded in the presuppositions of linearity and symmetry. For 
what is committed to paper is calculated and considered; whereas the multitude of 
fragmentary and inconclusive talks to oneself are always absent. My choices are 
"my" arbitrary choices which may sometimes be spontaneous and sometimes 
wrenched out of inner struggle, but when marshalled as controlled academic 
disclosure that inner struggle is absent by its unvoiced silence. Steiner (1978) 
underlines the importance of this unvoiced internal discourse: 
Linguists have given almost no thought to the formal characteristics, statistical 
mass, psychological economy or social specificities of internal speech. How 
often, under what lexical, grammatical and semantical categories and constraints, 
at what rate of flow, in what language (where the polyglot is concerned) do we 
speak to ourselves? The unvoiced or internal components of speech span a wide 
arc; all the way from the subliminal flotsam of word or sentence-fragments...to 
the highly defined, focused and realized articulacy of the silent recitation of a 
learned text or of the taut analytic moves in a disciplined act of meditation. 
Quantitatively, there is every reason to believe that we speak inside and to our-
selves more than we speak outward and to anyone else. Qualitatively, these mani-
fest modes of self-address...test and verify our "being there" (pp.345-346) 
Certainly as a narrative technique - the 'stream of consciousness' - this self-evident 
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capacity for our unvoiced silent conversations with self is crucial to the pioneering 
novels of Knut Hamsun, James Joyce and Virginia Woolf, but as a medium of 
critical reflection in academic enquiry concerning moral issues there is certainly 
scope for its greater amplification. The focus centres, then, on the notion of 
"reflexivity", where reflexivity can be understood as a 'bending back on itself 
(Mead, 1962). In this sense the construction of this thesis takes place within a 
myriad of multiple voices - the voices of my inner dialogues as well as engagement 
with the voices of others. What emerges from this self-referential nature of 
language is consciousness about oneself: self-consciousness. In other words the 
fourth, inner voice of conscience or what Socrates referred to as his Daemon. 
These multiple voiced and unvoiced conversations are in Becker's (1991) terms 
acts of 'languaging' and as such "1" decide what my world is to become and who "1" 
am going to be through these conversations. By adopting such a position personal 
actions are inseparably linked to personal responsibility; whereby an alternative 
position, as we shall see below, views self as largely the product of social 
interaction where personal identity is established in a social context. 
A Perspective From Sociology 
For Durkheim (1977) the major focus of sociology was 'social solidarity', or social 
cohesion. In this sense society consisted of a 'collective consciousness' - a moral 
force, at the centre of which was a core of values and beliefs that was considered 
sacred and where 'moral truth consisted in action and not in constructing beautiful 
images in the silence of the mind intfospectively' (pi09): 
Morality is the domain of action, and can only be grasped in relation to real 
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phenomena: otherwise it is lost in the void. To act morally is to do good to t»eings 
of flesh and blood, to change something in reality. But in order to feel the need to 
change, transform and improve reality, we cannot abstract ourselves from it. On 
the contrary we have to embrace and love it in spite of its ugliness, its pettiness 
and its meanness. We must not turn away from it toward an imaginary world but, on 
the contrary, we must keep our eyes fixed upon it. This is why an exaggeratedly 
aesthetic culture, by turning us away from the real world, would relax the springs 
of moral action (pp. 110-111). 
Durkheim's 'springs of moral action' are firmly embedded within established social 
and religious structures. It is in this structuralist sense that Durkheim (1952) sees 
the role of education: 
Education is only the image of and reflection of society. It imitates and reproduces 
the latter In abbreviated form, it does not create It (p.379) 
burkheim's perspective on society as a moral entity, mediated through its social 
structures, provides an important springboard for later, less conservative, thinkers. 
Indeed, from his conception of the 'collective consciousness', with its emphasis on 
the social rather than the individual, there flow many modern sociological 
expressions (Berger and Luckmann ,1987; Halsey, 1987; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; 
Reid, 1984; Schultz, 1967). 
This particular position is given its fullest modern expression in the pragmatism of 
Rorty (1991) where the image of self is 'as a centreless web of feelings and 
desires' (p.11). Indeed as Rorty's position is 'auxiliary to the poet rather than to 
the physicist' (lbid:8), his endorsement of the dynamics of 'the contingent historical 
circumstance and the socially constructed self (p. 189) becomes all the more 
persuasive. For Rorty there are no truths independent of language and therefore, 
reality is always contingently determined by social action. The social contingency 
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Of such a process of "languaging" Rorty (1994) puts as follows, 'The world does not 
speak. Only we do' (p.6). 
For Weber (1977) the focus of sociology was very much on types of action; 
whereby economics and law were the models of rational action, and religion was 
designated as non-rational action. His extensive study of the great religious 
systems of the world: Confucian, Hinduist, Buddhist, Christian, Islamist, Judaism 
was located within an economic and sociological analysis. For the purposes of this 
discussion, the significance of Weber's contribution was in locating the religious 
and the sacred within a secular analytical framework amenable to public scrutiny. 
Indeed Weber admits his central interest: 
The features of religion that are important for economic ethics shall interest us 
primarily from a definite point of view: we shall be interested in the way in which 
they are related to economic rationalism...as part of the particular rationalization of 
civic life which has become familiar in this part of the world (p.293). 
And although Weber, concluded that he could not choose between 'reason and 
revelation' or between 'Jesus or Buddha' his intention was 'to revitalise the great 
alternatives in showing the gravity and danger involved in choosing among them' 
(Bloom, 1987: 338). Weber's purpose was to endeavour to 'get beyond the tyranny 
and oppression of the fact' (Marcuse 1991). In summing up Weber's influence 
Bloom (1987) shows Weber's intentions as: 
...to present the battleground of the great decisions, all of which are spiritual or 
value choices. One can no longer present this or that particular view of the 
educated or civilized man as authoritative; therefore one must say that education 
consists in knowing, really knowing, the small number of views with integrity. This 
distinction between profound and superficial takes the place of good and bad, 
true and false (p.338). 
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Perhaps a helpful way of decoding this mode of sociological analysis is by 
reference to the sociological constructs of 'phenomenology' and 'constructionism'. 
In the first instance, phenomenology confirms the primacy of lived experience, and 
Merleau Ponty (1964), exemplifies this particular primacy of lived experience as 
crucial by his assertion that 'the perceiving mind is an incarnated mind' (p.3). From 
this perspective, therefore, perception is always an embodied perception - one that 
is uniquely what it is only within a specific social and cultural context. In these 
terms, then, perception in itself does not exist: 
Consciousness is perceptual and so my body is the fabric into which all objects 
are woven and the primordial layer into which both are woven ( Merleau-Ponty 
quoted in Barrett, 1991:133). 
In the second instance, constructionism emphasises the performative function of 
language where such interaction is central and where meaning is largely derived 
from social interaction. Steir (1991) states the case succinctly: 
Constructionist inquiry, as a human activity, must concern itself with a knowing pro-
cess as embedded in a reflexive loop that includes the inquirer who is at once an 
active observer. Reflexivity, or a turning back onto a self, is a way in which circularity 
and self-reference appear in inquiry, as we contextually recognize the various 
mutual relationships in which our knowing activities are embedded. These include, 
for example, a relationship between language and experience that allows us to see 
individual expehence as socially constructed, rooted in languaging activities whose 
possibilities for becoming our experience provides (p. 163). 
Giddens' (1994) radical sociological analysis for a new political framework, 
embraces the morality of post-modernist politics and sets out an agenda for 'an 
irremediably pluralistic universe of values' (p.20). His line of enquiry flows directly 
from Durkheim's ' springs of moral action" (op. cit), through Weber's sacred/secular 
analysis and reflexively concludes with the emergence of an ethic of universal 
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values - a morality of optimism: 
Can one say that there are certain more or less universal ethical principles 
emerging which tend to unite all perspectives? I believe one can...An ethics of a 
globalizing post-traditional society implies recognition of the sanctity of human life 
and the universal right to happiness and self-actualization - coupled to the 
obligation to promote cosmopolitan solidarity and the attitude of respect towards 
non-human agencies and beings, present and future. Far from seeing the 
disappearance of universal values, this is perhaps the first time in humanity's 
history when such values have real purchase (pp.252-253). 
A Perspective From Psycliology 
Moral psychology represents the study of behaviour in three distinctly different 
ways; (1) acquiring an understanding of society's various ethical codes - the 
cognitive. (2) learning to behave in accordance with such rules - the behavioural. 
(3) adopting certain attitudes or personal traits - the affective (Gross, 1992). This 
tripartite focus of knowledge, behaviour and feelings in moral psychology, although 
located within the context of the wider process of socialization, tends increasingly 
to be located within the cognitive paradigm of explanation (Demey, 1991). 
The cognitive study of moral development is largely concerned with the cognitive 
causal processes of developmental learning whereby each individual acquires 
their moral knowledge and behaviour (as opposed to the moral rules and ethical 
principles which distinguish between right ancf wrong): Held (1994) puts it as 
follows: 
If moral psychology is the psychology of making moral judgements and 
developing moral attitudes, it seeks causal explanations of how this is done. This 
leaves unaddressed the nomiative questions of whether the positions arrived 
at are morally justifiable (p.70). 
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But within these parameters various theories have emerged and in the Deleuzian 
(1979) sense such 'a theoretical combination must be conceived as a toolbox 
producing tools that work' (p.9). In this respect Kohlberg's (1981) theories of moral 
development have had a major influence and so will frame the following analysis. 
Indeed Kohlberg's theories contain explicit definitions of what it means to be moral, 
what it means to be morally mature, and what it takes by way of experience and 
development to become so. 
Kohlberg's juridical ethics locates the moral self within the framework of a problem-
solving agent. This image of the moral person places great weight on being 
analytical, able to arrive at disinterested but decisive judgements through rational 
discourse. Central to the theory lie three, mutually confirming, key claims: the 
philosophical, the psychological and the operational. The first claim concerns the 
concept of moral goodness which is defined as knowledge of the ideal of justice: 
'Justice is a universal mode of choosing, a rule of choosing which we want ail 
people to adopt in all situations (p.47). The second claim implies that 'the structure 
of morality is defined as the cognitive pattern of organization each of us have for 
processing information or for connecting experienced events in terms of equality or 
reciprocity' (p.51). The third claim states that 'we can analyze the nature of a 
person's morality by looking at the the pattern of judgements a person makes about 
situations in which people have conflicting claims on one another' (p.53).Kohlberg 
claims that this will provide a gestalt of the structure of a person's moral stage. 
In relation to the latter claim, first, the operational, the difficulty of using hypothetical 
moral dilemmas to cross-reference and identify a real person's morality can only 
ever provide a fuzzy picture. Moral intelligence even at its best works imperfectly, 
drawing on a rhizome of interconnections and so the connections between intent. 
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motive and action will always remain illusive to blueprint modelling. Of course 
there may be parallells in Kohlberg's model but there can never be a genuine 
sense of immediacy nor interactive immersion in real 'flesh and blood' angst. For 
the picture portrayed lacks ongoing immediacy and sense of vision and control, 
which for Murdoch (1956) are the real characteristics of the active moral agent: 
When we apprehend and assess Other people we do not consider only their 
solutions to specifiable practical problems; rather we consider something more 
elusive which may be called their total vision of life as shown in their mode of 
speech or silence, their choice of words, their assessment of others, their 
conception of their own lives, what they think attractive or praiseworthy, what they 
think funny: in short the configuration of thought which show s continually in 
their reactions and conversation. These things, which may be overtly and 
comprehensively displayed or inwardly elat)orated and guessed at, constitute 
what, making different points in two metaphors, one may call the texture of a 
man's being or the nature of his personal vision (pp. 32-33). 
Such a visional ethics is clearly not amenable to traditional academic analysis and 
Kohlberg's model, at least in its operational context, is not entirely adequate. 
Insofar as Kohlberg's first claim about the notion of virtue as knowledge of the 
ideal is concerned, the philosophical, this can never be a sufficient condition for a 
moral agent. Why? Because mere cognition of the concept justice is seriously 
reductive in defining the concept in rational, linear terms. In other words, so long as 
justice is concerned with the meeting of the objective and publicly articulable 
needs of persons with objectively definable acts and goods, then this notion of 
justice is necessarily incomplete. The problem is that this Kohlbergian notion of the 
rational and the objective fails to accomodate introspection, inter-subjective 
relationships and the essential incoherent contingent stumbling blocks of genuine 
reflexivity. 
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Thirdly, in relation to Kohlberg's second claim, the psychological, it can be argued 
that the development of a cognitive structure is not always a necessary condition 
for moral maturity. People can be morally mature, exemplars of moral goodness, 
without having the capacity to organize information and events in the way 
Kohlberg's model states. Nonetheless, it is difficult to encapsulate precisely the 
notion of a moral intelligence; too often 'the boundaries of ethics are hazy and 
can be seen as running up against the limits of language' (Wittgenstein, 1929). 
That apart, however, Kohlberg's central concept of stage has still undergone 
severe criticism and as Durance (1995) claims 'Development psychologists no 
longer accept as tenable the stage theory of cognitive development; sequence is 
now the preferred term' (p.35). 
The key to Kohlberg's conception of the psychological core of moral judgement is 
the Piagetian construct of objectivity. In these terms objectivity depends on 
cognitive reversibility: the ability to 'move back and forth between premises and 
conclusions without any distortion' (lbid:53). What is being assumed is the 
insistence that all reality is akin to a coherent set of manipulable variables. An 
alternative which emerges is the notion of imaginal thought (Broughton ,1985) 
Here the intention is to displace 'the fat relentless ego' (Murdoch, 1985:93) 
whereby the concept good resists the scientism of the rationalist and refuses to 
'collapse into the selfish empirical consciousness' (Ibid). But even though 
Broughton's criticism is severe, radical and wide-ranging, it does grasp that 
quintessential quality of being human; which is contrasted with Kohlberg's 
cognitive patterning: 
In place of tove and loss, cool, impartial knowledge that is always a gain. In place 
of pleasure and pain, the advance of rational mastery. In place of attachment with 
significant others, universal affiliation. In place of fantasy, play or dreams, the 
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structures of thought. In place of the unconscious, the conscious. In place of 
meaning, truth. In place of the development of the self, the equilibration and 
adaptation of the cognitive system. Instead of the fostering of kinship, 
authenticity and community, the principle of individual moral meritocracy, 
administered by a professional educational bureaucracy of psychological 
specialists (p.379). 
Almost Orwellian in its bland portrayal of Kohlbergian alternatives, although surely 
the real point is that the moral life cannot be reduced to choices and justifications 
scored in terms of linear stages. Broughton concluded as follows: 
None of this is to be blamed on stupidity or deviousness. The desire reparation of 
our individual and collective condition is in itself of noble intent. But the 
possibilities of a humane life need constant nurturance. And when the desire for 
social improvement yields to fascination with the complex and challenging task of 
totalizing a rational system, we are diverted from the simpler and less charismatic 
task of giving life (Ibid). 
Thus for Kohlberg, the core of the moral life is very much construed in terms of the 
way individuals adjudicate conflicting claims through linear structured cognitive 
processes. Not surprisingly, Kohlberg extends this cognitive patterning model to 
include religion: 
At our moral stage 1, divinity is bound to be an authority who is the ultimate 
dispenser of punishment and reward. At our moral stage 2 one of our children 
says, "You be good to God and he will be good to you." The relation of man and 
God is one exchange of trade. At moral stage 3 the notion of divinity as moral 
ideal, as an ideally good person, as the carer and protector of goodness is first 
entertained. At moral stage 4 divinity is first seen as lawgiver, bound by law and 
the ultimate ground of order. At moral stage 5 divinity or the ultimate becomes 
identified with or is the ground of freedom, individuality and responsibility (cited 
In Dkystra, 1981:24-25). 
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Indeed Dykstra (1981) frames his analysis of Kohlberg within a Christian 
frameworlt and uses Kohlberg's employment of Kantian rationalist principles to 
negate the model. First of ail he cites Kohlberg's admission: 'Philosophically I 
incline toward Kant's solution, that faith is grounded on moral reason because 
moral reason requires faith rather than that moral reason is grounded on faith' 
(p.25). The distinction clinches Kohlberg's argument and preserves the radical 
autonomy of the institution of morality and thus religious faith and belief have been 
collapsed into human psychological structures. 
Such an explanation of religion in Kantian terms, where value is detached from the 
inter-subjective world and becomes a function of sheer decision making, is entirely 
consistent with modern reductionist tendencies in cognitive psychology, and 
legitimates the primacy and autonomy of Kohlberg's moral domain. But for Dykstra 
(1981) religious faith can never be an extension of cognitive structures, nor can the 
transcendental be reduced to acts of human consciousness: 
If however, religious faith has to do with the way in which people are related to a 
transcendent center of power and reality that is distinct from themselves and their 
own structure of consciousness, and that acts in the world and in themselves to 
convert their patterns of thinking and ways of living, then faith and morality may be 
more intimately and effectively related. Here religious faith is not a matter of being 
confirmed in what we already implicitly know, but of being moved to new ways of 
seeing, knowing, feeling, and relating. And this has everything to do with how we 
make moral judgements (p.27). 
Even so, Kohlberg's model can illuminate reality by reference to it as one part of a 
complex theoretical toolbox. Indeed Vogt (1997) claims that 'few researchers have 
had as strong an impact on values education as Lawrence Kohlberg: 
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Thomas (1992), for example, claims that Kohlberg's theory "remains the most 
stimulating and potentially the most fertile of children's moral growth in current 
psychological and philosophical circles" (p.514). Cited in Vogt, 1997:143. 
Certainly Kohlberg's structured model of moral agency extends and enriches our 
moral vocabulary, albeit it within the limitations of fixed social conflictual situations. 
After all, individuals exist as moral agents only in relation to other individuals and 
collectively and indivisibly form part of an ever increasing wider moral community. 
In this context, Rorty (1994) puts forward a convincing case for the need to 
continually extend our vocabulary by conscientiously working within our own self-
generated social networks: 
Just as there is nothing which validates a person's or a culture's final vocabulary, 
there is nothing implicit in that vocabulary which dictates how to reweave it when it 
is put under strain. All we can do is work with the final vocabulary we have, while 
keeping our ears open for hints about how it might be expanded or revised 
(p. 197). 
A Perspective From Theology 
The Traditional 
The three main Western religions - Christianity, Judaism and Islam - all claim that 
God is the supreme reality. God is viewed as omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, 
perfectly good and a source of moral obligation; who exists externally and 
necessarily. However, within the confines of the possible, the scope of this 
discussions will limit its analysis to Christianity: a justification which arises, not 
from any narrow ethnocentric bias, but from practical expediency. 
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Honderich (1995) defines theology as 
The study or science which treats of God. His nature and attributes, and his 
relations with man and the universe...and based upon reasoning from natural 
facts apart from revelation (p.870). 
From this perspective a line of foundational Christian scholars from Augustine 
(354-430 AD) through Aquinas (1225 -1274) and Dun-Scotus (1265-1308) to 
Ockham (1285-1349) have each underpinned the centrality of one universal God. 
The crucial difference concerned where to lay most emphasis between faith" and 
'reason'. 
If Christianity is true, then my problematic relationship to God is what must be 
central to my moral life and the virtues that derive from that relationship must take 
precedence over those that may arise from my social position. In Augustine's 
classic formulation, the Christian is essentially a citizen of the City of God and the 
duties that arise from this role take precedence over those arising from 
membership of any earthly city (Rudd,1997). For Augustine, therefore, the primacy 
of faith over reason was sacrosanct: 
Understanding is the reward of faith. Seek therefore not to understand in order 
that you may believe, but to believe in order that you may understand (cited in 
Collinson, 1994:28). 
By contrast, however, Aquinas reversed the position by displacing the centrality 
of faith over reason by asserting that the proposition "God exists" is not self-evident 
(Honderich, 1995:44). Thus, Aquinas developed his 'five intellectual proofs of 
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God's existence', which remain the bedrock of modern Christian teaching and in 
particular Roman Catholicism (Velecky, 199,4). For Aquinas (1988), then, no 
demonstration can start from God and work to his effects, as such a demonstration 
would require insight into God's nature. Moreover, the five intellectual proofs were 
firmly underpinned by a causal logic which asserted that 'everything that moves is 
moved by something else, for nothing can move unless it has the potentiality of 
acquiring the perfection of that towards which it moves' (lbid:30). Clearly if this 
reasoning were to be extended "ad infinitum" then the consequences would be an 
infinite regression of causal links. Here, Aquinas introduced the concept of a first 
mover:' it is necessary to go back to some first mover who is not moved by anyone, 
and this first mover is God' (lbid:31). 
Collinson (1994) provides an excellent summary of the overall argument: 
The first proof invites us to consider the changes that take place in the 
world.arguing that anything that moves is moved by something else, that an 
infinite series without that beginning is impossible, and therefore we have to 
arrive at the concept of an unmoved mover. The second proof looks at actual 
causes of changes, arguing that there must be a first cause which is God since no 
other cause could be the cause of itself. The third proof argues that the fact that 
some beings come into existence and perish shows that they are contingent 
rather than necessary beings and that a necessary being must be postulated as 
the source of the existence of contingent beings. In the fourth proof Aquinas 
points out that we judge some things to be better than others and maintains that 
such degrees of perfection imply the existence of a best, a truest, a supreme 
being which is the cause of all relative perfections and is itself pure perfection. 
The fifth proof concerns the way in which natural bodies appear to operate 
towards some good end or purpose and from this is argued that there must t>e an 
intelligent being by whom everything is given an end that relates to things as a 
whole (p.35). 
This set of propositions is now axiomatic to any understanding and acceptance of 
Christianity and yet, for the purposes of this discussion, their real significance 
resides in the mode of argument which supports them which indeed usurps the 
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orthodoxy of Augustine's primacy of faith. 
By contrast, Duns Scotus (1987) could not accept Aquinas' five proofs because 
they argued from facts of ordinary human sense experience to the existence of 
God: 
I ask first whether it is possible to know God. And i ask first: whether the intellect 
of man in this life is able to know God naturally. I argue that it cannot...the 
senses perceive only what is sensible. Therefore the intellect is unable to grasp 
anything whose sense image cannot be known by the senses. Of God there 
is no sense image. Neither is He such that He could be perceived by such a 
sense faculty...But if it is impossible to know such things it is impossible to know 
God (p. 14). 
Thus for Duns Scotus, philosophical reasoning could never arrive at the concept of 
a Christian God; faith alone was the only possible path to a true understanding with 
God (Until last century, the universities of Cambridge, Edinburgh and Oxford all 
Included a Duns Scotus chair in theology). However, parallel to Duns Scotus, 
Ockham also reaffirmed that whatever concepts could be derived from the concept 
of a First Being, any knowledge thereby attained could only be knowledge of the 
concepts and not knowledge of God (Honderich, 1995:633). For both theologians 
knowledge of God was, of course, possible, though not via reasoning, but through 
revelation - whereby knowledge is of an entirely different kind and based on 
entirely different language and concepts. 
The scope of this scholasticism - separation of revelation and faith - heralded a 
new age of inquiry where the theoretical scope of and limits for the study of the 
natural world were established. The concept of 'Ockham's razor': 'do not multiply 
meaning beyond its necessity', or 'it is vain to do with more what can be done with 
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less' (Honderich: Ibid) typified the inexorable shift from the rhetorical and 
symbolic use of language towards the new orthodoxy of the empirical and 
verifiable. 
Parallel with the Copernican revolution in science was the search for causal 
connections between God and the universe which was most evident in the 
Protestant Reformation. Mediaeval religious certainty was displaced by the rise of 
modern science. An ascent which, complemented by the reductionist principles of 
Ockham's razor, found its greatest modernist expression in Descartes's (1591-
1650) and his methodology of rationalism. For Descartes, truth was determined 
and validated by a concept of certainty located in Cartesian doubt : "Cogito ergo 
sum". The formula itself was not new as it had been used by Augustine in 
answering the skeptics of his day, though what was novel was that it became the 
first principle of Descartes' Philosophy. He inherited many of the Medieaval proofs 
of the existence of God and adapted Anselm's (1033-1109) 'ontological argument': 
'Just as the sum of three angles of a triangle equalling two right angles is included 
in the very area of a triangle, so the existence of God is included in the idea of God' 
(cited in Towley, 1990:487). Also Descartes adapted Aquinas' "Cosmological 
argument" which argued back to a first cause: the difference was that 'whereas 
Aquinas had used the world to show the existence of God. Descartes had used 
God to argue for the validity of our perceptions of the world (Ibid). 
Ree (1974) argues that these reductionist principles of Cartesian positivist 
rationalism retained a stranglehold on scientific explanation until the 20th century 
and the eventual displacement of Newtonian physics: 
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The influence of his [Descartes] reductive ideal on the development of science has 
been so enormous that it justifies even his most boastful claims about the importance 
of his work. Newton took over Descartes' belief that the purpose of science was to 
reduce everything to the' universal qualities of bodies whatsoever'. And it was in the 
spirit of Descartes that he wrote dismissively of the things to which 'the Aristotelians 
gave the name of occult Qualities'...Similarly, in advocating the 'investigations of 
things by the h/lethod of Analysis' he echoes Descartes in speaking of it as moving' 
'from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most 
general (p. 19). 
A contrasting corollary to the orthodox Catholic position which Descartes sought to 
strengthen, albeit through rationalism, was the pantheism of Spinoza (1632-1677). 
Spinoza's rationalism emphatically denied the existence of God over and above 
the world, but at the same time asserted that there was only one substance - God, 
or nature. And although he was against all form of established religion he was 
nevertheless a passionate endorser of the moral messages in the Bible as a set of 
guidelines to influence the development of virtue. Indeed Spinoza's 17th century 
position on ethics anticipates the 20th century humanism of existentialism where 
the morally good is socially constructed rather than bestowed directly from God: 
PROP. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly and live rightly, without at 
the same time wishing to be, to act and to live - in other words to actually exist. 
PROOF. - The proof of this proposition, or rather the proposition itself, is self-evident, 
and is also plain from the deduction of desire. For the desire of living, acting, etc., 
bless^lly or rightly, is the essence of man - that is, the endeavor made by everyone to 
preserve his own being, (p.82). 
Following on from this, Spinoza collapses all ethics into his concept of the self: 
PROP. XX11. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavor to preserve one's 
own being 
PROOF. - The effort for self preservatk3n is the essence of a thing; therefore, if any 
virtue could be conceived as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be 
conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd. 
COROLLARY. - The effort for self-preservation is the first and only foundation for 
virtue . For prior to this principle nothing can be conceived, and without it no virtue 
can be conceived (Ibid). 
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The traditional Mediaeval realism - the objective belief in a universal and univocal 
God-given world order - had thus been seriously challenged and Spinoza's 
pantheism became an influential springboard for alternative human-centred 
theories of morality. 
The Modern 
The theology of Novak (1991) combines the political and economic with traditional 
theological arguments in an extensive analysis of the three economic isms; 
Marxism, Socialism and Capitalism. It is the latter, 'democratic capitalism', which he 
convincingly defends as the best moral and cultural option available. For Novak, 
political democracy is synonymous with a market economy and the impulses which 
gave birth to such an economy are persuasively stated as twofold moral ones: 
(1) to limit the power of the state, in defence against tyranny and stagnation; and (2) 
to liberate the energies of individuals and independently organized communities 
(p. 14). 
Novak (1993) is able to cite Vatican sources - Centesimus Annus, Para 35 - in 
defense of his thesis of the market economy. Pope John Paul II argues for the 
exclusion of the absolute predominance of the means of production and of the 
land, and in contrast endorses the necessarily free and personal nature of work: 
What is proposed as an alternative is not the socialist system which turns out to be 
state capitalism but rather a society of free work, of enterprise and of participation. 
Such a society is not directed against the market, but demands that the market is 
appropriately controlled by the forces of society and by the state, so as to guarantee 
that the basic needs of the whole of society are satisfied (p. 19). 
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And later in the same document the Pope again refers to Christianity within the 
context of democratic capitalism: 
This process, which throws practical light on a truth about the human person which 
Christianity has constantly affirmed, should be viewed carefully and favorably (Ibid). 
Here the the Pope advances two new and important arguments in favour of the 
thesis that market systems shed practical light on Christian truth and thus extend 
human welfare. The first argument sees markets as giving free reign to the 
creativity of each individual. The second argument is that rnarkets generate new 
and important kinds of secular community. Novak (1993) is unrestrained in the 
Pope's endorsement of his arguments for a democratic capitalism: 
To concede that markets in themselves are good is to concede a great deal. To 
recommend them as better than any known alternative is to praise them quite 
sufficiently (p. 19) 
Again in 1996 the Pope stated: 
The Church can certainly affirm a system that recognises the fundamental and 
positive value of business, the market and private property, as well as free human 
creativity in the economic sector (Catholic Bishop's Conference [CBC]:10) 
In these terms Novak (1995) advances his modernist conception of Christianity 
which is framed within a spirit of moral optimism: 
...modernity has, to its its great credit, by grant of Providence, made three great ins-
titutional discoveries. Modern thinkers first worked out, as neither the ancients nor 
the medievals did, the practical principles of the threefold free society; free in its 
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polity, free in its economy and free in the realm of conscience and inquiry. The great 
modern achievements in these matters have been supremely practical: How to make 
free institutions work at least tolerably well.and better in most ways than earlier 
regimes (p. 16). 
The moral obligation to accept creative responsibility for one's own actions places 
the person at the centre of a sacred morality within a secular context. A context 
which includes 'the Golden Rule, Beatitudes and Ten Commandments" (Skeen, 
1980, p.20) Nevertheless, The Ten Commandments, said to be given by God to 
His people through Moses in Exodus 20: 2-17, provides the mainstream moral 
code by which ultimately each Christian must be guided (Peschke, 1997): 
1 You shall have no other gods before me 
2 You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain 
3 Remember the sabbath day to keep it holy 
4 Honour your father and your mother 
5 You shall not kill 
6 You shall not bear false witness 
7 You shall not steal 
8 You shall not commit adultery 
9 You shall not covet your neighbour's wife 
10 You shall not covet your neighbour's house or field or anything that is your 
neighbour's (cited in Peschke, 1993:16). 
Parallel with this moral code Christian tradition developed a catalogue of main 
sins, designated as the capital sins of Pride, Avarice, Envy, Lust, Gluttony, Anger, 
Sloth. Along side this, tradition lists seven main virtues: the three theological 
virtues of faith, hope and charity and the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, 
fortitude and temperance. Yet within this interesting melange of value 
characteristics there is little direct correspondence between the sins and virtues. 
Indeed the virtues opposed to the capital sins are different from the seven main 
virtues and vice versa. Peschke (1993) nevertheless points out their enormous 
83 
importance to a critical and reflective morality: 
In fact the table of the capital sins and cardinal virtues are not the result of systematic 
analysis and logical deduction, but stem from a popular ethics and have something of 
accidentalness. They are not so much aids in the scientific study of moral theology as 
helps for spiritual incitement and ascetic reflection (p.306). 
In spite of the inclusion of the above virtues, it is fair to say that the concept of virtue 
Is not the dominant idea in Scripture which it is in the Greek and Humanistic ideal 
of the virtuous personality. For the latter aims at the perfection in virtues as the 
highest summit of moral excellence; whereas Christian perfection consists in 
conformity to the image and ideals of God. In Peschke's terms 'a man has either 
all virtues or none at all' (lbld:342) and, if this is so, it probably follows that Christian 
virtues are rather more aspirational than realistically possible to achieve. 
The modern usage of the concept "conscience", as the dominant constituent part 
of moral agency, in a sense draws together the different Christian moral positions 
(CBC,1996; Peschke,1993). Conscience is neither the exercise of reason alone 
nor of will alone because it is possible to will and do what is opposed to 
conscience. The Conference of Catholic Bishops argue for 'the extending of the 
traditional Catholic custom of "examination of conscience" to be extended into the 
social and political realm' (CBC.11). Peschke defines conscience as both 'the 
centre of the soul where man encounters God and as the result of the interplay 
between intellect, will and man's total personality' (p.204). If, by this reckoning, 
conscience is concerned with the processes of reflexivity and languaging, what 
logically must then must follow is a space for those metaphysical qualities of 
reflection and deliberation. In other words, what therefore, is required is a silent 
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space whereby the focused and the foggy can co-exist within a range of internal 
silent conversations which are frequently and simultaneously cross-referenced to a 
chaotic myriad of other unspecifiable data. 
The Postmodern 
In 'The Postmodern Condition' (1984), written as a report on knowledge for the 
Quebec government, Lyotard examined knowledge, science and technology in 
advanced capitalist societies. The idea of a society with a fixed national identity 
was judged to be inadequate as was the epistemological foundations of modernity, 
reflected in its "metanarratives". Two influential metanarratives, knowledge is 
produced for its own sake, and knowledge is produced in the quest for 
emancipation, were severely criticised. Lyotard's Postmodernity contested such 
goals of knowledge and implied that no ultimate proof was available. His 
argument was that these metanarratives lock civilization into restrictive totalitarian 
and logocentric thought systems whereby knowledge and truth are viewed as 
abstract and theoretical constructs rather than direct, subjective human experience. 
Lyotard stressed the contingency of socially constructed meaning and dismantled 
the Enlightenment conception of reason and of the rational subject. The 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1962) had already signalled the possibilities 
for a socially contingent reality by claiming "consciousness is always actively 
perceptual" (op. cit) and in these terms the primacy of lived experience reinforced 
"the perceiving mind as an incarnated mind" (Ibid). Ricouer (1988) and Rorty 
(1994), built on Lyotard's critique and adamantly rejected the dominant "great 
master narrative" of the positivist cognitive and epistemological world view and 
instead posited the notion of the dissolution of self into a host of living social 
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networks and active relationships. 
Ricoeur (1990) sees the problem of personal identity as the problem of change, 
inherent in the notion of personal history. In these terms it is impossible to base 
one's identity of selfhood on one's identity of sameness, as sameness is simply not 
permanent enough. The identity of sameness can diminish over time and vanish. 
People change in appearance and they also change inwardly; they change their 
opinions, acquire new predispositions and so on . The identity of sameness thus 
disappears, but it is not necessarily the case that the identity of selfhood 
disappears as well. Therefore, the identity of self does not depend ultimately on a 
stable identity of sameness, neither in appearance nor in terms of the inner kernel 
of self (13). In Ricoeur's terms then: 
It is not substance that call identity into existence, but interpretation. This hermeneut-
ical concept of narrative identity then, is historical and dynamic. Personal identity lies 
in the narrative mediation between the two types of identity which never totally 
coincide. One's biographical story restores unity by bringing coherence into the 
diversity, continuity into the changes in one's life, including the changes in oneself. 
Personal identity, therefore, is a history, an interpretation (1990:138) 
For Ricouer, the subjective and objective aspects of a situation cannot be isolated 
because they intenweave dialectically. But language forces us to relate to situations 
in terms of either subject or object and yet we find that neither can singly provide 
an adequate vocabulary for describing situations. (i 4) 
For the theologian, Cupitt (1995) this development inevitably led to: 
...vulgar relativism, "nihilism with a happy face." For them it is certain that there is no 
truth, only opinion, my opinion your opinion...nothing else is left but preference 
(P-19). 
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Personal identity, therefore, is a history, an interpretation (1990:138) 
For Ricouer, the subjective and objective aspects of a situation cannot be isolated 
because they interweave dialectically. But language forces us to relate to situations 
in terms of either subject or object and yet we find that neither can singly provide 
an adequate vocabulary for describing situations. (14) 
For the theologian, Cupitt (-1995) this development inevitably led to: 
...vulgar relativism, "nihilism with a happy face." For them it is certain that there is no 
truth, only opinion, my opinion your opinion...nothing else is left but preference 
(p.19). 
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The controversial theology of Cupitt (1995) presents perhaps the most extreme 
interpretation of modern Christianity; 
The god was so patent and vivid that you scarcely had time to think about the ritual 
vocabulary in which you were communicating...But the centuries passed, oracles and 
prophecies ceased. God fell silent and became distant and impersonal, and the 
practice of one's religion replaced the old immediacy. A certain fetichization of the 
religious system began (p.38). 
The culprit of this 'fetichization' is positivist science, or in Nagel's (1986) terms 
"scientism". Cupitt's point is that the activity of science - mathematics and physics, 
etc. - cannot step outside language but tries to do so: 'The error arises because 
when we are trained in science we are trained systematically to bracket out our 
own subjectivity and pay no attention to it' (pp.40-41). In this respect the referential 
nature of scientific inquiry- the thinking-about - is assumed to be outside language, 
'whereas thinking-about remains firmly inside language' (p.41) and by analogy the 
argument is reinforced: 
A man who supposes he has moved outside language is like a man who searches for 
his spectacles, forgetting that he wouldn't be able to search unless they were already 
on his nose...There is no non-human language, and no non-human vision of the 
worid against which we can check our own perspectives...truth and value are thus 
radically humanized (Ibid). 
Here language is the mediator of morality and accordingly Cupitt's language 
thesis offers an important contribution to Christian theology by its stress on the 
intersubjective and socially contingent structure of religious communication. This 
particular kind of languaging and reflexivity can be seen as crucial elements in 
fusing the myriad of different and often competing conversations within and across 
a diversity of particular language games (i 5). 
87 
Cupitt's other, more radical, thesis is that 'God is objectified only in his 
absence. When present, he is just people's own charisma, their creativity, their 
freedom' (1995:126) violates mainstream Christianity like an earthquake. Moral 
values are now construed in terms of social values woven into a post-modernist 
Christian tapestry (Grenz, 1996) 
A Perspective From Philosophy 
By reason of the assumption that all rational responses to moral dilemmas are 
necessarily theory-dependent, as they can only make complete sense within a 
specific intellectual frame of reference, it then follows that the way in which a moral 
problem is approached will depend on the ethical framework which is either 
explicitly or implicitly appealed to. What this further implies is, of course, that the 
language and concepts used will be largely drawn from within the specific ethical 
culture in order to exemplify and amplify the moral reasoning thus supported. Even 
so, and with the exception of formal and symbolic logic, all philosophy is part of 
natural language; which is a point Murdoch (1997) is keen to make emphatically in 
relation to moral issues: 
It is important to remember that language itself is a moral medium, almost all uses 
of language convey value. This is one reason why we are almost always morally 
active. Life is soaked in the moral, literature is soaked in the moral. If we attempted 
to describe this room our description would naturally carry all sorts of values. 
Value is only artificially and witti difficulty expelled from language for scientific 
purposes (p.27). [myitalics] 
In other words the limitations of the language will always necessitate the limitations 
of the ethical system, and until the language is changed neither the reality nor the 
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theory underpinning it will be changed. For it is only by consciously contesting 
and challenging the dominant discourse - which shapes and is the embodiment of 
consciousness - that change can happen at at all (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977 & 
1990; Merleau-Ponty, 1964; Ricour,1990). Or to put it another way, experience 
needs to be shaped by language in order to become real. This underlying binding 
principle is the point of Whitehead's (1970) famous dictum: 'the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness', whereby experience is seen as primary. 
In contemporary western culture, modern moral thinking emerges largely by 
reference to two particular ethical traditions: the liberal utilitarian and the 
conservative Kantian (Billington, 1993; Foot, 1990; Honderich, 1995; Maclntyre, 
1987; MacNiven, 1993; Murdoch, 1992; Scruton, 1994; Williams, 1993). 
Both of these ethical systems have deep roots in western culture. In the first 
instance, Kantianism is related to both secular and religious humanism and was 
strongly influenced by the classical natural law tradition and derives its name from 
Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804). And secondly, Utilitarianism has a more recent 
lineage associated with the rise of modern science and derives its name from John 
Stuart Mill (1806-1873). 
Therefore, the scope of this section will be to examine these two ethical systems 
and to examine as well secular, as distinct from religious, humanism and then to 
conclude with an exploration of Wittgenstein's approach on ethics as exemplified 
in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus', first published in 1921 and his 
'Philosophical Investigations', first published in 1953. Following on from this, a 
synthesis will be developed within a new frame of reference from what otherwise 
would necessarily remain four incommensurable approaches. In this respect 
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Wittgenstein's (1993) dictum, 'the limits of my language are the limits of my world' 
(p.56) will provide the rationale and the impulse for the emergence of a new 
ethical framework. 
The Kantian Perspective 
For Kant morality is just rationality in action - that is to say it is the condition of 
rational consistency in action, and, as such, it is entirely autonomous and self-
supporting. In these terms and central to Kant's ethical theory - as expounded in 
his 'Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals', written in 1785 - are two 
deceptively simple theses: (1) If the rules of morality are rational then it follows that 
they must be the same for all rational people; and (2) if the rules of morality are 
binding on all rational people then contingency is displaced in favour of the 
rational will. Kant asks the question 'How is an imperative of Morality possible?' 
(p.82). By jettisoning the reference to 'empirical conditions' (Ibid) in terms of needs 
and desires that are only known a posterori, Kant produces an a priori imperative 
whose validity is guaranteed by reason alone: 
Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law (p.84) 
Adherence to this highly compressed principle captures Kant's rationalist demand 
for reason as well as endorsing the Christian golden rule: Do unto others as you 
would like them to do unto you . The practical imperative thus follows: 
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end 
(p.91). 
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The moral conviction implied by such imperatives sees freedom as the condition 
that makes morality possible by virtue of the fact that 'rational nature exists as an 
end in itself (Ibid). The 'universal' good is willed by a sense of duty: 
Wherever an object of the will has to be put down as the basis for prescribing a rule to 
determine the will, there the rule is heteronomy; the imperative is conditioned as 
follows: 'If, or because, you will this object, you ought to act thus or thus, 
consequently it can never give a moral - that is, a categorical - command. However the 
object determines the will - whether by means of inclination, as in the principal of 
personal happiness, or by means of reason directed to objects of our possible 
volitions generally, as in the principle of perfection - the will never determines itself 
immediately by the thought of an action, but only by the impulsion which the 
anticipated effect of the action exercises on the will: 7 ought to do something because 
I will something else.' And the basis for this must be yet a further law in me as a 
subject, whereby 1 necessarily will this 'something else' - which law in turn requires an 
imperative to impose limits on this maxim (p. 105). 
Kant's moral obligation must be be fulfilled for its own sake and not for happiness 
or utility nor for the sake of a Christian God since 'an obligation imposed on men by 
God would result in turning men into slaves' (Ibid). This clear emphasis on a 
rational moral autonomy, independent of God, places the onus for doing good 
squarely on the metaphorically broad shoulders of each rational agent. But by 
basing morality on the individual's judgement of what is deemed to be a universal 
law, there is a real danger that this could lead to subjectivism and thereafter to 
moral relativism. 
Rawls (1986) furthers Kant's approach by his "hypothetical" contractual theory of 
justice which is premised on two key concepts: (1) the veil of ignorance and (2) 
reflective equilibrium. In terms of (1), each person draws up the best possible rules 
of justice for an ideal society by placing themselves in a state of fictional ignorance: 
'That is, nobody knows which place he wilt obtain in this society, whether he will be 
rich or poor, intelligent or dull, healthy or handicapped, white or black' (p. 12). In 
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relation to (2) Rawls employs reflective equilibrium as a method for achieving 
coherence in our moral views: 
by achieving colierence in our moral views tlirougli mutual adjustment between 
particular moral judgements, general principles, and theoretical constructions like the 
social contract (p.53). 
A distinguishing feature of the reflective equilibrium approach is its appeal to the 
individual's natural capacity for reflection over everyday judgements about what is 
right and wrong. By framing his approach in a concept of aspirational impartiality, 
Rawls provides a rational framework from within which a decision procedure for 
moral issues can be applied. Here the distinction between the moral and ethical is 
sharply drawn, as Kant's categorical criteria relate to an ethical system but Rawl's 
model for "considered judgements' does not: 
A considered judgement does not provide any reason for the decision. It simply 
states the felt preference in view of the facts of the case and the interests competing 
therein {p. 186). 
In both Kant and Rawls the emphasis is on the impersonal rational thinker and a 
personal will and in these terms complex issues are amenable to resolution 
through general first principles (Kant) and abstraction (Rawls). With this conception, 
moral life requires moral kriowledge, and moral knowledge means knowledge of 
the true moral principles. It is almost as if the moral life is an intellectual riddle to be 
solved, and if the burden of proof is demonstrable then intellectual reasoning is 
essential. But when the burden of proof is less so then it is necessary to discover 
an alternative.In this context the process of discovery can be regarded as a creative 
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process whereas the process of proof is not. 
Moreover, Kantian moral thought has always had to struggle against the charge of 
vacuity, the suspicion that the description of a person as simply a rational agent is 
just too thin for any significant moral constraints to be derived from it (Rudd, 1997). 
But whereas for Murdoch (1997), however, the idea of a more humanistic Kantian 
moral agency is just about right: 
The moral agent is thus pictured, in a manner which remains essentially Kantian, 
as using his reason to survey the ordinary factual world, and making decisions 
therein which he will defend by reference to facts and to simple principles offered 
as patently rational. He is not pictured as using his reason to explore the 
intermediate area of concepts. Moral action, in short, is seen as the making of 
sensible choices and giving of sensible and simple reasons. It is not seen as the 
activity of theorising, imagining, or seeking for deeper insight (p. 177). 
Nonetheless the strength of Kantianism is, not in it use as a template or formula, 
but in its use as a model capable of yielding a reasonable return on explanation. 
The underpinning logic is that by reference to enriched theoretical constructs which 
yield high informational content and aspire towards low probability of being false 
there is always a demonstrable value. Flowing from this epistemological position, 
in accordance with probability theory, the more information a theory contains then 
the greater the number of ways it can turn out to be false. Thus if highly falsifiable, it 
is also highly testable and nearer the truth (see Popper, 1979, pp. 101-103). 
But whereas, Kant's paradigmatic ethical first principle 'Act only on that maxim 
which you can, at the same time will to become universal law' does fulfill these 
epistemological criteria, so too does the sharply contrasting social utility of its 
Utilitarian counterpart: 'Act always so as to produce the greatest good for the 
93 
greatest number'. 
The following paragraphs will seek to illuminate some of those key differences. 
The Utilitarian Perspective 
Mill's Utilitarianism distances itself from Kantian ethics by its assessment of 
actions in terms of their ends and consequences, their contribution to human 
happiness and the prevention of human suffering. Mill (1987) states his first moral 
principle: 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness, wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness (p.6). 
Following on from this, Mill distinguishes between first principles and secondary 
principles, the latter being a list of moral rules such as: do not commit murder, tell 
no lies, keep promises etc. The core of Mill's reasoning here involves two basic 
premises: (1) a particular action is justified as being right if it can be demonstrated 
that it accords with a moral rule, and (2) a moral rule is shown to be right by 
demonstrating that the recognition of the rule promotes the 'greatest happiness 
principle' (GHP).The significance of the distinction between first and secondary 
principles is stated thus: 
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We must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles 
is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to. There is no case of moral 
obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved; and if only one, there 
can seldom be any real doubt which one it is, in the mind of any person by whom the 
principle itself is recognised (lbid;26). 
For Kant, the moral law requires a very heavy appeal to reflective agreement, but 
whereas in Kant such reflection is guided by reason, in Mill it is guided by desire; 
desire as both a means and as an end in the pursuit of the GHP. In this way the 
individual fulfils personal happiness as well as promoting the general civic good. 
The value of Mill's approach is in providing a criteria - frequently known as 
consequentialism - to determine what is right and wrong based upon actual states 
of affairs and not hypotheticals. Indeed the scope does not extend to a definition of 
these terms which was central to Moore's (1991) Principia Ethica. 
Norman (1983) provides a useful summary of the effects of Mill's GHP: 
The combined effect of all these sanctions is to induce people to pursue their own 
pleasure in such a way as to co-operate also in the production of pleasure and 
avoidance of pain for others. The task of the moralist and of the legislator is to 
manipulate the various sanctions, so as to maximise the happiness of all (p.125). 
Interpreted in the light of his GHP, Mill's utilitarianism can be viewed as 
complementary to Christian ethics. Mill recognized the affinities with Christianity 
and argued that when properly understood, although not derived or dependent on 
Christianity, it was completely compatible with the Christianity of Jesus Christ: 
...utilitarianism is essentially concordant with the ethics of Christianity. In the golden 
rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility...as a 
religion of humanity (p.27-28). 
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The criterion to be chosen for the values of happiness is 'the experience of 
intelligent people as competent judges' (lbid:41). Of course there are certain 
difficulties in deciding which people and whose values? But precisely because 
Mill's utility principle is deeply rooted in the premises of enlightenment humanism 
(Honderich, 1995), value is intended to reside in the well-being achieved in day-
to-day social life and not in universally-fixed absolutes. 
The Humanist Perspective 
After the collapse of the intellectual hegemony of the Christian Middle Ages, the 
major project of moral philosophy had become the search for an abstract rational 
foundation to build a modern ethical framework. The Enlightenment introduced 
radical new ideas which contradicted the fixed moral certainties of the Bible and, in 
these circumstances, the seperation of Church and State inevitably led to the 
alternative voices of Protestantism, Science and Humanism. 
In these terms it is hardly surprising that Existentialism, as a variant of Humanism, 
enters the frame with its strong emphasis on an individual morality grounded in 
experience. Certainly the impulse for modern Existentialism was Sartre (1905-
1980) in his 1945 lecture, 'Existentialism and Humanism' where he defined the 
central tenet of his aesthetic variant: 
existence comes before essence - or i f you will we must begin from the 
subjective...! am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating 
a certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself I fashion 
man (p. 30). 
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He refers to God as 'an out of date hypothesis' (p.33) and sets out his alternative 
argument over the next two pages which is summarised as follows : 
1. To be morally constrained to do something is to be commanded by 
somebody with moral authority to do it 
2, Only God can have moral authority 
3 But God does not exist 
4 Therefore there is nobody with moral authority over us 
5 As we are not constrained morally, we are free to choose 
(see PP33-35). 
Central to this reasoning is a belief in 'the absolute character of free commitment, 
by which every man realises himself in realising a type of humanity' (p.47). Sartre 
concludes by emphasing 'the universe of human subjectivity' (p.55): 
...in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human 
universe - it is that which we call existentialist humanism. This is humanism, because 
we remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus 
abandoned, must decide for himself; also because we show that it is not by turning 
back upon himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself, an aim which is one of 
liberation or of some particular realisation, that man can realise himself as truly human 
(pp.55^56). 
The link between human agency and being moral and in separating will from 
reason is uppermost in the claim that 'to be authentically human is to view conduct 
as problematic' (lbid:48). These various claims are also important in the religious 
existentialism of Kirkegaard (1813-1855) who states in his journal that he wants to 
create a pattern of life which would allow him to: 
lead a complete human life and not merely one of the understanding, so that 1 should 
not...base the development of my thought upon...something that is called 
objective...but upon something which grows together with the deepest roots of my 
life (cited in Golomb, 1995:33). 
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For Kirkegaard, 'man is a living passion' and not an abstract reason and must 
embrace the ethics of social and civic responsibilities: 
The person who has ethically chosen and found himself possesses himself in his 
entire concretion...Here the objective for his activity is himself, but nevertheless not 
arbitrarily determined, even though it became his by his own choosing. But although 
he himself is his objective, this objective is nevertheless something else also, for the 
self that is the objective is not an abstract self that fits everywhere and therefore 
nowhere but is a concrete self in living interaction with specific surroundings, these 
life conditions, this order of things. 
The self that is the objective is not only a personal self but a social, a civic self (cited in 
Matustik and Westphal, 1995:7). 
The transition to authenticity and enlightenment is incorporated into three key 
stages of development, each imbued with its own set of values: 
1 Aesthetic A person must explore the world of wit & sensuality 
2 Ethical A person must explore the world of moral responsibilities 
3 Religious A person must make a leap of faith (lbid:171). 
Stage 3 is further divided into (a) Socratic religion and (b) Christian religion. In the 
former 'the totality of a guilt-consciousness is the most upbuilding element' (lbid:8). 
In this respect the individual is striving desperately to become a true Christian and 
the struggle is from within. And in the latter, religion B punctuates the decisive 
moment in the life of the existent spheres by demarcating the internal into the 
temporal: 
In Religiousness B, the upbuilding is something outside of the individual; the 
individual does not find the upbuilding by finding the relationship with God within 
himself, but relates himself to something outside of himself to find the upbuilding 
(IbidilO) 
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This capacity to interact reflexively is a cornerstone of existentialist thinking. This 
quality of being able to"step back" from the empirical data to make free decisions is 
what Hampshire (1996) describes as: 
The paradigm of moral choice which is that of escaping from the data via a wild 
leap of the will, making choices which may be perverse and are certainly free 
from the dictates of reason...What is of primary moral value is the will and its 
movement of free choice, the actions we perform have only secondary value 
(cited in O' Connor, 1996:66) 
For Murdoch (1989) moral life can not be entirely reduced to pure Kantian or 
Utilitarian principles and instead she argues for a moral reality whereby 'What is 
real may be non-empirical without being in the grand sense systematic' (p.41). Her 
conclusion, based on humanist ethical principles, that 'the concept good resists 
collapse into the selfish empirical consciousness' (p.93) is persuasively argued: 
A genuine sense of mortality enables us to see virtue as the only thing of worth; and it 
is impossible to limit and foresee the ways in which it will be required of us. That we 
cannot dominate the world may be put in a more positive way. Good is mysterious 
because of human frailty, because of the immense distance which is involved. If there 
were angels they might be able to define good but we would not understand the 
definition. We are largely mechanical creatures, the slaves of relentlessly strong 
selfish forces the nature of which we scarcely comprehend. At best, as decent 
persons, we are usually very specialized. We behave well in areas where this can be 
done fairly easily and let other areas of possible virtue remain undeveloped....The self 
is a divided thing and the whole of it cannot be redeemed anymore than it can be 
known. And if we look outside the self what we see are scattered imitations of Good. 
There are few places where virtue really shines; great art, humble people who serve 
others. And can we, without improving ourselves, really see these things clearly 
(p.99). 
Murdoch captures the quintessential simplicity of the Good in creative and 
reflective ways by illuminating aspects of the self which remain hidden to Kantian 
and Utilitarian criteria. Here the fabric of moral life is in the active weaving of new 
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patterns rather than in the pursuance of patterns already pre-defined. In contrast 
Kant and Mill largely define the moral in terms of the world of facts and overt 
behaviour: while certainly this "choice and argument" model of morality, although 
yielding high explanatory value, it does not provide a pattern for all morality. 
The Lanquaqe Perspective 
This running up against the limits of language is ethics . I think it is definitively 
important to put an end to alt the claptrap about ethics - whether intuitive knowledge 
exists, whether values exist, whether the good is definable. In ethics we are always 
making the attempt to say something that cannot be said, something that does not 
and never will touch the essence of the matter (cited in Murdoch, 1992:29). 
These remarks were written by Wittgenstein (1889-1951) in a letter to a friend in 
1919 and what is interesting is that the problems stated, if not the sentiment, are the 
same problems occupying me while operating this word processor here today. So 
in one sense nothing much has changed. 
Murdoch (1992) describes Wittgenstein's Tractatus Loglco-Philosophicus as 'the 
definitive book on ethics' (p.28) which on first sight may seem somewhat surprising 
as there are only a very few remarks to do with ethics which cluster in the last two 
pages and climax in the remark: 'What we cannot speak about we must pass over 
in silence' (p.74). 
Nevertheless, closer textual scrutiny tends to support Murdoch's assessment. 
The following section will, therefore draw together a number of Wittgenstein's key 
principles within the terms of reference he advocated for the framing of ethical 
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questions. George Moore (1873-1958), author of 'Principia Ethica' of 1903, and 
one time mentor and friend to Wittgenstein, endorses the importance of 
Wittgenstein's method in his autobiography: 
When 1 did get to know him [Wittgenstein], I soon came to feel that he was much 
cleverer at philosophy than 1 was, and not only cleverer, but also much more 
profound, and with a much better insight into the sort of inquiry which was really 
important and best worth pursuing, and into the best method of pursuing such 
inquiries...when his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus came out, I read it again and 
again trying to learn from it. It was a book which I admired and do admire extremely. 
There is, of course, a great deal in it which I was not able to understand; but many 
things 1 thought 1 did understand, and found them very enlightening...He made me 
think that what is required for the solution of philosophical problems which baffle me, 
is a method quite different from any which I have ever used - a method which he 
himself uses successfully, but which 1 have never been able to understand cleariy 
enough to use it myself (cited in Levy, 1989:272). 
The immense humility of Moore is striking, but as significant is his allusion to the 
insight and unspecifiability of Wittgenstein's method which appears to emerge from 
the intuit and tacit rather than any explicit known criteria. 
This analysis will, however, endeavour to apply aspects of Wittgenstein's method 
and in doing so will draw on two complementary explanations of language One 
account in the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus',written in 1918, where a model of 
explanation is presented which draws a line between factual public language 
verifiable by logical analysis or experience, and private or personal language 
verifiable by reference to one's ethical framework. In 'Philosophical Investigations', 
published posthumously in 1953, the emphasis is shifted towards usage in a 
multiple of different "language games" generated by different social interactions. 
The earlier view arrived at in the 'Tractatus' is that philosophical problems arise 
from our misunderstanding of the logic of language and that philosophy is no 
science but an activity of elucidation and clarification. The later 'Investigations' 
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sees the nature and conception of philosophy as the same, namely a development 
of the earlier view (Fann, 1969). 
Of course there are many other interpretations, some of which tend to disfigure the 
sense of the book such as that which the Logical Positivists' claim (e.g., there are 
two kinds of meaningful statement portrayed in the Tractatus: analytic statements 
as in mathematics and logic which are true by definition; and statements that can 
be verified by experience; other statements are either metaphysical or rhetorical, 
Ayer, 1990). Alternatively, there is Russell's school of thought known as Logical 
Atomism (e.g., a picture theory of thinking whereby language represents a 
composite reality) and many other interpretations all of which wrongly assume that 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy was a radical break with the Tractatus; whereas this 
analysis will seek to demonstrate that there exists strong continuity between the 
earlier and later Wittgenstein in his conception, rather than method, of philosophy. 
A phrase which permeates the spirit of this analysis is the central 'Tractatus' dictum: 
'The limits of my language mean the limits of my world' (op. cit.). Clearly the limits 
set upon thought are not as narrow as the limits set upon written language, and the 
limits set upon the various expressions of language (i.e. Sociology, Psychology, 
Theology, Philosophy, Education) fall somewhere in between. In this sense 
language is able to refer to what it cahnot adequately express. The result of this 
forces us to recognise that we can set a limit to language - as this controlled 
disclosure demonstrates - because we can think both sides of such a limit (i.e., the 
requirements of this piece of research writing requires both (a) extensive and deep 
reflection as well as (b) controlled and clearly articulated written argument and 
both of which need to eventually complement each other as approximately as 
possible). 
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But by contrast, we cannot set a similar limit for thought since this is only done by 
coming up against what cannot be thought. Thus, in between the logical limits of 
language and the failure of thought - and this is the central point in terms of ethics 
in the 'Tractatus' - lies all ultimate expressions of value. In one sense (i.e., the 
sense of this thesis) language ought to stop with as much clarity as can be 
realistically achieved, whereas it frequently pushes against reality until finally it is 
forced into silence. 
In these terms analysing language is an unending process, precisely because no 
actuality is finally ultimate. And since language arises between the possible and 
the actual, the process of continually constructing a new possibility ensures this 
constant state of flux. Wittgenstein's ingenious solution to the problem was to 
distinguish between theory and practice and logic and reality. Bernstein (1967) 
has put the case succinctly in an excellent article: 
At least three languages are distinguished in the Tractatus: the perspicuous 
language, ordinary language, and the ladder langLiage. The perspicuous language is 
an aid for understanding how language works when we use it to make true and false 
statements It is not an ideal language which ordinary language must "approach" in 
order to fulfil its function. To describe this perspicuous language, we must use a 
language - the ladder language - which must not be confused with the object 
language that it describes: the propositions in the ladder language cannot occur in 
the perspicuous language 
(pp. 236-237). 
Wittgenstein's ladder language has affinities with the rationalist language of Kant 
and the colloquial language has affinities with the utilitarianism of Mill. And as it is 
not possible to step outside of one's own consciousness we cannot transcend our 
own language or thought, but by the construction of the perspicuous language we 
can attempt to lay bare the structure of that particular reality. Such a language of 
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logic is constructed by determining what elements are necessary for the symbolism 
to have meaning. 
It is true that in the 'Tractatus' Wittgenstein was seeking to establish an 'ideal 
language', i.e. one which had been purged of everything unsayable and only 
consisted of propositions from the natural sciences; but there are things which 
although they cannot be spoken about do still show or manifest themselves. It is by 
virtue of this manifestation into the 'suburbs of our language' (PI: 18) that while we 
are silent we can yet communicate. Hence the significance of the concluding 
remark in the Tractatus: 'What we cannot speak about we must pass over in 
silence' (1993:74). 
This language of silence, introspection and reflection, is the very essence of 
reflexivity and the cornerstone of metaphysics in its non-empirical form. Here 
Wittgenstein's philosophical method consists of an inner dialogue, posing 
questions and inwardly listening to answers. This phenomenon is not amenable to 
public and explicit scrutiny but is no less real, which is Wittgenstein's purpose in 
stating 'ethics is transcendental' (Ibid.71). However, in his earlier notebooks, 
intended as preparatory sketches for the Tractatus, Wittgenstein's remarks are in 
more open prose: 
When my conscience upsets my equilibrium, then 1 am not in agreement with 
Something. But what is this ? Conscience is the voice of God (Notebooks 1914-
16,1969:75). 
Again in 'Philosophical Investigations' the emphasis is upon 'the silent ihternal 
discourse of others' (p.222) as well as the socially construed, observable 
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conversations which Wittgenstein terms the 'multiplicity of language games'. Such 
an examination of the language games of ethics is invariably complex, but it is 
possible to identify specific modes of moral vocabulary and forms of ethical theory 
(Sherry, 1977) (i 6). 
A Summary and Synthesis 
The manner in which moral dilemmas are to be resolved will ultimately depend on 
their method of justification which will be inherent in the system of ethics being 
appealed to. Translated into practical terms the Kantian will assume the motivation 
of an action predominates in moral judgements and the Utilitarian will lay emphasis 
on consequences. But, whereas traditional moral philosophy lays a line of 
demarcat ion between these two dif ferent theories because of their 
"incommensurability" (Billington, 1994; Foot, 1990; Honderich, 1995; Maclntyre, 
1987; Murdoch, 1992; Scruton, 1994; Williams, 1993), this analysis brings them 
into equilibrium as two modern cornerstones in a composite ethical system. 
Subsumed within this composite ethical structure also will be religion as a 
cornerstone which, in the terms of this limited discussion, means the inherited 
impact of Christian ethics. The fourth and final cornerstone is secular humanism 
whereby the socially and psychologically construed aspirations of the individual 
are seen as ends in themselves as they result from human experience and help to 
shape and determine it. Peschke (1997) neatly encapsulates this particular form of 
humanism in his list of 'existential ends': 
...self-preservation, including bodily integrity and social respect; self-perfection, 
including the enlarging of experience and knowledge and the improvement of the 
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conditions of life; procreation and the education of cliildren; concern and care for the 
spiritual welfare of one's fellow-men; social fellowship for the promotion of common 
utility; commitment to goodness and value in its absolute, transcendental form, 
especially union with God through worship of him (p.99). 
But how to establish priority in the case of conflicting moral signals is, of course, the 
seminal difficulty. Now, however, with a new template as a frame of reference, it is 
possible to correlate specific issues against competing ethical systems The 
composite model presented in the next chapter provides this template and is a 
summation of the preceding description and analyses. A model is thus proposed 
which draws together incommensurable ethical structures into a new architecture 
and scaffolding for framing moral issues. 
The crucial next task will be to provide a method capable of representing common 
key concepts such as "languaging" and "reflexivity", and at the same time nurturing 
the common denominator Peschke (1997) refers to as the 'ultimate subjective norm 
of moral conduct' (p.205) i.e. conscience. In this respect, Rawls (1986) constructed 
the 'reflective equilibrium' method as a reasoning-tool for ethics while Daniels 
(1979) broadened the scope of the method; 
The method of wide reflective-equilibrium is an attempt to produce coherence in an 
ordered triple of sets of beliefs held by a particular person, namely (a) a set of 
considered moral judgements; (b) a set of moral principles; (c) a set of relevant 
background theories (cited in Furrow 1995:16). 
An adaptation of this "best-fit" approach to moral reasoning will inform and frame 
the unfolding of the following emergent theory of morality. 
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C H A P T E R 5 : A MODEL FOR MORAL D ISCOURSE 
Introduction: An Emergent Theory 
The radical contention of this argument - guided by the Wittgenteinian view that 
until you change the language you cannot change the reality - is that a subliminal 
Treasure Chest of Ethics (i ?) is potentially available and accessible to us all. 
Which is to suggest that we possess, individually and collectively an innate 
primitive data storage capacity which, potentially, enables us to discriminate 
between value positions but currently we cannot easily do so as we lack a moral 
vocabulary of common terms. In other words if I want something to mean 
something, then it can mean whatever I choose; but if I want others to accept my 
meaning then I must argue its case in the public domain. This is the essence of 
initiating change (i 8). 
Or to put it another way, without a commonly agreed explicit conceptual frame of 
reference and an associated moral vocabulary it is impossible to consistently 
behave morally within the confines of a complex and pluralist society. In any case, 
experience needs to be shaped by language in order to become socially real. In 
these terms, until you change the language you cannot change the reality; hence 
the importance placed here on creating a framework for a public discourse domain 
of ethics in education. 
Recent attempts by the Schools Curriculum Assessment authority (SCAA) to 
develop moral values in the school curriculum, allied to the recent establishment 
of the National Forum on Values in Education (NFVE), are strongly indicative of a 
real desire now taking place to locate that which constitutes a public morality in our 
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pluralist society. Chapter 3 focused specifically on recent public body discourse in 
this regard, although here I have merely elaborated the point as a contextual 
marker. The fact is that a real search for a public moral vocabulary and agreeable 
frame of reference is now a major objective for a number of key public bodies. 
Parallel to this, the primary goal of this research is to present, through synthesis, 
extension and argument, a 'common morality' with sufficient generality and 
applicability that it may provide a provisional working model for education. 
Clearly, there will always be a discrepancy between, on the one hand, language 
and its concepts and, on the other hand, the reality it serves to describe. For as 
Pirsig (1991) observed, 'the former are static and discontinuous while the latter is 
dynamic and flowing' (p.372). In a similar context, Tomlinson in his wonderfully 
illuminating article "Teachers and Values" (1995) argues that 'we must not 
abandon the deeper humanistic values that have nourished western civilization 
just because we happen to live in a period of nihilistic and self-seeking moral 
confusion' (p. 311). Instead, he argues that 'the object of all our learning should be 
a sense of personal and social moral responsibility' (p.313). He locates the 
present dilemma for teachers in the following 'post-war intellectual terms': 
Thus, in our lifetime especially, all three pillars of our curriculum - knowledge, the 
knower and the context - have been shaken. Educators have carried not only the 
burden but also much of the blame - attributed to them sometimes from ignorance, 
much more often from confusion, anxiety and malice in the face of half-understood 
and much feared intellectual and social forces. 
That might have stood for a description of our situation as teachers at any time from 
1960 to 1980. It is reflected in the movements to set up councils for the development 
of the curriculum and teaching methods and in legislation towards racial and sexual 
equality with its consequences for schools. I want to argue now that, in fact, our 
current situation is even more dire. That is because of recent radical political policies, 
the effects of which are structurally already with us but whose social and spiritual 
consequences have still to be harvested (My emphasis; pp.306-307). 
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In Tomiinson's terms then, the structural changes - especially post-1988 ERA - are 
still at the reactive level of response rather than the more reflective 'social and 
spiritual'. In these terms, Tomlinson cites the poet Kathleen Raine in support of 
his passionate case for a new agenda for education: 
To recreate a common language for the communication of knowledge of spiritual 
realities, and of the invisible order of the psyche is the problem now for any serious 
artist or poet, as it should be for educators (p. 314). 
Nonetheless, without such a moral discourse our direct experience lacks explicit 
moral descriptors and frequently hovers, at best in muffled silence and at worst in 
anger and violence. For until we shed the encumbrances that muffle and stifle 
moral expression we will continue to have chaos, or at best what Novak (1991 
calls 'moral relativism' where personal preference dominates (i 9). 
However, if we begin by removing the subject/object perceptual distinction and 
apply instead Merleau-Ponty's (1964) observation which regards 'consciousness 
as perceptual'(p. 113), then the primacy of experience can be validated through 
feelings, which is prior to analysis through language. Such an experientially-
driven view of language and morals was emphasised in the nineteenth century 
socially polemic dramas of Ibsen and typified by the expression "Eksempelets 
makt" to underscore the importance of the power of example over public 
rhetoric (2 0); similarly, Whitehead (1974) had introduced the clever concept of "the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (21) (Op cit.) in order to reinforce the primacy 
of experience over description. In both cases the point to emphasise is that unless 
conceptual clarity is ultimately achieved in moral discourse then the values of 
each individual will chaotically continue to collide ad-infinitum. In a sense values 
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can only be ascribed publicly when it is understood exactly what is being valued 
and what criteria are being employed to value it. 
Following on from this, the belief here countenanced is that a common morality 
does in fact exist: a common morality that binds society rather more than it 
disunites it and a morality, once made explicit, is capable of clarifying and uniting 
the public self with the private self. These, then, are the underlying assumptions 
upon which this thesis is built. The intention of this chapter, therefore, is to set 
out more clearly those elements which constitute the basis of such a common 
morality. 
In the first instance, I shall present an examination of the two basic, constituent 
parts of the emergent theory: (a) a Four Quadrants' model and (b) a Syntax of Four 
Voices' model (where (a) is intended to be representative of and to demonstrate an 
external and publicly accessible frame of reference and where (b) is intended to 
be representative of and to demonstrate an internal and privately accessible 
frame of reference). And, second, by linking the two separate parts of the model 
and drawing upon fresh insights which flow from the synthesis, the basis of a 
common morality emerges which is encapsulated by (c) Six Moral Precepts. 
Hence the above combination and synthesis of (a), (b) and (c) will provide a 
model and emergent theory which cumulatively represent a common morality. 
In other words, and as previously stated, the approach, analysis, illumination and 
explanation of the emergent theory will be a sort of "best-fit" approach whereby 
the most adequate description of the pattern of the data examined combines and 
coheres in favour of the models presented. In these terms a theory can be 
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defined as: 
A scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a 
group of facts or phenomena...which consists in the knowledge or statement of the 
facts on which it depends, or of its principles or methods as distinct from the practice 
of it (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1987, Vol 2, p. 1281). 
By this reckoning, the process of argument is not always a chain of demonstrative 
reasoning, rather it is frequently a case of a presenting and representing of those 
features which severally cooperate in favour of the conclusion of the emergent 
theory with its "common morality". Indeed as Rorty (1994) puts it, when applying 
Rawls' (1986) process of "reflective equilibrium", 'there is no neutral ground...all 
we can do is work with the techniques for reweaving our vocabulary of moral 
deliberation...while keeping our ears open for hints about how it might be 
expanded or revised' (pp196-197).The self-same spirit of enrichment and 
consequent necessary revision frames and informs the following deliberations. 
Thus, my own starting point is to question orthodoxy, dig deeper than mere 
explanation and to be guided by J.S. frills' penetrating insight of 1859: 
There is nothing more awesome to behold than a vested interest masquerading 
as a moral principle (cited in Collinson, 1994:105). 
In a sense what is really needed is a sort of Copernican revolution, capable of 
displacing epistemology and instead locating morality at the centre of our socially 
construed universe. In other words, we need a model which is capable of 
transcending conventional received wisdom. 
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Model 1: The 4 Quadrants 
The intention here is to arrive at a new synthesis from existing ethical systems by 
incorporating the following four cornerstone ethical positions: (1) the rationalism of 
Kant's moral agency; (2) the empiricism of Mill's Utilitarian consequentialism; (3) 
Religion as a moral paradigm (framed here in terms of Christian ethics); (4) 
Humanism represented here by one of it major postmodernist derivatives. 
Existentialism. 
First of all, and In relation to Kantian ethics and Utilitarian ethics it is generally 
recognized, as already noted, that these two ethical theories have not only been 
particularly dominant in contemporary moral philosophy, but equally they have 
been very influential in practical ethics and in the field of jurisprudence as well 
(see especially Billington, 1993; Foot, 1990; Honderich, 1995; Maclntyre, 1993; 
MacNiven, 1993; Scruton, 1994; Vardy, 1994; Peschke, 1997). 
Both ethical systems have deep roots in western culture. Kantianism is 
representative of an older, conservative tradition which is related to both secular 
and religious humanism. By contrast, the position of Utilitarianism represents a 
more recent, liberal tradition associated with the rise of modern science. The major 
philosophical difference between these two systems resides in the methods used 
to justify moral judgements as their epistemological foundations differ markedly. 
Utilitarians are empiricists who believe that all knowledge is based on experience 
and use scientific method - incorporating observation and experiment - in acquiring 
knowledge as their paradigm of reasoning. Following on from this line of 
reasoning, Utilitarians hold that the morality of an act depends upon its 
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consequences rather than from the motives which produced it. For, of course, the 
actual consequences of acts are observable to the extent that they produce a 
greater degree of happiness and minimise suffering, while the actual motives are 
themselves not amenable to such scientific scrutiny. 
By contrast Kantians, as rationalists, believe that all knowledge is ultimately 
arrived at through a universal rationalist process of reason. Consequentialism is 
rejected and the morality of an act depends upon the underlying motives and 
intentions of the agent. Indeed Kantians are universalists who hold that moral 
rules apply equally to everyone, while the utilitarians are particularists who hold 
that the rightness or wrongness of a particular act depends upon its circumstances 
and eventual consequence. 
MacNiven (1993) argues for an ethical position which is able to unify Kantianism 
and Utilitarianism: 
Ordinarily most of us are strictly neither utilitarians or Kantians. Our moralities are a mix 
of utilitarian consequentialist and Kantian non-cons'equentialist principles. Even the 
most systematic of us tend to incorporate important elements of the opposing 
standpoint into our moral practice...Ultimately the way we try to resolve moral 
dilemmas will, as we have seen, depend on the method of justification which is implicit 
in the system of ethics appealed to (pp. 41-42). 
But whereas MacNiven chose to unify Kantianism and Utilitarianism this is very 
much an isolated phenomenon. Most mainstream philosophers still cling to the 
view that while undeniably these systems are cornerstones of modern moral 
philosophy they remain incommensurable. 
However, as no unified theory of ethics, as such, has yet emerged, Maclntyre's 
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(1993) advice remains influential: 
Our "intuitions" are simply opinions; our philosophical theories are the same...a 
reasonable task for the philosopher is to bring them into equilibrium. Our common 
task is to find out what equilibria there are that can withstand examination, but it 
remains for each of us to come to rest in one or another of them...Once the menu of 
well-worked out theories is before us, philosophy is a matter of opinion (p. 267). 
But even though the scope of MacNiven's analyses is very much to be 
commended, as it successfully extends and enriches ethical theory by embracing 
what is apparently incommensurable - Utilitarian and Kantian systems - it is still not 
sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the social and religious diversity of moral 
behaviour. Here MacNiven's answer is to appeal to idealist systems of ethics: 
In idealist systems of ethics our duties, rights, liberties and responsibilities are defined 
by social roles, by the functions we perform within a social entity (p.41). 
In these terms the concepts of any given social function will only make sense in 
terms of the purposes or functions they are characteristically expected to serve. 
And for Maclntyre (1994), morality is also context-specific and all we can do is 'to 
articulate the morality of some particular social and cultural standpoint' (p.268). 
Leaving aside whether or not such a view leads to what Scruton (1994) dismisses 
as moral relativism, what is absolutely central to Maclntyre's argument is the 
location of all decision making within a specific social and cultural context. This is 
an important extension to the debate as the individual is no longer represented as 
a sovereign chooser who determines the values to live by independently of 
context: 
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My account of the virtues proceeds through three stages: a first which concerns 
virtues necessary to achieve the goods internal to practices; a second which 
considers them as qualities contributing to the good of a whole life; and a third which 
relates them to the pursuit of a good for human beings the conception of which can 
only be elaborated and possessed within an ongoing social tradition (p.273). 
Tomlinson (1995) extends the same argument to teachers with a plea 'for a 
personal moral responsibility grounded in the plain fact that we are all mortal 
individuals with absolutely no way of justifying claims to greater importance and 
rewards than anyone else' (p.316). His advocacy for a renewed moral community 
in the school is persuasive: 
Human institutions are constituted by language and unless our best values are 
renewed in a common speech they will wither and die. The school must be a moral 
community, continually exptaring the ethics of the common life (Ibid). 
A Similar, humanistic ethic emerges from within the field of pure science. For 
example, Johnstone (1997) in reviewing the biologist Matt Ridley's recent 
publication 'The Origins of Virtue' endorses the notion of Danwinian natural 
selection which 'has equipped us with a a toolkit of specialised social instincts 
(p.26). His summation is particularly germane: 
To conclude, Ridley's book offers us a deep insight into the way that selfish genes 
can forge social groups, and shows us that the formation of a society is not merely a 
human challenge, but a recurring theme of evolution. With clarity and honesty he 
shows us that to solve the problems of society, we cannot afford to overlook the 
mental tools with which natural selection has equipped us. But while the origins of 
virtue and society lie in our evolutionary past, the social contract is not written 
unalterably in our genes. It is one thing to ask how society can be built, and another to 
ask how it should be built, Here, we may look to our evolutionary origins for guidance, 
but not for an answer (p. 27). 
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Clearly these sentiments echo Richard Dawkins' very influential 'Selfish Gene', 
written in 1979, which prefaces its intention as follows: 
This book is mainly intended to be interesting, but if you would extract a moral from it, 
read it as a warning. Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which 
individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can 
expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism 
(new revised edition, 1989:3). 
In this particular context, Danwin's 'The Descent of Man' written in 1871 offers the 
the definitive interpretation of rriorality: 
Ultimately a highly complex sentiment, having its first ohgin in the social instincts, 
largely guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by reason, self-interest, 
and in later times by deep religious feelings, confirmed by instruction and habit, all 
combined, constitute our moral sense or conscience (cited in Wright, 1995:210). 
The significance of Johnstone and Dawkins' contributions is, as modern and 
influential biologists trained in the Darwinian tradition of 'natural selection', that 
they nevertheless argue that moral choices must be fused inextricably in the 
pursuit of a common good within and across social and cultural networks. 
Still, the real point of emphasis here is precisely and emphatically this humanistic 
capacity for determining the social values we live by. Such a humanism locates 
individual choices squarely at the centre of interest; which for Sartre (1975) 
necessarily implies that 'existence precedes essence' (p.29), because 'the aim is 
to precisely establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values and a human 
universality of condition' (pp.46-47). In other words in choosing I do not choose to 
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exist as existence is given and one has to exist in order to choose. Therefore, what 
I choose is my essence of meanings and values. Existentialism is defined as a 
morality of freedom: 
What is at the very heart and centre of existentialism, is the absolute character of the 
free commitment, by which every man realises himself in realising a type of humanity -
a commitment always understandable, to no matter whom in no matter what epoch -
and its bearing upon the relativity of the cultural pattern which may result from such 
absolute commitment (p.47). 
Sartre's primary concern is not to prescribe what human beings ought to do but 
what they are like, and in this respect the conditions of human existence are such 
that we cannot avoid making value choices. For Sartre then, humanity is author of 
its own values: 
There is no other universe except the human universe, the universe of human 
subjectivity. This relation of transcendence as constitutive of man (not in the sense 
that God is transcendent, but in the sense of self-surpassing) with subjectivity (in 
such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human 
universe) - it is this that we call existential humanism. This is humanism, because we 
remind man that there is no legislator but himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, 
must decide for himself; also because we show that it is not by turning back upon 
himself, but always by seeking himself, an aim which is one of liberation or of some 
particular realisation, that man can realise himself as truly human (p.56). 
Sartre, like Heidegger, attacks the Cartesian Cogito ergo sum. There is no '1' that 
thinks, but only thought. Thus the long journey towards the dissolution of the 
Cartesian egological self, initiated by Nietzsche, reaches its climax: 
To summarise, since all objects of consciousness, including the 'me', are outside 
consciousness, and since only consciousness possesses absolute 'certitude' (ibid., 
p.44), all states and hence all authentic states, transcend consciousness, and are 
thus dubitable (ibid., p.64) [cited in Golomb, 1995:135-136]. 
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Implicit in this reasoning is the view that the more intense the reflection on one's 
consciousness, then the clearer a sense of 'me, '1' or 'self will then necessarily 
emerge. In these terms the notion of self to emerge is the self-generating 
existentialist self which Cooper (1995) defines as follows: 
The Existentialist argument for an ethic of reciprocal freedom, then, is this: since my 
view of myself is indelibly coloured by how I take myself to stand in the eyes of others, 
then an authentic understanding of myself as freedom - one released from 
'connivance' in bad faith - requires me to view others as possessed of this same kind 
of existence. Unless I so view them, I cannot expect them to view me in that manner. 
Only if I regard and treat others - or better, regard them through treating them as loci of 
existential freedom, will I receive back an image of myself as such a locus (p. 181). 
The greatest challenge for Existentialism is how to marry the exercise of individual 
freedom with collective freedom? Or to put it another way, how to reconcile the 
appetite of what Murdoch (1985) refers to as 'the fat relentless ego' (p.93) with the 
common needs of a society. An Existentialist ethic, rooted in intense reflection and 
directed towards an ideal of reciprocal freedom can be made to work, but only, as 
Cooper (1995) rightly points out, 'against a background of relative stability in the 
thought and vocabulary of that society' (p,187). 
At a deeper level of fundamental values there is a strong case to argue in favour of 
a historical aprioristic position where values are a priori correct. The belief that 
human life should be worth living, for example, should be self evident to all rational 
beings; as too should a range of ethical and religious ideal conceptions of a more 
just social structure be preserved. The major difficulty remains of an absence of a 
common vocabulary and agreed frame of reference which are prerequisite to 
establishing any notion of the common good. 
Nevertheless, for any ethical system to claim comprehensive coverage, religion as 
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one paradigm of values must necessarily be included; which, in the case of this 
particular analysis, will be Christianity as the final cornerstone of the 'Four 
Quadrant' model. 
With the rise of modern science and technology the significance of religion both 
historically and culturally has, according to Progoff (1958) changed dramatically 
from a context whereby: 
individuals experienced the meaning of their lives in terms of local religious 
orthodoxies and accustomed national or tribal ways of life of their communities. These 
traditional practices and institutions provided built-in psychic security for the 
individual. When faith in these commonalities broke down, however, the individual 
was left unprotected. With no recourse to a spiritual past shared with others, the 
individual was isolated and cut adrift; sand it is this situation of the lone individual no 
longer sustained by the cultural resources of his ancestors that is the main root of the 
psychological problems that have arisen in modern times (cited in 
Guignon,1995:216). 
Progoff is right to equate cultural resources with religious heritage, although his 
major point is that some aspects of our humanity suggest a transhuman spiritual 
source. In other words his argument is that the higher dimensions of human 
experience - the intellectual, the moral and the personal - combine to suggest that 
the creative potentialities of the universe can trace their origins to a spiritual reality. 
And thus language, conscience and morality are seen to be positing a 
convergence toward a moral community and level of being no less personal and 
spiritual than ourselves. 
Peschke's (1997) definition of Christian ethics defines moral goodness as 'a quality 
in the person, constituted not by rule-keeping behaviour alone, but by the formation 
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of character, patterns of action, the right vision of life, the basic values and 
convictions which move a person to ask: What sort of person should 1 become 
because I believe in Christ?' (p.3). The parameters of this discussion are framed in 
accordance with these Christian values: 
A presentation of Christian ethics implies that the ideals and norms presented are 
inspired by the sacred books of the Old and New Testament and related to what 
Christians believe about the world, God and each other. Above all it implies a 
permanent inspiration by the ideas, values and concerns of Jesus Christ...[and] the 
positive revelation of the Old and New Testament as source of its moral knowledge 
and guidance (p.4). 
These traditional sources include the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20: 2-17); the 
Eight Beatitudes (Matthew 5: 3-10); the Golden Rule (Matthew 7:12); the Seven 
Deadly Sins and the Seven Main Virtues (Peschke.309-310). A lesser known list of 
qualities defined by O'Connell (1958) are no less traditional: 
Corporeal 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
To feed the hungry 
To give drink to the thirsty 
To clothe the naked 
To visit the imprisoned 
To shelter the homeless 
To visit the sick 
To bury the dead 
Spiritual 1. 
2. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
To admonish the sinner 
To instruct the ignorant 
To counsel the doubtful 
To comfort the sorrowful 
To bear wrongs patiently 
To pray for the living and the dead 
(cited in O'Connell 1959: 159) 
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This, then, completes these four distinct value positions - the Kantian, the 
Utilitarian, the Humanist, and the Religious - a juxtaposition of these four ethical 
systems can produce the following configuration: 
MEANING 
(High) CERTAINTY (Low) 
REUGKM UTILIT^ANISM 
RATIOM*<LISM EXISTEhmALISM 
(a) Political Continuum (b) Theological Continuum 
Figure 3: The 4 Quadrants 
The assumption underpinning the model's rationale is that the best ethical structure 
will strive to embrace as higher a proportion of meaning and certainty as it can. 
Next, it is necessary to further designate categories within these two co-ordinates 
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by ascribing the properties of high or low value to each characteristic. Such a 
combination produces four options: 
(1) High certainty/high meaning 
(2) Low certainty/high meaning 
(3) High certainty/low meaning 
(4) Low certainty/low meaning 
Clearly numbers (1) and (4) represent the two extremes whereas Numbers (2) 
and (3) represent the other value permutations. The results of this is represented 
by a four square table which reveals two ideological continuums - theological and 
political - and which reflect the four different ethical structures of this new 
synthesis: Religion, Utilitarianism, Rationalism and Existentialism. 
Model 2: The Syntax of 4 Voices 
Heidegger (1995) makes the point that there is no such thing as raw experience, 
experience is always interpreted: 
What we first hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the crealcing waggon, 
the motor-cycle. We hear the column of the march, the north wind, the woodpecl<er 
tapping, the fire crackling. It requires a very artificial and complicated mind to hear a 
pure noise. The fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the 
phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already 
dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell 
proximally alongside 'sensations'; nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of 
sensations to provide the springt)oard from which the subject leaps off and finally 
arrives at a'world'. Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what 
is understood (p. 207). 
Heidegger is arguing that true 'Dasein' experiencing always involves some kind of 
reciprocal relationship between the individual interpreter, the world and the act of 
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interpreting itself. Such experience is essentially intentional in structure and always 
initially inwardly directed towards one's private frame of reference before then 
being outwardly directed towards a public frame of reference. This clearly involves 
the risk of misinterpretation and so therefore, we must provide for discussion and 
argument about the adequacy of interpretations. 
By seeking to identify the fourth, private inner voice, which at an everyday level 
we communicate with all the time, in terms of all sorts of hidden assumptions veiled 
in what Searle (1995) refers to as 'a huge invisible ontology of competing moral 
choices' (p.6), the model of the 'Syntax of Four Voices' emerges. 
Indeed what this in fact represents is an internal frame of reference which is 
neither visible, nor easily described in traditional analytical terms; and yet we 
are constantly actively engaged in its exercise. Indeed, as long ago as 1890, 
William James introduced the phrase 'stream of consciousness' to characterise 
this unbroken flow of thought and awareness in the mind. The concept was quickly 
translated into a successful and major narrative technique where long passages of 
introspection attempt to capture the spectrum and flow of a character's inner 
thoughts. The technique was used by Henry James, Knut Hamsun, James Joyce 
and Virginia Wolf. 
So although it is difficult to deal with analytically its treatment in creative terms does 
have a distinguished pedigree. The concept of an unvoiced self has many labels, 
i.e., 'a sixth sense'; 'conscience';' an inner voice', the 'language of silence' Freud's 
'L/nconsc/otys',Socrates' 'Daemon', Heidegger's 'Dasein'; Sartre's 'pour-soi/en-
so/"; Polyani's tacit knower, etc. But the most important point is that the formation 
of a concept of conscience is an integral part, albeit the subjective dimension, of 
123 
this particular theory. In other words, while the Four Quadrants model represents 
the external, public frame of reference, the Syntax of Four Voices draws attention to 
our internal repertoire of silent reflections and innumerable deliberations. The 
purpose of the following model, then, is to act as a sort of analytical trigger 
mechanism in order to locate by differentiation the invisible fourth voice: 
A SYNTAX O F 4 V O I C E S 
SUBJECT OBJECT 
Voice 1 Personal = 1st person 1 Me 
Voice 2 Preacher = 2nd person You/Thou You/Thee 
Voice 3 Objective = 3rd person He/She/It Him/Her/It 
Voice 4 Moral = 4th person Subliminal Conscience 
Figure 5: A Syntax of 4 Voices 
The problem is, of course, that the vocabulary of inner self is necessarily private, 
unshared, unsuited to argument, but it nevertheless exists. The fundamental 
premise of this thinking is that a belief or a sort of conscience stirring can still 
regulate action. For the purposes of this particular analysis, although these various 
meanings may be complex and multi-dimensional, their special significance lies in 
the fact that they are shared and implicitly in the public domain along with other 
competing voices. The fact that, no public space exists to accomodate our inner 
voice is not the same thing as saying no inner voice exists. 
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First person expression and third person expression serve different functions. The 
former is representative of self-interest and subjectivity and the latter is 
representative of public-interest and objectivity. In the third person, for example, the 
quest for objectivity can remove moral puzzlement and reverence, as there are only 
questions of clarification and enforcement. Indeed it is the third person narrative 
that asserts moral objectivity and appears at a moral distance. But, unlike a code of 
ethics, a morally-living situation is never just the application of rules to situations. 
In this context an imposition by third person expression is alien and alienating and 
the emergence of a moral dialogue can never be a power struggle between 
first and third person evolving around issues of legitimacy or autonomy. 
In order to establish rapport in any moral dialogue, at the very least another voice is 
needed. If the encounter is mediated by a second person, the "thou" or "it" - the 
language of prescription - then the moral waters become somewhat muddied by 
imposed values rather than negotiated ones. For neither the self-interest of the first 
person nor the aspirational objectivity of the third person can ever be fully 
mediated by the somewhat prescriptive voice of the second person. 
The development of a moral dialogue requires listening as well as speaking and 
an acknowledgement of the primacy of experience over language. We must 
become as comfortable with ambiguity and chaos as with symmetry and logic. 
Indeed, as Freud once pointed out, "It is only in logic that contradictions are 
forbidden!" (Guardian 12 March 1996). So what is actually required is what Rawls 
(1971) refers to as a 'thickening process of reflective equilibrium' (p.20) in which 
we learn to be at home with both public and private, voiced and unvoiced. 
In educational terms Pring (1995 b) defines this demonstrable interplay between 
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the two different aspects of self - the private and the public - as the arena in which 
'explorations developed in school are but the beginning of those further 
explorations of the values which are often much later found to be worth pursuing' 
(p. 130). What is crucial for Pring is to ensure that a sharing of private and public 
voices takes place within the school arena: a school arena conceived as an 
educated moral community and 'captured by a language which is shared within a 
form of life, and preserved within a community of educated people. Education 
surely lies with familiarising the next generation with that world' (p. 137). Pring 
captures the spirit and dynamic of this interactive process: 
the subtle interplay of the personal and impersonal, of public tradition and 
personal searching, of confidence in the objective world of books and artifacts 
and uncertainty over what is of most worth, of moral commitment and moral doubt. 
The significance of the community of educated people is that it provides a 
framework in which that confidence can grow and yet in which the uncertainties 
can be recognised, respected and explored together (p. 139). 
These multiple voiced and unvoiced conversations are in Becker's (1991) terms 
acts of 'languaging' and as such " I " decide what my world is to become and who " I " 
am going to be through these conversations. By adopting such a rationalist position 
personal actions are inseparably linked to personal responsibility. Peschke (1997) 
locates conscience very much within these social and temporal parameters: 
Formation of conscience however does not merely consist in the rational 
appropriation of a set of moral norms and principles and the acquisition of the 
necessary factual l<nowledge for a concrete judgement of conscience. We make our 
decisions more out of the beliefs we live by and the habits we have formed than out of 
the principles we have learned. The world of moral values to a large extent consists in 
a collection of traditions and religious observances, exemplary figures and ways of 
acting, stories and images, which are all mediated by the communities to which a 
person belongs (p.206). 
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In these, then, terms a credible, workable morality must include both an objectively 
grounded coda of external reference points, as well as space for a subjectively 
grounded set of silent internal reference points. Here the mediator for such critical 
reflection is to be found in Becker's (1991) reflexive dynamic of the "Chekovian" 
act of 'languaging': 
Etlilcs goes back to languaging. The legitimacy of my own experience witliin my own 
domain of discourse depends upon - and is built around - the legitimacy o f the 
experience of others, however undesirable that other experience may appear to me. I 
need not approve only keep the possibility of conversations open. Hence this 
languaging is seen as a continuous orientation within world - and self-sustaining 
circular domains of consciousness, created in human interaction and hence from the 
beginning basically ethical (pp.232-233). 
Here is Becker's source of inspiration for these silent conversations of languaging: 
The stupendous reality that is language cannot be understood unless we begin by 
observing that speech consists above all in silences. A being who could not 
renounce saying many things would be incapable of speaking. And each language 
rep[resents a different equation between manifestations and silences. Each people 
leaves some things unsaid in order to be able to say others. Because everything 
would be unsayable. Hence the immense difficulty of translation: translation is a matter 
of saying in a language precisely what that language tends to pass over in silence 
(Jose Ortega yGasset, cited in Becker, 1991). 
Thus by explicitly acknowledging the language of silence, the capacity and scope 
for reflection is more fully accommodated; and by implication so too is the non-
empirical inner voice of the Socratic Daemon. 
Ultimately, therefore, in order to arrive at a valid understanding of reality as a moral 
agent it is necessary to accomodate and internalise meanings, rooted in a myriad 
of different language games, from both objective and subjective perspectives. 
Moral understanding is both objective in the social sense and personal in the 
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subjective sense. Moustakas (1994) puts the case convincingly In the context of 
education: 
As a learner, to know initially what something is and means, I listen to my inner 
dialogue, purified as much as possible from other voices, opinions, judgements sand 
values. This is a challenging task we are too often taught the reverse in our homes, 
schools and society. We are expected to attend to and repeat what other people 
think, believe, and say regarding what is true (p.62). 
A Common Morality: Six IWoral Precepts 
As individuals we are both self-creating - in terms of our inner resources - and 
products of our social and cultural environments. The combination of these 
influences - the internal and the external - combine on each individual differently. 
The significance of rationalism, however, as a major common denominator and 
determinant in matters of morality cannot be ignored as it permeates each of the 
four quadrant positions of the model respectively, albeit to differing degrees and to 
a lesser extent in relation to utility. In this respect the overriding thesis is that moral 
judgements are expressions of practical as distinct from theoretical reason which 
does not depend on an absolutist 'God's-eye view' of an independent reality. 
Being moral requires that I should respect the capacity for rational agency, and 
therefore that I should treat all persons never merely as means to an end but 
always as ends in themselves. This idea of a preeminent 'respect for persons' 
regardless of consequences, although theoretically difficult for philosophers does 
convert, often too easily, into the sacrificial "lambs to the slaughter" syndrome. 
Sometimes the greater good must become the servant of the common good rather 
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than the agent of its downfall. 
Clearly, this issue is very contentious and it is not my intention to state choices in 
terms of either/or particularities. Instead I offer an enrichment by extension of these 
otherwise incommensurable dogmas of Kantian agency and Mill's 
consequentialism. For it is possible to embrace and enrich both positions: in the 
former sense by integrating the allegedly incommensurable and, in the latter 
sense, by including religion and humanism. 
To a very large extent, the ethical framework I am proposing is rooted in an 
historical reality which at least goes back to the time of the Old Testament. Kelly 
(1996) puts the position as follows: 
In a sense, our moral principles are the product of a host of conscience-decisions 
made by our forebears. These conscience decisions have led them eventually to 
formulate the most important fruits of their experience in some sort of moral code or 
system of tatxjos (p. 67). 
With the emphasis on 'conscience-decisions' the importance of the "fourth voice" 
as filter and regulator of moral action is key. Here the role of reflection, the status of 
the language of silence and the value of inner deliberation in accessing one's own 
subliminal treasure ch6st of ethics are all fundamental. And perhaps what is 
equally fundamental, is the belief in our individual and collective capacity for a 
rationally-based, humanistic wisdom which will always favour the common good 
rather than the individual good. 
Arguments which favour either means (in the Kantian sense of moral agency) or 
ends (in the Utilitarian sense of consequences) can never have sufficient breadth 
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to claim commonality; moreover, neither too can Humanism with its emphasis on 
'the fat relentless ego' (Murdoch, 1992) claim commonality, and nor can Religion, 
with its self-confessed allegiance to Christian dogma (22), claim sufficient 
commonality. In a sense, the gap between these four ethical positions is too great 
ever to be bridged by any outright synthesis, but a combination of all four as 
composite external reference points does seem to offer greater possibilities in the 
quest towards a common model of morality (23). 
There must be constant striving toward better and richer, lived definitions of what it 
is to be a moral community by exploring the ethics of the common life. And what 
flows from such an analysis is a view of moral agency which can be tentatively 
represented in the formulation of six provisional moral precepts: 
1 The individual, considered as a moral agent, is a rational agent. 
2 Each individual acquires a social and moral identity by interaction within 
and across particular social and religious groups, from which a subjective/-
objective schema of 'meaning' and 'certainty' about moral issues is derived. 
3 Each socialised individual, although uniquely different mentally and 
physically, ultimately appeals to the basic dignity of being human and 
deserving of equality of treatment. 
4 The world inhabited by each individual exists within a cultural mosaic of highly 
complex yet interrelated frames of reference in the form of specific ethical 
systems: Religion, Utilitarianism, Rationalism, Humanism. 
5 There exists a 'common morality' which regulates individual actions both 
objectively as explicit doing and subjectively as the doing of such action. 
Objectively, such action is either permissible or impermissible and 
subjectively, either culpable or inculpable. 
6. Language is the major moral medium and mediator of meaning and means 
for regulating action between, on the one hand internal and, on the other 
hand external experience of one's cultural community. And by continuously 
checking and rechecking value perspectives, accessible through language 
activity [Language Games], one is able to assimilate and reflect this common 
morality. 
Figure 5: The Six Moral Precepts 
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A Summarv Position 
For Durkheim (1977) society was viewed as a 'collective consciousness'; a moral 
force firmly embedded in social and religious structures, at the centre of which was 
a core of values and beliefs considered sacred. This sociological perspective 
viewed society as a moral entity with meaning mediated through its social 
structures. Complementary to ttiis position, Weberian action theory allowed 
explanations which explicitly acknowledged that social structures are inseparable 
from the subjective meanings of the individuals whose repeated behaviour 
constitutes these various social structures. 
Moreover, such a socially-construed image and influence permeates the recent 
and influential pragmatism of Cupitt (1995) where 'selfhoods overlap in ecstatic 
immanence' (p.119). Additionally, the same can be said of Rorty's (1991) even 
more influential pragmatism where self is understood as 'a centreless web of 
feelings and desires' (p. 11). This post-modernist fashionable trend locates any 
notions of self exclusively in social and secular forms, whereby self is largely 
explained reductively in terms of 'the pragmatic motive' (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1987:56). However, the real dilemma is how do we accomodate this 
'pragmatic motive' of self-interest without allowing vested interests to masquerade 
as moral principles ? 
Perhaps the answer to this conundrum flows in part from Kohlberg's (1981) model 
which, although operationally inadequate, is able to illuminate and extend reality 
by novel reference to it; albeit oppositionally, as one part of a complex Deleuzian 
theoretical toolbox. Vine's (1996) assessment of Kohlberg's contribution views it 
as an essential foundation stone: 
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[to] stimulate a more differentiated, "new look", post-Kohlbergian phase in both 
theorising and data collection...What is wanted is something which the rigidities 
of the Piagetian and especially Kohlbergian research programmes in moral 
education were bound to hamper (p465) 
And whereas the 'consequentialism' of Mill's 'greatest happiness principle' 
appears to conflict with the 'categorical imperative' of Kant's rationalism, there is 
inherent in both theories a fundamental acceptance of rational human agency. 
After all, rational individuals exist as rational moral agents only by virtue of their 
complex relation to other individuals, It is in this respect that the Old Testament's 
'Ten Commandments' and the New Testaments 'Eight Beatitudes', although 
explicitly formal and largely prescriptive, also presuppose that each person is a 
rational moral agent. Rationalism in Christian ethics has indeed a very durable 
pedigree, stemming from Aquinas' 'five intellectual proofs' right through to modern 
theology (Dowley, 1990, Honderich, 1995 and Peschke, 1997). 
For the purposes of this particular analysis, although these various meanings may 
be complex and multi-dimensional, their special significance lies in the fact that 
they are shared and in the public domain along with other competing voices. And, 
in the same vein, the significance of rationalism as a major common denominator 
cannot, therefore, be ignored as it permeates each of the four quadrant positions of 
the model respectively. And, moreover, by explicitly acknowledging the language 
of silence, the capacity and scope for reflection can begin to be accommodated. 
In terms of actual moral choices we can distinguish between moral rules, on the 
one hand, and moral ideals on the other hand; although even then the issues are 
by no means clear cut (2 4). I may, for example be committed to a particular kind of 
morality and yet because of adverse or odd circumstances be confronted with a 
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moral dilemma where I must choose between my own values and someone else's 
values. It may, for example, be that the choice is between my own self-interests and 
the interests of another person (see case study 1 and 4 in appendix), or it may even 
be that the choice is between sacrificing a few lives to save many other lives (see 
case study 2), or it may be a case of choosing between staying at home to look 
after a frail parent or pursuing some other ideal (see case study 6). How do I 
choose? 
Often there will be a clash between ideals and rules, the former abstract and 
usually remote and the latter concrete and usually immediate. Often a major flaw in 
one's own moral thinking is to neglect the distinction between moral rules and 
moral ideals. For unlike moral ideals, everyone is morally obliged to obey moral 
rules impartially. Indeed in this respect everyone is morally prohibited from murder 
or deception. Prohibitions against causing harm, directly or indirectly, can always 
be obeyed impartially, whereas injunctions to help others cannot be followed 
impartially (Gert, 1992). 
But, as this thesis has argued, there is now a general recognition that - apart from a 
religious, Christian value position which ultimately appeals to an omnipotent and 
omniscient higher authority - no other moral theory can claim to capture all the 
factors that must be taken into consideration in making moral decisions. In terms of 
the four quadrant value positions, this means that sometimes the rules of Kant's 
position which emphasizes the autonomy of the individual's 'good will' should be 
used, and sometimes the utilitarian principles which stress the aggregate social 
welfare should be applied. Or in terms of humanism this means that there will 
necessarily be a tendency at times to embrace either one of these secular 
positions, but there will always be tension between individual and collective 
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responsibility as each individual strives to create their own meaning in their own 
particular and unique social milieu. 
The rules of Kantianism will always favour an outcome predicated on a moral 
obligation which must be be fulfilled for its own sake and not for happiness or utility 
nor for the sake of a Christian God since 'an obligation imposed on men by God 
would result in turning men into slaves' (Kant, 1991:91). By contrast, the rules of 
Utilitarianism will always favour an outcome based on the social utility of the GHP 
principle. The rules for Christianity are cast largely in terms of Biblical exegesis and 
have their ultimate authority in the moral laws of the Church (Peschke, 1997). 
Humanism tends to turn from a spiritual law giver to a human one. In any event 
these different approaches to morality all combine to reflect the Confucian Golden 
Rule - 'do not do to others what what you would not like them to do to you' - which 
has been a guide to good conduct for some 2500 years (Hobson and Jenkins, 
1994). Indeed the Christian form 'do unto others as you would have them do to 
you' emphasises the reciprocity of social responsibility for the humanist, while for 
the Christian following the Golden Rule is seen as God's will. 
And yet If a word or concept, such as good or bad, does not have a uniform 
employment, but an irregular one, then it follows that there cannot be any one 
theory of morality. By this reckoning an inherently pluralistic and richer perspective 
emerges: the view that values, obligations, virtues, ideals, or fundamental moral 
principles are inherently diverse and cannot be reconciled into one harmonious 
scheme of morality (Berlin, 1988). Hence, this leads to the view that moral 
choices, if they cannot be reconciled into any one theory, are a function of the 
particular context and language game then being enacted. 
Before proceeding further, it is perhaps worthwhile to pause here in order to point 
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out that, in accordance with this view of language games, we should not regard the 
words in language - language embedded in action - as being like the pieces in a 
game; for they are not to be understood by looking for some associated idea in the 
mind, or by following some procedure of verification, or even by looking at the 
object for which they stand. Instead we should think of words in accordance with 
their use - referring to objects in the world is, of course, only one of many 
uses that words have. Thus the meaning of a word is arrived at by its use, and the 
family of related uses that a group of words has constitutes a language game. 
(Wittgenstein, 1994). 
In the context of moral rules, then, a utilitarian will tread a categorical path which 
follows a consequentialist route and is based on the rational grasp of 'the greatest 
happiness principle'; and, by contrast, the Kantian will tread a no less categorical 
path based on the rational grasp of a first moral principle 'the categorical 
imperative'. In both cases, although the moral reasoning is based on rational 
thinking, the decision reaphed will usually be very different as one is concerned 
with ends while the other is concerned with means to an end. 
The important point to grasp here, though, is that although each particular 
language game is governed by its own rules and criteria of value this does not 
imply that language games are either reductionist or foundationalist. In other words 
each language game is discretely unique and cannot be reduced to other 
language games. 
Similarly, religious practice in this context forms a family of related language 
games. The pattern here is one in which the words and gestures are intenwoven in 
acts of worship, prayer, confession, absolution, all of which combine into a unified 
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and coherent religious value position. The difficulty arises when one tries to explain 
the moral language game by words that lie outside of its terms of reference. To be a 
practising Christian is to enact and embody a form of life which is not directly 
translatable to non believers who will necessarily amplify other moral messages 
from their own particular language game. 
Moral language games can be regarded as descriptive and indicative of behaviour 
in different contexts and roles, rather than as prescriptive templates for the 
purposes of moral guidance. To understand a moral concept is to be able to use 
the corresponding word or words in their particular language game in which the 
concept has a home. Thus, mastery of a concept consists not in having any 
particular idea, but in having a certain skill: namely being able to participate, by 
means of 'just doing' in a certain pattern of action. And this 'just doing will consist in 
using the word in the language game to do a certain job, namely that job which it is 
the word's role in that language game to do' (Philips, 1993:193). 
Nevertheless, the language game defines only the public and the visible, but is is 
equally important to recognise that the private and the invisible role of moral 
reflection is crucial. Thus, acting and doing is the focus to be considered from 
within the language game - objectively and subjectively - rather than reasoning or 
interpreting from outside. Gellner (1982) puts the point elegantly: 'by looking at 
language games, we hunt with the empirical-naturalistic hounds; but by accepting 
their contents, we run with the transcendental hares' (p85). 
It is thus untenable to merely view moral reasoning as the application of moral 
principles to particular situations; for as Kelly (1996) puts it: 
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...that does not allow the situation to influence the principle and does not give 
sufficient consideration to the origin and cultural transmission of moral principles 
themselves. These moral principles represent the collective wisdom of 
humankind...In other words there is a continual dialectical process between 
principles and situations, between facts and moral reflection, a two-way-traffic 
rather than simply a one-way application of principles (p.67). 
Nevertheless, the underlying importance of the role of reasoning for effective moral 
agency remains critical, but no less critical is the crucial and fruitful interplay 
between objective terms of reference and subjective terms of reference. In terms of 
the former, this is summarily represented by the 'Four Quadrants model' whereby 
there is a publicly accessible objective body of views drawn together and 
amenable to critical debate and demonstrable modification. In relation to the 
latter, conscience, and its formation and development, this can be regarded as the 
ultimate subjective norm and regulator of moral conduct, which Wittgenstein 
(1993) described as 'the voice of God' (p.63). In this latter sense, of course I can 
dip in and out of various moral theories and religious viewpoints, but the ultimate 
moral arbiter for my own actions will always reside within me in the form of a silent, 
internal dialogue with my subliminal self (25). 
Of course it can never be sufficient to claim moral reasoning is simply the 
application of moral principles to particular situations. This is largely why the three 
constituent parts of the emergent theory - the Four Quadrants, the Syntax of Four 
Voices and the Six Moral Principles - emerge from a synthesis of the collective 
wisdom of many previous generations. Thus, in order to accomodate more than 
mere reasoning there must be a continual dialectical process between, on the 
one hand objective principles and external situations and, on the other hand, 
between subjective moral reflection and dialogue. 
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It is little more than a rhetorical truism to state that it is essential to establish moral 
dialogue with people culturally different to ourselves; but I wonder how often the 
the same case is put for establishing moral dialogue with people who share the 
same language and culture as ourselves? This is one of the central points in 
Pring's (1995 b) article The Community of Educated People' where he concludes: 
Such a community of educated people is fragile. That fragility is threatened from the 
inside as much as from without, as those who should i<now better seek their future 
security in bending with the wind - in taking on board the language of quality control or 
in responding to whatever banal initiatives come from a Secretary of State, 
surrounded by a carefully picked advisers, believes that he or she knows, without the 
advice of the wider community, all the answers to the latest crisis (p. 144). 
In these terms, Tomlinson's (1995) analysis locates both the problem and its 
solution. In relation to the problem he states: 
...all knowledge and morality was declared relative and governments enshrined the 
selfish self as the basis of civil society. How could schools - how could teachers - any 
longer hope to create a moral community in which the world of minds was worthy of 
respect and that respect the impetus to learning ? (p.311). 
And in relation to the solution he states: 
Human institutions are constituted by language and unless our best values are 
renewed in a common speech they will wither and die. The school must be a moral 
community, continually exploring the ethics of the common life (p.316). 
Thus by identifying separate and discrete propositions of various incommensurable 
theories it is possible to discover unifying threads which bind and unite into a 
single body of systematic theoretical reasoning. In this respect it is important to 
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point out that no definitive blueprint has emerged from these deliberations. Instead, 
however, the result of these cogitations on the nature and scope of morality can be 
characterised by the multiple and contrasting voices from disparately different 
disciplines. 
Indeed Donagan (1977) grasps precisely the case in similar, complementary terms 
to Tomlinson (1995) when he says: 
Morality is characteristically learned as one learns to speak one's mother tongue 
grammatically: not by formal instruction, in times set aside for it, but by conversation 
and by participation in a common life. And one learns it incidentally to learning how to 
act well (p. 12). 
In this respect there is an appeal to an informal, less structured kind of learning 
which is directed toward an inner kernel of self - a subliminal self. A position which 
finds its finest post-modern literary expression in Pirsig's (1980) odyssey 'at the 
cutting edge of consciousness' (p290)(26). 
In respect of our accessing our subliminal moral self it is, of course, essential that 
we must have good information in the first place in order to make good moral 
judgements. And while integrating different moral language games into the school 
curriculum must be regarded as prerequisite to children enriching their moral 
imaginations and flexing their moral muscle, it is no less instrumental to such a 
purpose to somehow nurture and develop the role of reflection and deliberation -
conscience - as the ultimate subjective norm of moral conduct. Indeed it is 
inconceivable for truly moral action to occur without the illuminating quality of moral 
reflection preceding it. Peschke (1997) puts this point convincingly: 
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Since conscience stands in need of illumination and guidance, a man is responsible 
for its formation. To call upon the judgements of one's conscience without having 
striven to inform it properly is an insulting abuse. (p.205) 
Of course this discussion has rarely behaved as a scientific theory searching for 
proofs to test and verify, as the solution to the problem could not be solved by the 
amassing of new empirical knowledge; rather the major characteristic of its method 
has been the re-arrangement of existing knowledge into objective and subjective 
descriptive units in order to codify the parts anew {Wittgenstein, 1994). 
To briefly restate the position then, it is necessary to point out that the emergent 
theory is very much a first attempt, a first stab at provisionally establishing the basic 
underlying structure for a "common morality' within the highly localised context of 
an English, Humanist and Christian perspective. Language games, as forms of life, 
are not testable hypotheses, but ways of reacting to and meeting life situations. The 
application of the theory to particular instances will require sensitivity and great 
care. But the fact that we are not all behaving like savages, although we could 
easily be doing so, suggests that something, somewhere binds and unites rather 
more than, at first sight, seems obvious. It is the contention of this thesis that that 
something is the sort of common morality typified by the Six Moral Precepts and 
legitimately, arrived at by means of the objective and subjective processes 
described. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE WAY FORWARD 
The Model Revisited 
The constituent parts of the model and its concomitant emergent theory are 
threefold: (1) the "Four Quadrant' model, (2) the 'Syntax of Four Voices' and (3) the 
Six Moral precepts. In relation to (1) and (2) these represent the external and 
internal reference points respectively; whereas (3) draws from (1) and (2) its 
principal specific precepts to arrive at a view of a common morality. Thus there 
emerges a theory with a system of moral precepts which is binding on all rational 
individuals and as such its contents are ascertainable by human reason, rather 
than by revelation or religious faith. In the latter case it is unlikely that this emergent 
theory would in any fundamental sense dislocate the basic premises of Christianity. 
Donagan (1977) argues convincingly and cleverly for a similar kind of 'rationally 
autonomous' moral agency: 
Finally, the grounds on which the first principle of common morality has been held to 
be binding on all rational creatures as such will be considered. They will be shown to 
involve a kind of teleology that is very widely misunderstood and hence neglected; 
namely, a teleology in which the end for the sake of which an action is done is not 
something to be produced by doing it but something already in existence to be 
respected in doing it (p.31). 
Nevertheless, by actually drawing out the common themes into the resultant moral 
precepts some things will be lost while other things will be saved, but of course 
things do not carry their identity about in themselves. This is an important point as 
all meanings need to be generated within a public arena of competing, often 
weightless and invisible, multiple voices (1996). And although in principle 
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Kant's categorical imperative Is the philosophical formulation of the golden rule of 
love of neighbour, this is, as previously argued, a formulation which also 
underpins much socially construed behaviour as well, including positions 
inherent in Utilitarianism and Humanism. 
Still there is a real danger of regarding what one has got as the extent of what is 
possible, but lines have to be drawn somewhere and language and its concepts 
require shaping by experience. Hence, heuristic research must constantly push 
against the existing limits of language in an effort to expand understanding by 
broadening the scope of its application. Othenwise, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, the 
limitations of the language will continue to limit understanding of the particular 
world under scrutiny. However, the real litmus test will be, in accordance with 
probability theory, the extent to which the emergent theory is able to yield a high 
return of rich information. For the more information a theory contains then the 
greater the number of ways it can turn out to be false and if highly falsifiable, it is 
also highly testable and nearer the truth {Popper, 1979, pp. 101-103). 
Some Language Games 
Of course, attempts to try to collapse conceptions of morality into any one theory 
may lead to a form of moral myopia in which explanations become telescoped into 
reductive and selective criteria. Indeed from Kant to Kohlberg, the tradition has 
been to seek to define the essence, to reduce moral discourse to its one true form, 
to exclude all other forms as not truly moral, and to define definitively what morality 
is. Hekman {1995) neatly summarises this tendency, as she assesses Carol 
Gilligan's feminist theories against Wittgenstein's notion of language games: 
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Modernist moral philosophers' attempt to define the one, true morality, the one 
correct moral discourse, are motivated by the same desire as the logical positivists' 
attempt to define an ideal language, to get it right once and for all. By contrast 
Gilligan like Wittgenstein, is attempting to get back to the rough ground, to return 
to the complexities of everyday language; she explicitly calls for the need to 
account for the "messiness" of human life. The attempt to define something like 
Kant's categorical imperative or Kohlberg's Stage 6 as the essence of morality 
closely parallells the logical positivists attempt to define an ideal language. 
Gilligan's attempt to listen to moral voices, to see what it is we do...her work entails 
that moral discourse is something about which we cannot fashion a single set of 
rules (p. 125). 
What flows from such a view is a representation of moral reality as an "archipelago" 
of autonomous language games. In these terms the language game is the 
minimum bond upon which society rests and becomes, therefore, the unit of 
analysis: 
to the extent that human action is social, it is rule governed and takes place within 
various "language games".As public and social actions are meaningful and 
intelligible to the agents who conduct them and to others who share the same 
linguistically mediated form of life (Bohman, 1994:58). 
This representation of a post-modernist vision of social reality - a fractured world 
composed of numerous incommensurable language games, each with their own 
goals, aspirations and rules that govern discourse and action - is a compelling 
explanation of moral reality. Indeed whenever we come to value anything, matters 
become difficult: there is no independent way of comprehending what it is we are 
valuing, as we are confronted by a complex mixture of different communities of 
speakers. Baumari's (1994) optimism captures this characteristically post-
modernist dynamic of morality in terms of 'ambivalence and decisional uncertainty' 
(p.32) whereby moral responsibility is defined thus;: 
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...morality Is a practice negotiated between learning agents capable of growth on the 
one hand and a culture capable of change on the other. Rather than reiterating that 
there would be no moral individuals if not for the training/drilling job performed by 
society, we move toward the understanding that it must be the moral capacity of 
human beings that makes them so conspicuously capable to form societies and 
against all odds to secure their - happy or less happy - survival (p.32). 
For each language game to be distinct from other language games 'it must be 
characterised by a distinctive set of activities (with their attendant beliefs and 
assumptions) and a distinctive set of rules' {Barrett,1991:119). Whatever 
similarities exist between different language games, nevertheless, there must be 
significant differentiation in the combination of activities, purposes and sets of rules. 
Thus, not only are all the scientific disciplines - physics, chemistry, biology, 
geology, meteorology - distinctive language games in themselves, but science 
itself is a language game as distinct from, say, theology or sociology. 
Within and across each of these disciplines and various subjects will be different 
theoretical positions (e.g., facts versus values, empiricism versus rationalism, or 
nature versus nurture, and indeed the quantitative versus the qualitative). 
According to Wittgenstein, one of the greatest mistakes that can be made in this 
respect is to mistake one language game for another and try to apply the rules of 
the one to the other. This is the reasoning behind Wittgenstein's (1994) assertion 
that Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language' (p. 104). 
Goldberg (1993) puts the case as follows: 
Our socio-cultural tradition includes many overlapping, but partly competing moral 
languages: Homer's, Plato's, Aristotle's, the Old Testament's and the New 
testament's, Augustine's, Aquinas's Kant's, Mill's, Marx's, Freud's.etc etc (p 229) 
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Thus in relation to moral discourse there are perhaps as many language games as 
there are established theories of morality, albeit that some will be more established 
than others. Moral discourse can therefore be defined as a multiplicity of competing 
voices where no neat division between words and actions exists, but instead 
language is construed as something we do (Hekman, 1995). 
And as this analysis has located what many commentators regard as the major four 
ethical systems, in a western UK context, the next challenge is to delineate 
the characteristics of the particular types of language games each of them practice 
Perhaps, then, the next stage would be, as schools and teachers are indeed 
highly influential moral agents, to explore a sampling of these language games in 
schools. For although moral education is not really about memorising rules and 
precepts, it does involve acquiring a moral language, or moral languages; and, 
likewise, in learning to express oneself morally it is first necessary to acquire the 
wherewithal - the vocabulary and underlying concepts - to do so. 
In other words, and central to my argument, language is seen less as a mosaic and 
more as a living organism 'since it no longer needs to be judged from a single 
view-point, that of pellucid logic, but from the many view-points of everyday life' 
(Peursen; 1969:83). Moreover, without a moral vocabulary it is not possible to 
express oneself adequately as a moral person. In these terms, language is 
everything; for as well as being the means of description, language is also the 
Instrument of action. The capacity to behave morally, then, is linked inextricably to 
the capacity to express oneself in different moral language games; as a minimal 
requirement this would at least demand the capacity to accomodate different moral 
languages. 
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In terms of moral education tolerance is seen as the minimal necessity:: 
Tolerance is minimally necessary for civil society. Although I could easily be 
persuaded that we should aim higher than mere tolerance, tolerance should be our 
first step; it is the lowest accefstable level of intergroup harmony. After we have 
attained it, we can perhaps move to a higher ground {Vogt,1997:43). 
While the arguments in this thesis have aimed higher than 'mere tolerance", at 
least at the level of description, certainly Vogt's case is a persuasive one at the 
level of practicality. But beyond the teaching of tolerance lies the possibility of 
learning an archipelago of different moral language games in our classrooms and 
combining this with a pedagogy of silence and space for moral reflection, which 
again, in T.S. Elliot's (1989) terms, means that: 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time 
(p.48). 
Poetic Disclosure 
Wittgenstein (1990) claims 'The meaning of a question is the method of answering 
it. Tell me how you are searching, and I will tell you what you are searching for' 
(p. 12). And he further claims that 'it isn't possible to believe something for which 
you cannot imagine some sort of verification' (p.89). But as traditional skills, 
intuition, scientific practice, poetic and religious insights are all fed from the same 
rhizomatic and swampy root, it is necessary to account for discovery as it actually 
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occurs: in other words, it is equally necessary to accomodate other forms of 
knowledge besides the explicit, exact and testable kind and where 'the domain 
between religion and knowledge is poetry' (Musil, 1979:301) and where the 
'sublime experience is what makes life worth living'(27). 
In this context, Goldberg (1993) argues convincingly for the role of creative 
literature: 
My basic contention is that imaginative literature has traditionally been, and still is a 
distinctive and in-eplaceable form of moral thinking. Compared with philosophy in "its 
various branches, or history or psychology, or biography, or any combination of the 
moral sciences , it has a unique capacity to took at human experience with as it were 
stereoscopic moral vision, (p.63). 
Such a view, is 1 believe, compelling, as it makes us recognise that in a certain 
sense we are each author of our own values. For if being who we are is largely 
disclosed through language, it must then follow that being moral requires largely 
the same disclosure. The fact that there is now a flurry of public body activity trying 
to define what constitutes the common good in educational terms is perhaps a 
symptom of the general exhaustion towards the renewal of such a moral language. 
In pursuit of the view that any moral interpretation must be animated and guided by 
the power of illumination, as it is only through such power that moral interpretation 
can risk that which is othenwise too audacious to risk, the entrusting of an idea to 
one's inner poetic voice thus instead becomes a way of drawing out that which 
may otherwise remain unsaid. And although the formal analysis of this thesis has 
been conducted in a discursive language - the language of the academic world - to 
pursue such a line of poetic reasoning any further leads appropriately to the 
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summation of this thesis to conclude instead with the telescopic moral vision of 
the poet, complementing that of the academic: 
TO BE STRANGLED AT THE GATES OF THE WOMB 
(A Moral Odyssey) 
Always in action and yet always at rest 
a puzzle of logic in a new litmus test 
When question and answer dissolve in a riddle 
explained by the law of the excluded middle 
A criteria of facts without either/or 
kindled by a magic in its own moral core 
For to state what 'is', is merely to describe 
instead of 'ought' which is to morally prescribe 
So how then is right so different to wrong? 
if good bestows evil in its old marriage song 
Pleasure is maximised as a utility 
consequences calculated of what's to be 
A prescriptive ensemble, socially construed 
contrasts with more fodder, more moral food 
A categorical imperative, Kant's agency 
invokes moral intent to the Godhead trinity 
So is good in action? or in consequence? 
or is it a vapour, a spiritual dispense? 
Something of which we can barely forego 
enslaves disobedience in its crude show 
To confess to our sins is to acknowledge instead 
an omniscient something outside of our head 
Or othenwise something much deeper within 
encased in a daemon with no original sin 
A contingent self, or a fourth inner voice? 
narrow the choosing and yet narrows the choice 
How, therefore, then can there be morally right 
if my interests prevail and yours must take flight? 
In spite of confusion in this strangulation's tale 
such quintessential goodness does still prevail 
And even though evil spreads its own curse 
still, the sow's ear can become the silver purse 
For truth is not cognitive, but is moral deed 
like the route of the wombgate's virginal seed 
Where the clash of new facts is not the main goal 
but is verily replaced by the needs of the soul 
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And if actions speak louder than the words we say 
then words must precede action as night is to day 
Thus language we compromise at great moral risk 
sacrificing moral's meridian, the treasure's fisk 
A taxonomy of values is not what is needed 
when social injustice goes ail but unheeded 
And where political might so tortures the brave 
and where children and women no one man can save 
Thereafter, collective individuals must speak with tongues uncurled 
when the limits of a new language become the limits of a new world 
(28) 
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Appendix: Some Language Games in Action 
Wittgenstein (1994 a) states that 'Language is a labyrinth of paths' You approach 
from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from 
another side and no longer know your way about' (p.82). By this he means that 'we 
remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language-
games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike' (lbid:224). 
In one particular sense, then, morality becomes a question of grammar: 
In the use of words one might distinguish'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. 
What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is 
used in the construction of a sentence, the part of its use - one might say - that can 
be taken in by the ear - And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word "to 
mean", with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it 
difficult to find our way about (Ibid: 168). 
For in these terms it is only by knowing the rules of language games - syntactically 
and culturally - by their myriad of applications that we can establish what morality 
actually is: thus to extend one's morality one must first extend one's repertoire of 
language games (29). 
By the same reckoning, there isn't any point of view available from outside the 
language games where we can stand back and appraise the relationship between 
language and the reality of that particular language game. We cannot get outside 
of language to look at the relation between language and reality and see whether 
or not language is adequately representing reality. As indeed Searle (1987) puts it 
There isn't a non-linguistic Archimedean point from which we can appraise the 
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success or failure of language in representing, coping with or dealing with the real 
world. We are always operating in some language game or other '(p.331). 
There may be as many language games as there are theories of morality, but for 
illustration purposes 1 shall sketch an outline of some indicative simple exemplars 
in relation to the four quadrants' model (although in practice language games are 
complex and overlap with other language games in many different ways). First, I 
shall illustrate Utilitarian and Kantian positions, followed thereafter by Humanism 
and then Religion. 
The following tabulation briefly lists in two parallel columns just a few of the many 
philosophical and moral differences between Utiiitarian and Kantian ethics. 
UTILITARIAN- -(PHILOSOPHICAL)- -KANTIAN 
1 Empiricism 
(all knowledge comes from experience) 
2 Consequentialism 
(Right/wrong depends on consequences) 
3 Public IVIorality 
(concerned with public conduct) 
(MORAL) 
Rationalism 
(all knowledge comes from reason) 
Non-consequentlalism 
(Right/wrong determined by motive) 
Private Morality 
(Duty to self primary concern) 
1 Social Utility 
(maximise happiness & pleasure; 
minimise human pain & suffering) 
2 Hedonism 
(Pleasure definitive good; pain -
definitive evil) 
Respect for Persons 
(Treat persons as ends in them-
selves; never merely as means) 
Self-perfection 
(Moral virtue definitive good, moral 
vice definitive evil) 
3 Expediency Conscientiousness 
(A good end always justifies the means) (Do your duty for duty's sake) 
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At this point that I would like to introduce the notion of a moral dilemma by 
reference to four simple case studies: 
1 The man in a white suit 
A man in his late 20's was out walking across a deserted town square one 
late afternoonand was late for a romantic rendevouz. Earlier it had been raining 
heavily. Various puddles criss-crossed his path so he moved somewhat 
cautiously to avoid splashing his expensive white mohair suit 
Suddenly he noticed a mother with two children - the one a young girt of around 4 
years and the other a baby in a push chair - and as he directly passed them he 
noticed that the baby had fallen face-down into a pool of water. The baby was 
unable to right itself and the mother was pre-occupied with the young girl and 
completely unaware of her baby's dilemma. The man continued on his journey as 
he was unwilling to risk getting his white mohair suit dirty and the baby died. 
2 The SinMng Ship 
A passenger ship sank in a stomn. Two large lifeboats full of people managed to 
get clear. The lifeboats lost contact with each other, but one of them began to 
take on water and was sinking rapidly. It was decided that unless the load was 
significantly lightened then the boat would sink. The first mate decided that the 
only means available to lighten the load - all superfluous goods had already been 
thrown overboard - was to throw a number of passengers overboard. 
He reasoned that the three crew members were necessary to man the large 
lifeboat, that women and children should be saved, that married couples should 
not be split up and that the rest were expendable. The mate and crew reluctantly 
threw 13 passengers overboard. The tioat stopped taking on water. Eventually 
the crew and hundreds of passengers were rescued with no other fatalities. 
3 Who benefits? 
For the purpose of this exercise you need to put yourself into the role of being a 
unique teacher in a unique teaching situation. You are an experienced teacher with a 
background of successful teaching of high-ability pupils in the Science department of 
a Comprehensive school. Moreover, you have also worked, equally successfully, 
with groups of profoundly handicapped chiWren in a special school environment. In 
your new teaching post you are presented with the smallest teaching group in your 
career - a mere two pupils: 
Susan is a 16-year old girl with multiple physical and mental handicaps. She 
requires a great deal of individual attention and skilled teaching in order to 
maximise her independence and communication skills. 
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Gary is academically highly able and is keen to read for a Science degree. On 
the basis of an optimal teaching and learning environment, Simon is ex-
pected to excel in his forthcoming exams. 
NB The achievements of both pupils are equally dependent upon the level of 
teaching input and time they receive from you (30) 
Ann Frank 
During the second world war in Nazi-occupied Holland a Dutch family hid an 
adolescent girl - Ann Frank - in their cellar because, as a Jew, she was vulnerable. 
When Nazi soldiers called at the house and asked if their were any Jews living there 
the family said, no there was no Jews living in their house. The family had lied to 
protect the girl, from what would have entailed certain death. 
By consulting the ethical framework presented - Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics - and 
with reference to your own personal value systems, 1 would now like you to consider 
the following questions in relation to the four case studies. 
(a) In terms of case studies 1 and 2 please answer the following two questions: 
(1) Was murder committed? 
(2) Was the behaviour moral? 
(b) In terms of case study 3 
How much time will you spend with each child? 
e.g., more time with Susan? 
e.g., more time with Gary? 
e.g., or 50/50? 
(c ) In terms of case study 4 
Were the Dutch family right to lie? 
(NB: for Kantianism the means can never justify the 
ends, whereas for Utilitarianism the reverse is 
true) 
Use the space below to make notes and answer the questions: 
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C A S E S T U D Y 1 The man in the white suit 
C A S E STUDY 2 The sinking ship 
C A S E S T U D Y 3 T h e Schoo l teacher 
C A S E S T U D Y 4 Ann Frank 
(31) 
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Here are two examples of Sartre's particular form of Existentialist humanism, 
whereby because all the values and meanings are derived from one's own 
choices, so too is the responsibility for making those choices: 
(a) Waiter in the cafe 
Let us consider the waiter in the cafe. His movement is quick and forward, a little too 
precise, a little too rapid. He comes towards the patrons with a step too quick. He 
bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too 
solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally, there he returns, trying to imitate in his 
walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the 
recklessness of a tight-rope walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, perpetually 
broken equilibrium which he perpetually reestablishes by a light movement of the arm . 
and hand. All his behaviour seems to us a game. He applies himself to chaining his 
movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other, his gesture 
and even his voice seem to be mechanisms; he gives himself the quickness and 
pitiless rapidity of things. He is playing, he is amusing himself. But what is he 
playing?...he is playing at being a waiter in a cafe. There is nothing there to surprise 
us. The game is a kind of marking out and investigation (Sartre, 1971:59). 
Q u e s t i o n s : To what extent is this a description of a person playing a game? and 
to what extent is it an accurate description of a waiter doing his job? 
(b) Phi iosophy student 
I shall cite the case of one of my students who came to see me under the following 
circumstances: his father was on bad terms with his mother and, moreover, was 
inclined to be a collaborationist; his older brother had been killed in the German 
offensive of 1940, and the young man, with somewhat immature but generous 
feelings, wanted to avenge him. His mother lived alone with him.very much upset by 
the half treason of her husband and the death of her older son; the boy was her only 
consolation. 
The boy was faced with the choice of leaving for England and joining the Free French 
Forces - that is, leaving his mother behind - or remaining with his mother and helping 
her to carry on...As a result, he was faced with two very different kinds of action; one, 
concrete, immediate, but concerning only one individual; the other concerned an 
incomparably vaster group, a national collectivity, but for that very reason was 
dubious. And, at the same time, he was wavering between two kinds of ethics. On the 
one hand, an ethics of sympathy, of personal devotion; on the other, a broader 
ethics, but one whose efficacy was more dubious. He had to choose between the 
two (Cited in Navia & Kelly, 1980:490-91). 
Q u e s t i o n : Who or what could help him choose? (3 2) 
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In general, the practice of religion, Christianity in this context, involves many 
different language forms: prayers, parables, commandments, sacraments, sermons 
creeds, collective worship, etc. The frame of reference for Christianity as a 
language game, along with other language games, is a frame of reference which 
can only be properly arrived at from within its own religious discourse. And the fact 
that even within the scope of this particular language game there are still other 
distinct and overlapping language games operating does not alter this; as they 
belong to a wider language game of expressions of value, in the same way as 
biology, physics and chemistry belong to the language game of science. 
I detail below a selection of quite common religious forms of life which are 
indicative of a religious language game within a Christian context: 
A person crosses themself with the sign of the cross before a very critical 
experience; say a life-threatening operation, an important examination or the 
making of a really big decision. 
2. A mother places a garland on a statue of the Virgin Mary 
3. A repentant sinner confesses his sins to a priest 
4. A young widow prays for her dead husband, killed in a car accident (3 3) 
5. A church congregation pray to God for world peace 
A professor of theology asserts that rather than Charles Darwin being the 
definitive source for the explanation of our origins, God is and the true 
explanation lies in the book of Genesis (3 4). 
Questions: Are these activities testable hypotheses? 
If they are testable, what criteria would be used? 
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In the same vein Phillips (1993) offers some illuminating examples: 
If one man contradicts another, they can be said to share a common understanding, 
to be playing the same game. Consider the following examples: The man who says 
that the sun is 90 million miles away from the earth contradicts the man who says that 
the sun is only 20 million miles away from earth. The man who says that the profit from 
a business venture is £100,000 is contradicted by the man who says that the profit is 
£50,000. The man who says that there are unicorns contradicts the man who says 
there are no unicorns. In these examples the disputants participate in a common 
understanding. The disputants about the distance of the sun from the earth share a 
common understanding - namely, methods of calculation in astronomy. The 
disputants about the business profit share a common understanding - namely, 
business methods of calculating gain and loss. The disputants about the unicorn 
share a common understanding - namely, the methods of verifying the existence of 
various animals. The disputants differ about the facts but they are one in logic - that is, 
they appeal to the same criteria to settle the disagreement (p.61). 
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Notes and References 
An extensive literature search of both the International ERIC database (mainly UK, USA, New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada) and the WORLD catalogue on the internet has yielded 
masses of information and stacks of paper relating to ethics and morals in education. Various 
and multiple permutations of these key words and related words produced actually very little in 
terms of my specific query concerning (1) a moral vocabulary in education and ( 2) an ethical 
discourse framework in education. There were literally thousands of references for religious 
and moral education and even more concerning moral philosophy - some of which proved to 
be useful and sometimes even inspirational but by far the majority were simply to technical 
and specialist and abstract for my purpose (although once my hopes were really raised when 
I noticed a reference to values in education in relation to an American university, but only to be 
dashed when I discovered it to be an accountancy analysis of a new 'value for money' formula 
being tested!) 
1 list below a limited exemplar, numerically tabulated, of what the literature survey actually 
yielded, although 1 must stress this is the metaphorical tip of a metaphorical iceberg: 
150,320 Moral Philosophy 
97,790 Ethics 
3,508 Ethics & Education 
349 Language of Values 
106 Language of ethics 
From Moustakas, C. (1990) Heuristic Research (p.43), London, Sage. 
From Musil, R. (1979) Man Without Qualities, Volume 1 (p.299), London, Picador 
Specifically in the context of the UK there are few texts which go beyond the necessary 
preconditional critiquing stage and offer a theoretical model for moral discourse in education: 
hence this author's choice of the topic for Ed D theoretical research. 
See Raban, J.(1989) God, Man & Mrs Thatcher: A Critique of Mrs Thatcher's Address to the 
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in the Chatto Counter Blasts series , No. 1, 
London, Chatto & Windus. 
In addition to Fullan's (1994) model of change, a variety of different models of the change 
process inform this discussion . For further reference see the following pe rspec t i ves (a) 
B u s i n e s s : Moss Kanter (1983) The Change Masters and Martel (1988) Mastering Change-
the former is a text for senior managers with models and recipes on innovation and 
change implementation strategies for business, while the latter is a macro economic 157 
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analysis of cyclical and structural changes (mainly in the USA) and the implications for 
business, (b) S y s t e m s Thinking: Checkland (1991) Systems Thinking in Practice, is 
considered the definitive introduction to this form of modelling, (c) Science: Popper (1980) 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, contrasted with Kuhn (1970) The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, (d) Soc ia l Sc ience: Hegel (1978) Philosophy of Right, Marx (1977) The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Popper (1957) The Poverty of Historicism. ( e ) 
G e n e r a l : In terms of organizational analysis, Morgan (1984) Images of Organizations, in 
relation to qualitative change Woodcock and Davis (1978) Catastrophe Theory and a good 
general introduction to different modelling devices is Waddington (1977) Tools For Thought. 
Jn relation to the debate on the role of paradigms in scientific research see Lakatos, I. and 
Musgrave, E, A. (eds)(1970) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, London, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Magee, B. (1975), Popper, London, Fontana provides the definitive introduction to Popper's 
key ideas in epistemology, political and social philosophy. The book is a part of the 'Fontana 
Modern Masters' series and is eminently readable. 
9 Checkland, P. (1991) Systems Thinking Systems Practice, London, Wiley & Sons Ltd 
contains a very comprehensive chapter on the role of paradigms within the wider context of 
'systems theory'. 
1 0 Michael Polanyi occupies a unique and distinguished position within the debate on scientific 
method contrasted with method in the social sciences, as he was both an eminently 
successful scientist as well as an equally successful philosopher. He held the Chair of 
Physical Chemistry at Manchester from 1933 to 1946 during which time he established a 
world reputation in physical chemistry. In 1946 he turned to philosophy and until his death in 
1976 worked continuously in that field. He once remarked 'I believe that the doctrin e derived 
from our erroneous scientific world view have in our days shattered our culture, casting much 
of the world into mindless servitude, while afflicting the rest with confusion' (cited in 
Scott, 1996:3) 
In relation to philosophy, he wrote, '1 came into my true vocation in 1946 when I set out on the 
pursuit of a new philosophy to meet the needs of our age. My way of starting off with little or 
no schooling was wholly beneficial here. For a sound knowledge of philosophy makes the 
necessary radical advances extremely difficult. One must shoot here first and ask questions 
afterwards, as I have always done.' lbid:4). Shoot first and ask questions aftenwards - draw your 
conclusions and then find the reasoning to support them - these two half jesting remarks 
about his methods tell something important about Polanyi. According to Scott (1996) 'he did 
not start from formal reasoning leading to conclusions, but from a few conclusions to which his 
own experience led him inescapably' (p.4). 
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1 1 The 'product life cycle' is a key concept in marketing and includes four crucial stages in the 
development of a product from the introductory to the stage of rapid growth and then maturity 
to the stage where decline is identified. And corresponding to each stage in the cycle there is 
a need for different marketing approaches. A useful introduction to this concept is contained 
in Piercy, N. (1992) Market-Led Strategic Change, Oxford, Butterworth Heinemann Ltd. 
A very unusual adaptation of the concept is in De Mey, M (1992) The Cognitive Paradigm, 
Chicago, the University of Chicago Press. Here De Mey, a cognitive psychologist, undertakes 
an analysis of the change process in science by adapting the product life cycle concept to 
the changes in the social structure of science (see especially Chapter 9). 
1 2 The idea of competing discourse domains, although in principle it draws on the dynamic of the 
product life cycle model, it originated in my thinking during the taught part of the Ed D when 
pursuing the Policy Studies unit. Here, with hindsight, I was struck by the complete lack of 
any seriously articulated challenges to Thatcherism and the 1988 ERA; indeed, in the first 
instance it was not until after ERA that well formulated critiques began. Hence my thinking 
evolved in this way. 
1 3 In T h e Selfish Gene' Richard Dawkins describes human beings as possessing a dual system 
for transmitting information; genetics and culture. The latter he refers to as "memes". 
1 4 There is a long and enduring analytical tradition in the sciences and social sciences whereby 
subject and object are held apart in order to analyse the relationship between them. When 
this practice is extended to ethics the great bete noir for a discourse of moral values sets in; 
that is the infamous - in this case illusory - subject/object dichotomy, or to give it its 
philosophical name "the law of the excluded middle. 
In relation to Wittgenstein's notion of language games Finch (1996) offers an illuminating 
observation: 
Before we look we look into the question of what a language-game is, we should notice 
one fact of central importance, that the unit of meaning here already involves in one 
complex three factors of human beings, a world-setting, and language. So far as I Know, 
this Is the first tome ion Western thought when the starting point for thought was not, in 
however disguised a way, a subject and object (p.44). 
1 5 See Appendix for examples of language games drawn from across the Four Quadrants model 
1 6 See SHERRY, P (1977) Religious Truth and Language Games, London, Macmillan where a 
theologian defines religious understanding in terms of 'language games of ethics as highly 
complex and that they touch and overlap with other language games' (p,65). 
1 7 At a subliminal level we are influenced by an extraordinary range of knowledge and 
understanding, including cultural heritage, religious teachings, political ideology the formal 
and hidden curriculum, family values - this is the essence of the subliminal treasure chest of 
ethics. 
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1 8 It is of course important to distinguish between, on the one hand the "what" of change (the 
content) and, on the other hand the "how" of change" (the process). In the context of the 
latter, Fullan (1991) states: 
...we need to comprehend the dynamics of educational change as a socio-political 
process involving all kinds of individual, classroom, school, local, regional, and national 
factors at work in interactive ways (Fullan 1991 ;5). 
Fullan illustrates the multiple nature of his model of change by illustrating its implementation at 
the classroom level which he divides into three dimensions: 
(1) the possible use of new revised materials..(2) the possible use of new teaching 
approaches...and (3) the possible alteration of beliefs...My point is the logical one that 
change has to occur in practice along the three dimensions In order for it to have a chance 
of affecting the outcome (lbid:37). 
This lynch pin concept is central to Fullan's thesis of educational change along with his other 
central concept encapsulated in the phrase 'Ultimately the transformation of subjective 
realities is the essence of change' (p.36). Fullan's assertion that 'interaction is the primary 
basis for learning' (p.77 demonstrates powerfully and vividly the constant interplay of 
struggle to construe meaning against a backcloth of the divergent world of policymakers 
conflicting with practitioners. 
1 9 Fora fuller discussion see Novak, M (1991) The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism .London, lEA; 
or his more controversial essay: Eight Arguments about the Morality of the Marketplace, in a 
lEA (1993) pamphlet entitled. God and the Marketplace where he proposes "a theology of 
economics" and cites a Catholic - Pope John Paul's - endorsement of Capitalism along 
with a corresponding negation of Socialism. A more recent development of Novak's views is 
briefly stated in an lEA (1995) pamphlet entitled Awakening from Nihilism: Why Truth Matters 
which posits the practical principles of Novak's" threefold society: 
Free in Its polity, free in its economy, and free in the realm of conscience and inquiry. 
The great modern achievements in these matters have been supremely practical: 
How to make free institutions work at least tolerably well, and better in most ways than 
earlier regimes, (p. 16) 
He continues, most poignantly and persuasively, to describe the single, unifying key 
characteristic for a free society: 
Unless society deepens its moral culture it will die. As human lungs need air, so does 
liberty need virtue. As does this blue-green Planet Earth, so has liberty its own ecology. 
The deepest and most vital struggles of the 21 st century will be cultural arguments over 
sorts of habits we must teach our young? To allow liberty to sun/ive - and more than 
that, to make It all worth all the blood and tears expended to achieve it - how do we need to 
live (p. 21) 
2 0 Taken from Ibsens Samlede Verker: Henrik Ibsen Nutidsdramaer 1877-99 (Et Dukkethjem), 
Oslo.Gyldendal Norsk Forlag. Indeed in all of Ibsen's dramas, and especially the social dramas, 
the power of visible example, rather than characters' psyche, was critical. 
In Henrik Ibsen's great classical poet fantasy Pee Gynt written in 1867 there is a character 
known as the 'Onion Peeler' from whom Peer seeks inspiration in terms of his quest for his 
true self. The onion Peeler advises Peer that his quest is like the peeling of an onion, as with 
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2 0 every layer there is a feeling of reaching the kernel but, of course, eventually removing the 
layers results in being left with nothing. Thus the quest for discovering that essential kernel of 
self has a durable, albeit unsuccessful, pedigree. 
2 1 A.N.Whitehead had been a distinguished Mathematician who, with Bertrand Russell, wrote 
the influential Principia Mathematica (1903) which propounded a system of logic which 
uniquely generated mathematics, thereby reducing the latter to logic. And although Russell 
clung to the basic premises of the book. Whitehead abandoned it and begun a new career at 
Harvard as a Professor of Metaphysics. It is in this context, "the fallacy of misplaced concrete-
eness" was bom and flourished and what is interesting is that Whitehead completely 
rejected the scientific positivism of verifiable hard facts and chose instead to wrestle with 
metaphysical problems. Russell (1959) was at his dismissive best when describing his 
former colleague's conversion as "Obscure and difficult to read" (p.297). 
[Interestingly, Russell's mean spiritedness caused him to completely ignore mention of G.E. 
Moore, his influential fellow Professor of Philosophy, in all of his main writings] 
2 2 As a term in Christian theology, dogma refers to a doctrine claiming its authority over and 
beyond private opinion or hesitation in a believer's mind. Indeed it is held to be a religious 
truth established by divine revelation and in accordance with the factual underpinning of the 
Church and thus defined by the Church (Peschke, 1997). However, if the believer rejects it, 
he becomes to that extent a heretic. So in a sense the word means in accordance with the 
facts - the facts of the Church - and being dogmatic means, pejoratively, an opinion not in 
accordance with the facts and therefore unreasonably held. 
1 make these points because when I referred to 'allegiance to Christian dogma' (p. 129), I was 
not deliberately intending to be pejorative, but when I read the sentence later I was suddenly 
struck by the negative and pejorative connotations which were entirely unintentional. 
2 3 See Donagan, A. (1977) The Theory of Morality, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. This 
excellent book offers a view of a common morality based on 'double foundations: a theory of 
practical reason, and a theory of the nature of rational agents' (p.xx). Donagan is a 
distinguished theologian and as such the perspective - which permeates and sometimes 
dominates the analysis- is Christian. 
2 4 Moral rules can be regarded as largely public and specific. By contrast, moral ideals can be 
regarded as rather more personal and general and an intrinsic, subliminal part of one's private 
moral repertoire [see note 17 above). 
In the context of moral rules, then, everyone is required to obey them unless they have 
some justification for not doing so; whereas in the context of moral ideals the predis-
position to act is very much with the individual. Gert (1992) offers a useful definition: 
Neglect of the distinction between moral rules and moral ideals, together with the view that 
morality requires impartiality, leads some to make bizarre claims about what morality 
requires, e.g., claiming that when two people's lives are in danger, my wife's and some 
strangers, morality requires me to regard them impartially in deciding whom to rescue. 
Distinguishing between moral rules and moral ideals explains why accepting that one is not 
morally allowed to kill a stranger in order to save one's wife does not require accepting that 
one is not morally allowed to choose to rescue one's wife rather than a stranger (p.439). 
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2 5 It is interesting to note that primitive cultures, such as the Aborigines or Maories, access their 
concept of conscience by a process known as "vision quest" - the self in search of self, to 
gain psychological or religious insight (a person would wander alone into the wilderness, 
searching for a sign o r vision that would reveal some truth). The parallel to be drawn here 
is that the modern mind equally needs to engage in similar experiential probing, although in 
this context the 'wandering into the wilderness' will be usually in terms of moral reflection. 
1 came across this fascinating concept during my literature search of 'ethics in education' and 
related topics via the International Eric database. The Eric reference is: 
Eric No. ED275917 
Author: Suler John, R. 
Date: August 22 - 26, 1986 
Status: Research Paper 
Audience: Annual Convention, 
American Psychological Association 
Washington DC 
2 6 Pirsig's (1980) wonderful moral odyssey 'Zen and the Art of Motor Cycle Maintenance', 
London, Corgi goes to the very heart of many of the issues 1 have been discussing. Pirsig 
states his moral revolution as follows: 
I think that if we are going to reform the worid, and make it a better place to live in, 
the way to do it is not to talk about relationships of a political nature, which are 
inevitable, dualistic, full of subjects and objects and their relationship to one 
another, or with programs full of things for other people to do. I think the kind of 
approach starts it at the end and presumes the end is the beginning. Programs of 
a political nature are important end products of social quality that can be effective 
only if the underlying structure of social values is right. The social values are right 
only if the individual values are right. The place to improve the worid is first in 
one's own heart and head and hands and then work outward from there. Other 
people can talk about how to expand the destiny of mankind. I just want to talk 
about how to fix a motorcycle. I think what I have to say has more lasting value 
(p.291 ]. 
2 7 See Bengston, K.J. (1991 Poetic Rigor for a tough minded psychology in Qualitative 
Studies in Education, Vol 4, pp 341-359 . 
2 8 From an unpublished anthology of poetry: Collins, M.P. (1987) 'Inside Looking Out: The 
Poetry of Philosophy or the Philosophy of Poetry?'. 
2 9 The notions of 'surface grammar' and 'depth grammar' at one level of understanding concern 
untangling syntax, punctuation and semantic properties that claim our attention; and yet at 
another deeper level are about unravelling meaning from within a myriad of conflicting 
assertions all competing for our engagement and immersion. 
3 0 I am grateful to Professor Frank Coffield for bringing this case study to my attention. It was 
used at a conference consisting of specialist teachers of SEN and psychologists. As a matter 
of interest, I am told that about otie third of these professionals voted to spend more time 
with Susan! 
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3 1 The examples presented between pages 142 and 145 of the Appendix are taken from the 
following publication: Collins, M.P. (1996) The Existentialist Ethic in Psychology, published in 
the Proceedings of the 14th ATP Conference (pp.29-38), ATP, Leicester 
3 2 Here Sartre's own answer to the dilemma is defined inexthcably in terms of 'an ethic of 
action' (p.491): 
Who could help him choose? Christian doctrine? No. Christian doctrine says, "Be 
charitable, love your neighbour, take the more rugged path, etc., etc." But which is the 
more rugged path? Whom should he love as a brother? The fighting man or his mother? 
Which does the greater good, the vague act of fighting in a group, or the concrete one of 
helping a particular human being to go on living? Who can decide a priori ? Nobody. No 
book of ethics can tell him. The Kantian ethics says, "Never treat any person as a means, 
but as an end." Very well, if I stay with my mother, I'll treat you as an end as not as a 
means; but by virtue of this very fact I am running the risk of treating the people around me 
who are fighting, as means; and, conversely, if I go to join those who are fighting, I'll be 
treating them as an end, and, by doing that, I run the risk of treating my mother as a means 
(pp.490-491). 
3 3 With regard to the power of prayer the John Templeton Foundation, a United States 
charitable organisation devoted to promoting progress in religion , is about to fund a prayer 
experiment. Professor Stannard of the Open University describes it as follows: 
Patients about to undergo coronary artery bypass graft surgery at three big US hospitals 
will be divided into groups. One group of 600 will be prayed for by teams from religious 
groups. Another 600 wHl not be prayed for. Their case histories will be followed for over 
two years to see if there are any differences in the groups as regards the rate and degree 
of recovery. 
The project has been designed as a rigorously controlled scientific experiment. All 
patients will be told that they might or might not be prayed for, but no one will know to 
which group her or she has been assigned. Neither will the medical staff have access to 
this information (p. 19). 
Fortunately, Professor Stannard lives in the real world: 
Do we really want some Treasury official to use a positive result to close down hospital 
wards - because vicars can be hired to pray more cheaply? It would not altogether be 
surprising If God, In his wisdom, decided to frustrate the best efforts of the investigators -
for our own good. WE should recall in the Bible: 'Thou shalt not put the Lord thy God to the 
test" (p. 19) 
3 4 A review article by Fred Hoyle,'Search for a Universal Prologue', THES (p.19),14 March 1997, 
casts an interesting light on the current debate regarding 'big-bang cosmology', Hoyle's point 
is that in big-bang cosmology we do not start from a known position but conjecture a n 
entirely theoretical position and assume that the theory is correct: 
Standard scientific procedure starts from a known state of affairs whose reality is 
guaranteed by observation. Theories are then used to argue fonwards in time to a 
conclusion which can be tested by obsen/ation. The initial position is entirely conjectural. 
And it is logically not possible to use present-day observations to test the theory and to 
infer what the initial situation must have been 
What is done, therefore, is to assume that the theory is correct. The aim then becomes to 
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infer by backwards logic how thing must have been in the past, especially how things were 
in the early moments of the universe. Instead of this being a proof of the theory, it Is a 
protestation of faith. In effect, the theory becomes a religious doctrine. 
In other words, the 'big-bang' theory is the sort of theory, I described on page 57 of this text 
where "the explanation is a sort of "best-fit" approach whereby the most adequate 
description of the pattern of the data examined combines and coheres in favour of the 
model presented. In these terms a theory can be defined as: 
A scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group 
of facts or phenomena...which consists in the knowledge or statement of the facts on 
which it depends, or of its principles or methods as distinct from the practice of it (Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary, 1987, Vol 2, p.1281). 
And, in the light of Hoyle's assertions, the process of argument has not, therefore, always 
been a chain of demonstrative reasoning, but rather frequently it has been a case of 
presenting and representing those features which severally cooperate in favour of a 
conclusion and its emergent theory. 
165 
Bibliography 
ABRAMS, M.H. (1981) A Glossary of Literary Terms, New York, Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston 
ALMOND, B. (Ed) (1995), Introducing Applied Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell 
ARMSTRONG, D. A. (1993) Conflicting Perspectives on the Assessment of 
Emotional and Behavioural Difficulties: Children, Parents and Professionals, 
a thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D., Lancaster University 
APPLE, M. (1982) Education and Power, London, Ark 
AQUINAS, St, T. (1988) On Politics and Ethics, New York, Norton & Company 
ARTHUR, J. (1994) The Ambiguities of Catholic Schooling, Westminster Studies of 
Education, Vol. 17 
ARTHUR, J. (1995) The Ebbing Tide: Policy and Principles of Catholic Education, 
Leominster, Gracewing Fowler Wright Books 
AYER, A. J. (1990) Language, Truth and Logic, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
BAIER, K. (1995) The Rational and Moral Order, Illinois, Open Court Publishing Co. 
BALL, S. J. (1987) The Micro-Politics of the School, London, Methuen 
BALL, S.J, (1995) Education Reform, Buckingham, OU Press. 
BARRET, C. (1991) Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Beliefs, Oxford, Blackwell 
BARNSLEY, J.H. (1972) The Social Reality of Ethics, London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul 
BAUMAN, Z. (1994) Postmodern Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell 
BELL, J. and HARRISON, B.T. (Eds) (1995) Vision and Values in Managing 
Education, London, DAVID Fulton 
BENGSTON, J.K. (1991) Poetic Rigor for a tough minded psychology in Qualitative 
Studies in Education, Vol 4, pp 341-359 
BERDANI, G. (1989) Vico Revisited, Oxford, Berg Publishers 
166 
BERGER, P. and LUCKMAN, T. (1987) The Social Construction of Reality, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin 
BERLIN, I. (1988) Four Essays on Liberty, New York, Oxford University Press 
BERNSTEIN, B. (1993) The Structure of Pedagogic Discourse, Vol. 4, Class Codes 
and Control, London, Routledge 
BILLINGTON, R. (1993) Living Philosophy: An Introduction to Moral Thought, 
London, Routledge 
BJORNEBOE, J. (1977) Frihetens Oyebllkk, Gylendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 
BLOOM, A. (1987) The Closing of the American Mind, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
BLY, R. (1991) Iron John, Dorset, Elements Books 
BOHMAN, J. (1994) New Philosophy of Social Science, Cambridge, Polity Press 
BOTTERY, M. (1990) The Morality of the School, London, Cassell 
BOTTERY, M. (1992) The Ethics of Educational Management, London, Cassell 
BOWLES, S. and GINTIS, H. (1976) Schooling in Capitalist America, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul 
BRAITHWAITE, R. (1994) Theory of games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher: an 
Inaugural Lecture delivered in Cambridge on 2 Dec. 1954, Bristol, 
Thoemmes Press 
BREZINKA, W. (1994) Belief, Morals and Education, Aldershot, Avebury Books 
BROUGHTON, J. M. (1985) The Genesis of Moral Domination in Lawrence 
Kohlberg; Consensus and Controversy, Mudgil. S . & Mudgil, C. (eds), 
London, Falmer Press 
BRUNER, J. S. (1966) Toward a Theory of Instruction, Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press 
BRUNER, J.S. (1986) Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press 
BRUNER, J. S. (1990) Acts of Meaning, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press 
BUNYAN, J. (1987) The Pilgrims Progress, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
167 
BURGESS, R.G. (Ed) (1993) The Research Process in Educational Settings, 
London, Falmer Press 
CAREY, J. (1992) The Intellectuals and the Masses, London, Faber and Faber 
CARR. W. (1995) Education and Democracy: confronting the postmodernist 
challenge. Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol 29, No. 1, pp.75-91 
CARR, W. and KEMMIS, S. (1986) Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge and 
Action Research, London, The Falmer press. 
CASSIRER, E. (1959) Language and Myth, New York, Dover 
CATHOLIC BISHOP'S (1996) The Common Good and the Catholic Church's 
Social Teaching, London, The Catholic Bishop's Conference of England 
and Wales 
CATHOLIC CHURCH (1994) Catechism of The Catholic Church, Dublin, Veritas 
CHECKLAND, P. (1991) Systems Thinking Systems Practice, Chichester, John 
Wiley & Sons 
CIRLOT, J. E. (1981) A Dictionary of Symbols, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul 
COHEN, L. and MANION, L. Research Methods in Education, London, Routledge 
COLLINS, M.P. (1996) The Existentialist Ethic in Psychology, published in the 
Proceedings of the 14th ATP Conference (pp.29-38), ATP, Leicester 
COLLINS, M.P. (1996) A Subliminal Treasure Chest, an unpublished paper from a 
"Whose Values?" - Third Annual Conference on ^Education, Spirituality and 
the Whole Child', 28th and 29th June 1996 at the Roehampton Institute 
London 
COLLINS, M P. (1997) Inside Looking Out: The Poetry of Philosophy or the 
Philosophy of Poetry (an unpublished anthology of poetry) 
COLLINSON, D. (1994) Fifty Major Philosopher: A Reference Guide, London, 
Routledge 
COMMISSION ON SOCIAL JUSTICE (1994) Social Justice: Strategies for 
Renewal, London, Vintage 
COOPER, D. E. (1980) Illusions of Equality, London, Routledge and Kegan 
COOPER, D.E. (1995) Existentialism, Oxford, Blackwell 
1 6 8 
COOPER, H. (1989) Integrating Research, London, Sage 
COOPER, N. (1973) Language, Purpose and Morality in Pliilosophical Quarterly, 
Vol 23, NO 92 
CUPITT, D. (1994) After All, London, SCM Press Ltd 
CUPITT, D. (1995) The Last Philosophy, London SCM Press Ltd 
DAVIES, J. (1993) God and the Market Place, London, lEA 
DAWKINS, R. (1989) The Selfish Gene, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
DAWKINS, R (1991) The Blind Watchmaker, London Penguin 
DELEUZE, G. and GUATTARl, F. (1977) Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, New York, Viking Press 
DELEUZE, G. and GUATTARl, F. (1994) What is Philosophy, London, Verso 
DEMEY, M. (1992) The Cognitive Paradigm, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
DEWEY, J. (1966) Democracy and Education, New York Putman Publishing 
DIDEROT, D (1966) Ramueau's Nephew, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
DONAGAN, A. (1977) The Theory of Morality, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
DUNS-SCOTUS, J. (1987) Philosophical Writings, Indianapolis, Hacket 
DURANCE, G.M. (1995) Value Changes in Adolescents: School Effectiveness in 
the Affective Domain, PhD Thesis, University of Durham 
DURKHEIM. E. (1952) Suicide, London, Kegan & Paul 
DURKHEIM, E. (1977) Selected Writings, Giddons, A. (Ed), Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
DYKSTRA, C. (1980) Vision and Character: A Christian Education Alternative to 
Lawrence Kohlberg, Ramsey, New Jersey, Paulist Press 
EDUCATION GROUP (CCCS) (1991) Education Limited: Schooling and Training 
and the New Right Since 1979, London, Unwin Hyman 
EISNER, E. (1993) The Enlightened Eye, New York, Macmillan and Company 
ELLIOT, T. S. (1989) Four Quartets, London, Faber and Faber 
1 6 9 
ELIOT, T. S. (1990) The Wasteland, London, Faber and Faber 
ETZIONI, A. (1994) The Parenting Deficit, London, lEA 
FANN, K.T. (1969) Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell 
FEYERABEND, P. (1979) Against Method, London, Verso. 
FINE, G.A. and DEEGAN, J.G. (1996) Three Principles of Serendip: insight, chance, 
and discovery in qualitative research in the journal of Qualitative Studies, 
Vol 9, No 4, pp 434-447 
FLEW, A.G.N. (1970) Evolutionary Ethics, London Macmillan and Co Ltd 
FOOT. P. (Ed) (1990) Theories of Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
FOUCAULT, M. (1972), The Archeology of Knowledge, New York, Harper and Row 
FOWLER, H.W. (1991) A Dictionary of Modern English Usage (revised by Sir 
Ernest Gowers and Vol 3 of The Oxford Library Of English Usage), London, 
Guild Publish 
FULLAN, M. G. (1991) The New Meaning of Educational Change, London, Cassell 
FURROW, D (1995) Against Theory: Continental and Analytical Challenges to 
Moral Philosophy, London, Routledge 
GELLNER, E. (1982) Words and Things, Blackwell, Oxford 
GENOVA, G. (1995) Wittgenstein: A way of Seeing, Routledge, London 
GERT, B (1992) Moral Rules, in Becker, C & Becker B [Eds] (1992) Encyclopaedia 
of Ethics, pp. 859-863, Garland Publishing Inc., New York 
GIDDENS, A.(1978) Durkheim, London, Fontana 
GIDDENS, A. (1994) Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics, 
Cambridge, Polity Press 
GIROUX, H.A. (1994) Educational Leadership and School Administration: 
Rethinking the Meaning of Democratic Public Culture, in Democratic 
Leadership: The Changing Context of Democratic Preparation, New Jersey, 
Ablex Publishing Company 
GLASER, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory; 
Strategies for Qualitative Research, New York, Aldine 
1 7 0 
GOLDBERG, S.L. (1993) Agents and Lives, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press 
GOLOMB, J. (1995) In Search of Authenticity: from Kirkegaard to Camus, London, 
Routledge 
GRACE, G. (1994) Education is a Public Good: on the need to Resist the 
Domination of Economic Science, in BRIDGES, D. and McLaughlin, T. H. 
(Eds) Education and the Market Place, London, Falmer 
GRACE, G. (1995) School Leadership: Beyond Education Management:- An Essay 
in Policy Scholarship, London, Falmer 
GRENZ, S.J. (1996) A Primary on Postmodernism, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company 
GRAY, J. (1993) Beyond the New Right: Markets, Government and the Common 
Environment, London, Routledge 
GUIGNON, C. (1995) Authenticity, Moral Values, Psychotherapy in Guignon, C. 
(Ed) Heidegger, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
HACKETT, P. (1988) Presidential Address: Aesthetics as a Dimension for Com-
parative Study, Comparative Education Review, Vol 32, No.4, pp. 389-399 
HALPIN, D. and T R O Y N A , B . (1994) Researching Education Policy: Ethical and 
Methodological Issues, London, The Falmer Press. 
HALSEY. A.H. et al (1980) Origins and Destinations: Family, Class and Education 
in Modern Britain, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
HALSEY, A.H. (1986) Change in British Society, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
HAMMERSLEY, M. (Ed) (1993) Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice, 
London, Sage 
HARGREAVES, D. (1994) The Mosaic of Learning; Schools and Teachers for the 
Next Century, London, Demos. 
HEGEL, G.W.F (1978) The Philosophy of Right, London, Oxford University Press 
HEIDEGGER, M. (1995) Being and Time, Oxford, Blackwell 
HEIDEGGER, M. (1966) Discourse on Thinking, New York, Hayes and Row 
HEKMAN, S. J. (1995) Moral Voices Moral Selves, Cambridge, Polity Press 
1 7 1 
HILL, B. V. (1975) Education and the Endangered Individual, New York, Teachers 
College Press 
HOBSON, A. and JENKINS. N (1994() Modern Humanism: Living Without Religion, 
London, Adelphi Press 
HODGE, H. (1995) Heidegger and Ethics, London, Routledge 
HODGKINSON, C. (1983) The Philosophy of Leadership, Oxford, Blackwell 
HODGKINSON, C. (1991) Educational Leadership:The Moral Art, Albany, State 
University of New York 
HOLMES, A.F. (1984) Ethics: Approaches to Moral Decisions, Illinois. I. V. Press 
HONDERICH, T. (Ed) (1995) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 
HOUSE OF LORDS (1996) Society's Moral & Spiritual Well-being, London, HMSO 
HOYLE, F. (1997) Search for a Universal Prologue, in the Times Higher 
Educational Supplement (p. 16), 14th March 
HUGHES, J. (1993) Tha Philosophy of Social Research London, Longman 
HUSSERL, E. (1965) Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, New York, 
Harper & Row 
HUSSERL, E. (1970) Logical Investigations (Vols.1 & 2), N. York, Humanities Press 
IBSEN, H. (1978) Nutidsdramer 1877-99, Oslo, Gyldendal Norsk Forlag 
JONATHEN, R. (1995) Education and Moral Development: the role of reason and 
circumstances, in Journal of Philosophy of Education,Vol. 29 no. 23 
KANT, I. (1991) Critique of Pure Reason, London, Everyman 
KANT, I. (1991) The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral, London, Routledge 
KAZANTZAKIS, N. (1960) The Saviours of God: Spiritual Exercises, New York, 
Simon and Schuster Inc. 
KELLY, K.T. (1996) New Directions in Moral Theology: The Challenge of Being 
Human, London, Geoffrey Chapman 
KIRKEGAARD, S. (1989) The Sickness Unto Death, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
1 7 2 
KIRKEGAARD, S. (1993) Either/Or: A Fragment of Life, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
KOHLBERG, L. (1981) The Philosophy of Moral Education, New York, Harper and 
Row 
KOESTLER, A. (1967) The Ghost in the Machine, London, Hutchinson 
KUHN, T. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press 
LAKATOS, I. and MUSGRAVE, A. (eds) (1970) Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge, London, Cambridge University Press 
LANG, B. (1991) Writing and the Moral Self, London Routledge 
LEVY, P. (1989) Moore, London, Papermac 
LINCOLN, Y.S. and GUBA, E. G. (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry , London Sage 
LONG, E.T. (1985) Existence, Being and God, New York, Paragon House 
LYOTARD, J.F. (1984) The Postmodern Condition, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press 
LYOTARD, J. F. (1988) The Differend: Phases in Dispute, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press 
MACDIARMID, H. (1972) The Hugh MacDiarmid Anthology, London, Routledge 
MACHIAVELLI, N. (1979) The Prince, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
MACINTYRE, A. (1967) A Short History of Ethics, London, Routledge 
MACINTYRE, A. (1985) The Idea of an Educated Public, in Education and 
Values:The Richard Peters Lectures, London, Institute of Education 
MACINTYRE, A. (1994) After Virtue: a study in moral theory, London, Duckworth 
MACNIVEN, D. (1993) Creative Morality, London, Routledge 
MAGEE, B. (1975) Popper, London, Fontana 
MALCOLM, N. (1993) Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?, London, Routledge 
MARCUSE, M. (1991) One-Dimensional Man, London, Routledge 
1 7 3 
MARTEL, L . (1988) Mastering Change, London, Grafton Books 
MARX, K. (1977) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Moscow, Progress 
Publishers 
MATUSTIK, M.J and WESTPHAL, M. (eds) (1995) Kirkegaard in Post/Modernity, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press 
MAY. L, FRIEDMAN, M. and CLARK, A. (Eds) (1994) Mind and Morals: Essays on 
Cognitive Science, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT press 
MAYKUT, P. and MOREHOUSE, R. (1994) Beginning Qualitative Research: A 
philosophical and Practical Guide, London, The Falmer Press. 
MEAD, G.H. (1952) Mind, Self and Society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
MERLEAU-PONTY, M. (1964) The Primacy of Perception, Evanston, Northwestern 
University Press 
MERQUIOR, J.G. (1985) Foucault, London, Fontana 
MILES, M.B. and HUBERMAN, A.M. (1984) Qualitative Data Analysis: A Source-
book of New Methods, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications. 
MILL, J.S (1967) On Liberty, Hammondsworth, Penguin 
MILL, J.S. (1968) Utilitarianism, London, Fontana 
MONK, R (1991) Wittgenstein: the Duty of Genius, London, Vintage Books 
MORGAN, G. (Ed) (1983) Beyond Method: Strategies for Social Research, Beverly 
Hills, Sage Publication 
MORGAN, G. (1985) Images of Organisation, London, Sage 
MOORE, G, (1993) Principia Ethica, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
MOORE, F.C.T. (1978) The Psychological Basis of Morality: An Essay on Value and 
Desire, London, Macmillan Press Ltd 
MORE, T. (1975) Utopia, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
MORGAN, G. (1986) Images of Organizations, London, Sage 
MOSS KANTER, R. (1988) The Change Masters, London, Unwin 
1 7 4 
MOUSTAKAS, C. (1990) Heuristic Research: Design, Methodology and 
Applications, London, Sage 
MOUSTAKAS, C. (1994) Phenomenological Research Methods, London, Sage 
MOWRY, B. J. (1992) A reflective Approach to Research: Applying the Research 
Paradigm of Post-Positivism to the Evangelical Church, in Christian 
Education Journal Volume xxii. Number 2, pp.51-67 
MUNZ, P. (1985) Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge: Popper or 
Wittgenstein?, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul 
MURDOCH, I. (1956) Vision and Choice in Morality in Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 30 (pp 32-58) 
MURDOCH, I. (1985) The Sovereignty of the Good, London, Routledge 
MURDOCH, I. (1992) Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, London, Chatto & Windus 
MURDOCH, I. (1997) Existentialists and Mystics, London, Chatto & Windus 
MUSIL, R. (1979) The Man Without Qualities, Vol 1, London, Picador 
MUSIL, R. (1988) The Man Without Qualities, Vol 2, London, Picador 
MUSIL, R. (1988) The Man Without Qualities, Vol 3, London, Picador 
NATASON. M. (1970) Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of 
Alfred Schultz, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 
NAGEL, T. (1986)The View From Nowhere, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
NAVIA, L. E. and KELLY, E. (1980) Ethics and the Search for Values, New York, 
Prometheus Books 
NIELSEN, K. (1987) The functions of Moral Discourse in Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol 31, No 27 
NIETZSCHE, F. (1956) The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals, New 
York, Doubleday 
NIETZSCHE, F. (1990) Beyond Good and Evil. Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
NIETZSCHE, F, (1991) Ecco Homo, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
NORMAN, R. (1983) The Moral Philosophers, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1 7 5 
NOVAK, M. (1991) The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, London, IE A 
NOVAK, M. (1995) Awakening from Nihilism: Why Truth Matters, London, lEA 
NUSSBAUM, M (1986) The Fragility of Goodness, New York, Cambridge 
University Press 
NUSSBAUM,N (1992) Virtue Revived in Times Literary Supplement, 3 July (pp.9-ii) 
O'CONNELL, J.P. [Ed] (1959) A Practical Dictionary of Biblical Information in The 
Holy Bible' (Old Testament in the Douay-Challoner text and New Testament 
and Psalms in the Confraternity text), London, Virtue and Company Limited 
O'CONNOR, P.J. (1996) To Love the Good, New York, Peter Lang 
ONIONS, C. T. (Ed) (1987) The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vols 1 And 2, 
London, Guild Publishing 
ORWELL, G. (1970) Collected Essays, London, Seeker and Warburg 
PATON, M.Q. (1980) Qualitative Evaluation Methods, Beverly Hills, Sage 
PESCHKE, K. H. (1993) Christian Ethics: Moral Theology in the Light of the 
Vatican 11, Volumes 1 and 2, Alcester, Warwicks, C. Goodliffe Neale Ltd 
PETERS, R. S. (1970) Ethics and Education, London, George Allen & Unwin 
PETROV, I. (1975) Before 1 Was Born, Bulgaria, Sofia Press 
PEURSEN, C.V. (1969) Ludwig Wittgenstein, London, Faber and Faber 
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1993) Wittgenstein and Religion, London, Macmillan 
PIERCY, N. (1992) Market-Led Strategic Change, Oxford, Buttenworh Heinemann 
POLYANI, M. (1967) The Tacit Dimension, Chicago , The University of Chicago 
POPPER, K.R. (1976) An Intellectual Biography: Unended Quest, London, Fontana. 
POPPER, K.R. (1977) The Logic Of Scientific Discovery, London, Routledge. 
POPPER, K.R. (1979) The Poverty of fiistoricism, London, Routledge 
POPPER, K.R. (1979) Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
1 7 6 
POPPER, K. R. (1980) The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 1 and 2, London, 
Routledge 
POPPER, K. R. (1992) In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty 
Years, London, Routledge 
PIRSIG, R. (1976) Zen and the Art of Motor Cycle Maintenance, London, Corgi 
PIRSIG, R. (1991) Lila: An Inquiry into Morals, London, Bantam Press 
PRING, R. A. (1995 a) Closing The Gap: Liberal Education and Vocational Pre-
paration, London, Hodder and Stoughton 
PRING, R. A. (1995 b) The Community of Educated People, British Journal of Edu-
cational Studies, Vol 43, No. 3, June 1995, pp 125-145. 
PUTMAN, H. (1979) Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London, Routledge & Paul 
RABAN, J., (1989) God, Man & Mrs Thatcher: A critique of Mrs Thatcher's Address to 
the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (in the Chatto Counter Blast 
series. Number 1), London Chatto & Windus 
RAWLS, J. (1986) A Theory of Justice, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
REE. J. (1974) Descartes, London, Allen Lane 
RICOUR, P (1990) The Role of Metaphor, London, Routledge and Kegan 
RORTY, R. (1991 a) Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Philosophical Papers, Vol 1, 
Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press 
RORTY, J. (1991 b) Essays on Heidegger and Others, Philosophical Papers Vol 2, 
Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press 
RORTY. J. (1994) Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge and New York, 
Cambridge University Press 
RUDD, A (1997) Kirkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical, Oxford, Clarendon Press 
RUDESTAM, E.K. and NEWTON, R.R. (1992) Surviving Your Dissertation, London, 
Sage 
RUE, L (1994) By the Grace of Guile, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
RUSSELL, B. (1987) Wisdom of the West, London, Bloomsbury Books 
1 7 7 
SARTRE, J. P. (1971) Being and Nothingness, N.Y. , Philosophical Library Press 
SARTRE, J. P. (1975) Existentialism and Humanism, London, Methuen 
SCAA (1944) Religious Education: Model Syllabus, London SCAA 
SCAA (1996) Spiritual and Moral Development, London, SCAA 
SCAA (1996) National Forum for Values in Education and the Community: 
Consultation Document, London, SCAA 
SCHULTZ, A. (1965) A Phenomenology of the Social World, Evanston Illinois, 
Northwestern University Press 
SEARLE, J. (1987) Language Games and Religion in Philips, D.Z. (1993) 
Wittgenstein and Religion, London, Macmillan, pp.22-32 
SEARLE, J. (1996) The Construction of Social Reality, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
SERGIORANNI, T. (1992) Moral Leadership, San Fransisco, Sanney-Bras 
SHERRY, P (1977) Religious Truth and Language Games, London, Macmillan 
SKEEN, I. (1980) Whose Christian Values? in New Zealand Journal of Educational 
Studies, Vol 15, pp 15-23. 
SPINOZA, B. (1989) Ethics (ed Parkinson, G.H.R.), London, Routledge and Kegan 
STANNARD, R. (1997) Heart-Felt Prayers, in Times Higher Educational 
Supplement ( p.19), April 25 
STARRATT, R. J. (1994) Building an Ethical School, London, Falmer 
STEINER, G. (1978) "The Distribution of Discourse" in On Difficulty and Other 
Essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
STEIR, F. (1991) Reflexivity and Methodology: An Ecological Constructionism in 
Steir, F (Ed) Research and Reflexivity, London, Sage 
SOLSTAD, D. (1978) 25. september-plassen, H, Aschehoug & Co, Oslo 
StRAUSS, A.L. (1987) Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists,New York, 
Cambridge University Press 
TOMLINSON, J. (1993) The Control of Education, London, Cassell 
1 7 8 
TOMLINSON, J. (1995) Teachers and Values, British Journal of Educational 
Studies, vol. 43, No. 3, September, pp 305-317 
TOWLEY, T. (Ed) (1990) The History of Christianity, Oxford, Lion Publishing 
TURABIAN, K.L (1987) A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and 
Dissertations (fifth edition), Chicago, The University of Chicago Press 
TRUEBA, H.T. and ZOU, Y.(1994) Power in Education: The Case of Miao University 
Students and its Significance for American Culture, London, Falmer Press 
U.C.E.T. (1997) List of Moral Principles is not 11 Commandments in Times 
Education Supplement, 16 May 1997(p.i2) 
VARDY, P and Grosch, P (1994) The Puzzle of Ethics, Glasgow, Fount Paperbacks 
VELECKY, L. (1994) Aquinas' Five Arguments in the Summa Theologiae la 2, 3, 
The Netherlands, Kok Pharos Publishing House 
VINE, I. (1996) The Measure of Morality - rethinking moral reasoning in Journal of 
Moral Education, Vol 25 No. 4, December 1996 (pp.455-466) 
VOLTAIRE (1989) Candide, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
WADDINGTON, C.H. (1977) Tools for Thought, St Albans, Paladin 
WALSH, P. (1993) Education & Meaning: Philosophy in Practice, London, Cassell 
WEBER, M. (1977) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London 
WHITEHEAD, A.N. (1974) Religion in the Making, New York, Hayes and Rodd 
WHITE, J. (1990) Education and the Good Life, London, Kogan Page 
WHITE, P. (1983) Beyond Domination, London, Routledge Kegan & Paul 
WILLIAMS, B. (1976) Morality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
WILLIAMS, B. (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London, Routledge 
WITTGENSTEIN, L (1965) A Lecture on Ethics (from 1929) in Philosophical 
Review, Number 74, pp 3 - 26 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1988) Tractatus Logicus-Philosophicus, London, Routledge 
1 7 9 
WITTGENSTEIN (1990) Philosophical Remarks, Oxford, Blackwell 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1993) Philosophical Grammar, Oxford, Blackwell 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1994 a) Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Blackwell 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1994 b) Culture and Value, Oxford, Blackwell 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1994 c) On Certainty, Oxford, Blackwell 
WOGT, W. P. (1997) Tolerance and Education, London, Sage 
WOODCOCK, A. and DAVIS, D. (1978) Catastrophe Theory, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin 
WRIGHT, R. (1995) The Moral Animal, London, Little Brown and Company (UK) 
